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The diamond mining industry has until recently been the main industry and employer in the 
Namaqualand coastal region of South Africa. The largest and most powerful of the diamond mining 
companies, De Beers, followed by Alexkor, a state-owned mining company, have between them 
established a number of company towns to accommodate their large labour forces, and established 
extensive security systems along the coast to protect their diamond mining rights, including 
extensive barbed wire fencing and security check points. 
 Colonial and Apartheid regimes confined non-white inhabitants of Namaqualand to ‘Coloured Rural 
Reserves’, enabling the further consolidation of mining interests, and providing convenient labour 
reserves. Moreover, the centrality of the mineral extraction industry to South Africa’s industrial 
development throughout the twentieth century, led to minimal governmental regulation on 
companies to rehabilitate landscapes degraded by mining, or to respect the rights of local 
communities to customary land-based livelihoods. 
Now that the large companies operating diamond mines along the Namaqualand coast have ‘down-
scaled’ their operations, shifting core mining activities offshore, other economic ‘sectors’ are being 
promoted as alternatives to the mineral extraction industry. A combination of conservation areas, 
commercial fishing, mariculture and energy generation are among current proposals to ‘develop’ the 
region, with the potential to effect a ‘coastal access revolution’ that will open up the coast for 
livelihood opportunities for people previously excluded or disenfranchised by the pre-1994 
dispensation. 
This study assesses the social and environmental legacy that is currently being left in the wake of 
diamond mining along the north west coast of South Africa as a result of almost century of diamond 
mining. This involves an inquiry into the political, economic and ideological forces that enabled the 
establishment of the extractive industry, and a critical assessment of the role the industry has come 
to play in the region.  
The study then explores how the obligations of neoliberalising mining companies to the people and 
natural environment of Namaqualand are being defined, negotiated and contested in the post-1994 
context, through reviewing legislative, policy and corporate social responsibility approaches to 
environmental governance and social equity. A critical anthropological approach, influenced by the 
fields of political economy and political ecology, is pursued, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in 
the Namaqualand coastal region, in order to evaluate the legacy being left in the wake of diamond 















depart from or help perpetuate historical patterns of inequality, elite enrichment, unsustainable 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The post-1994 legislative and governmental transformation in South Africa held great promise for 
revolutionising systems of governance, social and economic entitlement, land tenure, access to 
resources, and environmental management, in ways that would change apartheid-era structures 
that were discriminatory, undemocratic and environmentally unsustainable. The new South African 
Constitution and legislation committed the post-1994 government to redressing racial injustice and 
achieving democratic governance, as well as ‘secur[ing]  ecologically sustainable development and 
use of natural resources, while promoting justifiable economic and social development’ 
(Constitution, Act 1O8 of 1996, section 24, Bill of Rights).  
Arguably, achieving justice after the racial dispossession, displacement and disenfranchisement of 
the majority ‘black’ and ‘coloured’1 people of South Africa necessarily involves a substantial 
transformation of the national economy and structures of governance, into a new system of political 
and economic organisation that is more democratically accountable, just and sustainable in the long-
term. In this new approach to governance, the rights and interests of those who have been 
historically marginalised, discriminated against, impoverished and exploited should be respected, 
and their inclusion and participation in decision-making processes, policy formulation and 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation, should become a priority.  
Whilst extractive industries, such as the diamond mining industry, have generated a vast amount of 
wealth for a small elite of South African and foreign business people and contributed towards 
national economic growth (Bond 2OO8); these ‘gains’ have been achieved at the cost of large-scale 
environmental degradation, stark social exclusion and inequality, and the pursuit of short-term 
economic interest over and above long-term sustainability (van Wyk et al. 2OO9; Bregman, 2O1O). 
As the National Framework for Sustainable Development in South Africa (NFSD, DEAT, 2OO8) 
highlighted, much of the growth in economic activity (measured as a percentage increase in GDP) in 
South Africa ‘is achieved by consuming natural resources and degrading our habitat at accelerating 
rates with the inevitable consequence that future economic growth and development objectives will 
be prejudiced’ (DEAT, 2OO8, p. 7). 
                                                          
1
 Under the Apartheid government in South Africa (1948-1994) the population was officially classified into four 
groups: Black, White, Indian and Coloured. The Coloured group included people regarded as being of mixed 
descent, including people of Bantu, Khoisan, European and Malay ancestry. The Population Registration Act 
(30 of 1950), which formalised racial classification and introduced an identity card for all persons over the age 
of eighteen, specifying their racial group. Through the Group Areas Act (41 of 1950), the Apartheid regime 
forced those classified as ‘non-whites’ into separate townships and ‘homelands’ (or ‘Bantustans’) where they 
were denied many of the rights and privileges reserved for ‘whites’. Though these terms are used in the thesis, 
this must not be taken as an endorsement of the racial violence that has been perpetuated in their name, but 















The NFSD further argued that ‘the achievement of sustainable development is not a once-off 
occurrence and its objectives cannot be achieved by a single action or decision. It is an ongoing 
process that requires a particular set of values and attitudes in which economic, social and 
environmental assets that society has at its disposal, are managed in a manner that sustains human 
well-being without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (DEAT, 
2OO8, p. 6-7). 
Since the ‘discovery’ of diamonds in the late 192O’s, Namaqualand’s abundance of diamond 
deposits both onshore and offshore enabled the development of a large mining sector which has for 
decades been the dominant economic industry of the region, and prime source of waged 
employment. The dominance of the diamond mining sector throughout the coastal zone, with the 
mining concessions in the hands of a few major companies, has also meant that public access to the 
coastal area has been historically extremely restricted; as has local community access to or 
ownership of coastal land and natural resources. 
Decades of large-scale mining operations have had profound and long-term impacts on local 
communities, entrenching a wage labour system, and establishing mining towns and built 
infrastructure dependent on the mining industry. Now, with the contraction of the mining industry 
and a shift in mining from land-based to sea-based deposits, recent mass retrenchments have had a 
devastating impact on Namaqualand communities (CSA, 2OO8, LEAP, p. 2). It has been projected 
that the downscaling of mining at Alexkor and De Beers Consolidated Mines, as well as copper 
mining at Okiep, could eventually result in the loss of over 5OOO jobs in the mining sector. (DEAT, 
FMSDS, 2OO3).  
Furthermore, much of the coastal natural landscape has been transformed beyond recognition, 
leading to environmental degradation and disturbance of ecological processes, which have further 
adverse impacts on the lives of local communities (van Wyk et al., 2OO9).  
This study thus seeks to assess the social and environmental legacy that is currently being left in the 
wake of diamond mining along the north west coast of South Africa as a result of decades of mining. 
This involves an inquiry into the political, economic and ideological forces that enabled the 
establishment of the extractive industry, and a critical assessment of the role the industry has come 
to play in the region.  
The study then explores how the obligations of diamond mining companies to the people and 
natural environment of Namaqualand are being defined, negotiated and contested in the post-1994 















environmental governance and social equity. These new approaches are to be seen in local historical 
context, and the contemporary performance of mining companies is to be evaluated in light of their 
historical modus operandi and early overtures toward corporate responsibility in the 199Os. The 
findings of the research indicate where the provision of new approaches to Corporate Social 
Responsibility and environmental governance approaches are failing to secure substantial social and 
environmental rights. 
A critical anthropological approach, influenced by the fields of political economy and political 
ecology, is pursued, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in the Namaqualand coastal region, in order 
to re-evaluate the legacy of mining and consider whether proposed alternative land uses and 
economic activities (including conservation areas, tourism, fishing, mariculture and energy 
generation) depart from or perpetuate established patterns of inequality, elite enrichment, 
unsustainable development and environmental degradation that have been associated with 
diamond mining, and the system of governance out of which it emerged and helped sustain.  
 
1.1 Theoretical orientations 
Selected scholarship in the fields of anthropology, political economy and political ecology has 
highlighted that, there is nothing natural about natural resource management (Tsing, 1999, p.9). As 
Tsing (1999) writes, ‘each word—natural, resource, management— has a complexly contaminated 
history. Each is embroiled in contemporary political fights, in which the term itself may help to 
establish positions. Each has become associated with characteristic sites of deployment in corporate 
and state planning’ (p. 9). 
Seeking to synthesise these approaches, throughout the study, consideration is thus given to how 
governance is being conducted, challenged and (re)formed by state actors, of various governmental 
departments, at local, provincial and national levels, mining companies, conservation agencies and 
persons who, by virtue of their occupation, knowledge and experience or powers of representation, 
control over finances, title deeds, information and other resources are in positions of authority. 
These actors include: mine managers and representatives, conservation park managers, legal 
advisors, fishers’ association representatives, the national and regional directors of an international 
conservation non-governmental organisation, academics and researchers, land claimants, media 
reporters and local entrepreneurs. All of these have a role in defining and determining what legacy 
will be left in the wake of diamond mining and how Namaqualand’s coast will be inhabited, its 















Yet the scope of influence and of these actors to achieve their vision or version of good governance, 
social equity and sustainability is understood to be shaped, and in some cases constrained, by 
existing hegemonic and institutionalised systems of management and control, enrichment and 
impoverishment, capitalist commodity production, and historically entrenched, racially hierarchical 
and elitist forms of privilege and entitlement. 
Whilst the post-1994 political context in South Africa has provided an opportunity to challenge these 
established systems of governance, ownership and control; the way in which the South African state 
and national economy remain bound into international neoliberal political-economic systems has 
substantially shaped the country’s developmental trajectory.  
Thus, a critical approach informed by the fields of political economy and political ecology is required 
to elucidate why purported governmental and corporate endorsement of principles such as social 
equity and environmental sustainability is, in practice, failing to redress historical patterns of political 
and economic hierarchy and inequality, and change unsustainable and destructive use of the natural 
environment. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The aim of the study is to describe and evaluate the legacy of almost a century of diamond mining 
for the Namaqualand coastal region in the Northern Cape Province of South Africa; and to determine 
whether post-1994 governing approaches to environmental management, socio-economic 
development and corporate responsibility in South Africa are adequate to the task of redressing 
established patterns of stark inequality, elite enrichment, unsustainable development and 
environmental degradation in the Namaqualand coastal region. 
 This involves addressing the following objectives: 
1) Review of key South African legislation and policy promulgated post-1994, as well as an 
increasingly prominent ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) agenda, which have the potential 
to reform the extractive industry; with particular focus on frameworks intended to achieve goals 
of social equity, democratic accountability, and environmental sustainability. 
2) Inquiry into the political, economic and ideological underpinnings of the diamond mining 
industry in South Africa; and a critical assessment of the role the diamond mining industry has 















impacts of mining; as well as documentation of how mining companies are currently interpreting 
and implementing their social and environmental responsibilities.  
3) Exploration of whether, in the context of Namaqualand, these governmental and CSR provisions 
and commitments are proving effective and adequate to the task of redressing a legacy of stark 
inequality, elite enrichment, unsustainable development and environmental degradation. 
4) To discuss two key cases where communities in Namaqualand have attempted to challenge 
mining companies using existing legal and institutional frameworks, assert their rights and gain a 
stake in decision-making and resource-benefit processes. 
5)  To explore some of the socio-economic ‘opportunities’ that have been promoted as alternatives 
to the diamond mining industry; and to consider the extent to which these alternatives are likely 
to achieve greater social equality, democratic accountability and environmental sustainability; or 
whether these alternatives instead perpetuate past and present patterns of elite enrichment, 
unsustainable development, stark inequality and environmental degradation.  
 
1.3 Methodology: Fieldwork and Interviews 
Ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation and qualitative interviews were chosen as key 
research methodologies, as they enable unique insight into how complex issues are unfolding on the 
ground, and an opportunity to compare and synthesise the accounts, knowledge and experience of 
diverse role-players alternatively positioned vis-à-vis governing systems of power and authority, and 
differently impacted by current developments. 
Ethnographic fieldwork was undertaken in Namaqualand during September (6-12th) and December 
of 2O1O (4-18th), and January of 2O11 (8-16th). Although these visits were relatively brief, they were 
eventful and productive, involving numerous in-depth interviews, guided tours, site visits and 
presentations made by mining company representatives and provincial government officials.  
The initial research agenda had been informed by the focus of the Environmental Evaluation Unit at 
the University of Cape Town on issues of coastal access, in the context of the application of the 
Integrated Coastal Management Act (ICMA, 24 of 2OO8) throughout South Africa’s different 
Provinces. However, through extensive background reading, and preliminary fieldwork research in 
Namaqualand, the scope of the study shifted to an assessment of the legacy diamond mining 
companies would leave for Namaqualand communities and their coastal environment. ICMA is thus 















potential means for redressing past injustice, and reducing stark inequality and poverty, whilst 
achieving environmental sustainability and ecological protection. 
During September 2O1O, contact was made with local government officials, nature conservation 
authorities and mining company representatives, and a number of interviews were conducted. At 
this stage it was explained to interviewees that the scope of the study was still to be refined and 
determined, though some of the key areas of interest were outlined. During this trip, the Groen 
River estuary (see Figure 1, with Groen River estuary marked on south of map) was explored as a 
potential case study area, and stakeholders  were interviewed who had been affected by and/or 
involved in a court case through which ‘squatters’ were evicted by the Department of Public Works 
(DPW)2.  
This initial scoping trip indicated the importance of researching the historical role and influence of 
diamond mining companies as key land owners with significant authority over the social, 
environmental and economic context of the region. Furthermore, preliminary research findings 
indicated that key political debates were being waged through legal claims to land and resources, 
and thus the implementation of key legislation and the process of making claims could be explored 
to gauge how justice, and social and environmental rights and responsibilities, were being defined, 
contested and determined in the post-1994 South African governance context.  
Accompanying staff from Northern Cape Provincial Department of Environment and Nature 
Conservation (DENC) in December 2O1O, on a coastal tour as part of their effort to conduct a coastal 
access audit as stipulated by ICMA, enabled access to diamond mining areas controlled by Alexkor 
and De Beers, and provided an opportunity to gain a detailed understanding of how the department 
conceives of, and is attempting to realise environmental governance objectives in the Namaqualand 
coastal context. Participation in this tour provided a unique opportunity to observe how 
environmental governance is being conducted on the ground, through dynamic engagement 
between, local actors and authorities, including government officials from different departments, 
mining companies, conservation agencies, small businesses owners, land claimant communities and 
fishers’ association representatives. 
                                                          
2
A number of white families historically holidayed at the Groen-River estuary, particularly over the Christmas 
season. The holiday makers were taken to court by the Department of Public Works, the legal land owner of 
the site, in the 199Os, in order to evict ‘squatters’ who had erected permanent structures without permission. 
The DPW indicated that the site was intended to be incorporated into an extended Namaqua National Park. (A. 
Niewoudt, evictee, interviewed September 2O1O). The court found in favour of the DPW, and the ‘squatters’ 
were duly evicted. Yet the section south of the Groen River still remains outside of the National Park (Manager 
















Furthermore, through attending the Marine and Coastal Educators Network Conference hosted in 
the Northern Cape in January 2O11 (9-14th), a dynamic milieu of educators, conservation authorities, 
government officials, mining company representatives, and academics were engaged with for the 
purposes of the research. A number of key interviews and attendance at presentations and site tours 
became possible through participation in the Conference. Moreover, other Conference participants 
were able to provide valuable information and/or were able to indicate fruitful avenues of 
investigation, including providing a comparative perspective on the Northern Cape situation in 
relation to South Africa’s other Provinces. 
Whilst the selection of most interview candidates (see annex 4), was strategic, the list of key 
stakeholders and knowledge-holders was compiled in an interactive, adaptive way as the research 
progressed. In some cases interviewees identified key persons or groups who should also be 
consulted; in other cases representatives were sought from key agencies such as government 
departments, research institutions, conservation authorities, mining companies, land claimant 
communities, and local fisheries. Some interviews, presentations and conversations were not 
formally organised by the researcher, but occurred during participation in tours, events and 
discussions during field work visits. 
The interview approach adopted was generally informal, qualitative, and fairly open-ended, with the 
average interview length reaching about two hours. Whilst a list of key topics and questions was 
prepared to beforehand, these were only a guide to facilitate discussion. The aim of the interview 
method was to invite interviewees to identify and explore issues they considered pertinent and to 
contribute their views and perspectives, so that research topics and key issues of concern could be 
identified. Given the research objective to describe and evaluate the social and environmental 
legacy of diamond mining, it was crucial to gather information and a range of perspectives from 
actors differently positioned vis-à-vis mining companies and governing authorities.  
All interviews were recorded, with the consent of the interviewee and for those who preferred to 
communicate in Afrikaans, a research assistant who is a native speaker assisted with translation and 
helped to later transcribe these interviews. Recording the interviews enabled a present focus and 
engagement with interviewees that would have been difficult had hand written notation been used. 
All interviews were later transcribed verbatim in order to carefully analyse key themes, to check 

















Figure 1: Map depicting the Namaqualand Coastal Region, Northern Cape Province, South Africa. 3 
 
1.4 Limitations 
A key limitation of the research was also, in some ways an advantage. The fact that the final research 
focus was not initially determined before the first fieldwork visit was undertaken, meant that the 
                                                          
3















research agenda changed in response to information provided by interviewees, participant-
observations of unfolding developments in the Namaqualand region, as well as in discursive 
commentary of these. An opportunistic, though systematic, approach to gaining information, 
securing interviews and participant observation; and a broad, multidisciplinary literature review 
were in many ways beneficial to gaining an appreciation of how issues often treated as distinct – 
such as the diamond mining economy, coastal access, environmental governance and corporate 
social responsibility – are linked and co-dependent.  
However, pursuing an iterative, adaptive research approach that spans across disciplinary 
boundaries runs the risk of introducing a number of theoretical perspectives and research themes, 
without exploring the nuances and complexities of each of these in adequate detail or depth to do 
them justice. Informed by an academic training based in the social sciences, particularly in social 
anthropology, the research reflects this disciplinary bias in its methodological and theoretical 
approaches, though attempts have been made to corroborate and consolidate research findings 
through cross-referencing with other studies and reports, including academic papers  and interviews 
with conducted with specialists in a range of disciplines, such as law, marine biology, ecological 
restoration, environmental management and conservation.  
The findings of the thesis could be further strengthened through more extensive and intensive 
investigation into the social and environmental impacts of mining activities and the repercussions of 
their termination; and further ethnographic research into the opinions, experiences and aspirations 
of local community members. This could be accompanied by identification of practical solutions to 























Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
Scholarship emerging from, and bridging disciplines as diverse as political economy (Ferguson, 1999, 
2OO5; Newell, 2OO8; Bond, 2OO8; Hornborg 2OO9) , eco-socialism (Pepper, 1993; Peet & Watts, 
2OO4; Lowy, 2OO5) , political ecology (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Scoones, 1999; Forsyth 2OO3; 
Zimmerer & Basset, 2OO3; Fairhead and Leach 2OO8) ; geography (Harvey, 1996; Adams, 2OO8); 
and social anthropology (Escobar, 1995; Scott, 1998; Zerner, 2OOO; Tsing, 1998, 2OO5; Sawyer, 
2OO4), has helped draw attention to the ways in which political ideology, hegemony and power 
come into play in systems of environmental management and programmes for economic 
development.  
For example, in his work ‘Seeing like a State’, Scott (1998) employs a Foucaultian analysis4 to 
demonstrate the context out of which environmental management emerged in colonialist and 
capitalist programmes for bureaucratic governance. He argues that modernising political 
programmes undertaken by colonial states ‘drew on the idea that nature could be understood, 
manipulated and controlled for social benefit through development of schematic (and increasingly 
scientific)  knowledge’ (Scott, 1998, in Adams, 2OO9, p. 47). In this work, environmental 
management, like other state sciences such as health, demographics and urban planning, is a 
bureaucratic science developed to enhance and extend state forms of fiscal governance and control 
over claimed territories and populations. 
Tsing (1999), on the other hand, focuses anthropological attention on the ‘open-ended, 
unpredictable process in which groups and institutions try to influence each other to redefine their 
respective projects. Environmental politics’, she argues, ‘is caught up in these definitional struggles’ 
(Tsing, 1998, p. 6). From this perspective, governance is a contested terrain where state actors and 
institutions negotiate and interact with private companies, non-governmental organisations, 
workers unions and civil society groups; making use of, and in some cases, being challenged and 
subverted by alternative conceptualisations and informal systems of governance, entitlement and 
control.   
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According to Sawyer (2OO4) ‘critical anthropology attends to the culturally and historically specific 
formations emerging under globalization’ and is thus well placed to analyse neoliberalism5 ‘as an 
unstable process whose outcomes are far from certain’ (p. 222). In Sawyer’s work, neoliberalism is 
explored as both ideology and governing political-economic approach to national and international 
development. Sawyer’s (2OO4) ethnographic analysis artfully explores how neoliberal reforms in 
Ecuador during the 1990s, particularly deregulation and liberalisation of the petrol mining industry, 
led to a crisis of governance, accountability and representation that spurred indigenous political 
resistance.  
The field of political ecology, on the other hand, involves various attempts to link environmental 
issues with radical social studies (Adams, 2OO9, p. 197). Diverse and trans-disciplinary, scholarship in 
the field seeks to tie the logics, dynamics and patterns of economic change to the politics of 
environmental action and to actual ecological outcomes  (Adams, 2OO9; Peet and Watts, 2OO4). 
Political ecologists incorporate a critical analysis of power and unequal relations between different 
actors to explain and interpret environmental outcomes, integrating ecological analysis with concern 
for social justice. (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Zimmerer & Basset, 2OO3; Forsyth, 2OO3). 
A synthesis of these radical scholarly perspectives is thus ventured throughout the study to provide a 
critical perspective on governing approaches to environmental management and corporate social 
responsibility in the Namaqualand coastal region. 
 
2.2 Linking Environmental Governance, Development and Social (In)justice 
As Hornborg (2OO3) argues, ‘the age of fossil fuels has provided a minority of the world’s population 
with an unprecedented source of power – in both a thermodynamic and political sense. But we are 
now beginning to realize that the combustion of fossil fuels has represented an illusory 
emancipation from land’ (p. 243). Through imposing ecologically-ignorant modes of social 
organisation and resource use, narrow pursuit of ‘economic’ interest has turned the non-human 
environment into a limitless resource for linear industrialist processes of production, distribution 
and consumption (Peet, 1991; Pepper, 1993; Vlachou, 2OO4).  
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 ‘Neoliberalism’ is a name given to the market-driven approach to economic and social policy based on 
neoclassical theories of economics that stresses the efficiency of private enterprise, liberalized trade and 
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Hornborg (2OO3) thus proposes an alternative to capitalist economic accounting which treats critical 
social and environmental problems generated through industrial production as ‘externalities’ in 
order to ‘reveal how the accumulation of money and technology in some areas of the world system 
occurs at the expense of the natural resources, environment and health of their peripheries.’(p.246) 
Moreover, Cullinan (2O1O) argues that ‘almost all of the “environmental crises” that threaten 
contemporary industrialised civilisation from climate change to the depletion of freshwater sources, 
are caused by ecologically unsustainable and harmful human practices.’ (p.1) He suggests that ‘one 
or the reasons why legal systems are failing to protect the Earth community is because they reflect 
the underlying belief that humans are separate from, and superior to, all other-than-human 
members of Earth whose primary role is to serve as “natural resources” for humans to consume’ 
(Cullinan, 2O1O, p.1)  
Cullinan (2O1O) thus advocates a new approach to law and governance, called ‘earth jurisprudence’, 
which would foster ‘mutually beneficial relationships between humans and the other members of 
the Earth community’, replacing governance systems that ‘ are designed to perpetuate human 
domination of Nature’ (p. 2), which have been sustained by modernisation theory and the ideology 
of development. 
 
2.3 Questioning the Ideology of Development 
During the nineteenth century the concept of development was associated with a linear theory of 
progress, bound up with capitalism and Western cultural hegemony (Sachs, 1992; Crush, 1995; 
Escobar, 1995, 2OO4).  Human societies, it was assumed, could all be located on a single civilisational 
trajectory, from origins in simple, primitive and savage social systems, to increasingly complex, large-
scale, bureaucratically managed, and industrially sustained societies. This modernist ideology 
imagined the industrialising and urbanising state-governed modes of societal organisation of 
European countries to be at the forefront of an advancing historical process of human progress. This 
ideology, argues Adams (2OO9), was, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, spread 
through mercantilism and colonial imperialism. 
 
After the Second World War, the United States of America took a lead role in shaping an 
international, ‘post-colonial’ developmental agenda. Whilst the Soviet Union had a competing vision 
for modernist society, it is the US ‘free-market’ neoliberal vision which has come to predominate 















to this vision, the ideal mode of social development involves a combination of urbanization, 
industrialisation, representative democracy and a governmental approach that enshrines the rights 
of private property, capital accumulation, and consumerism. (Sachs, 1992; Luke, 1997 Ferguson 
2OO6).  
During the Cold War era, the USA lead the way in establishing financial institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, through which this development agenda could 
be pursued,  and by offering ‘developing nations’ loans and AID ‘donations’ with directives attached 
promoting the US version of ‘good governance’.  
Failure of ‘developing nations’ to thus far meet development goals were, in the post- Cold War 
context, attributed to the incompetency and corruption of developing nation state governments; 
and to the misguided pursuit of expensive welfare programmes responsible for creating dependency 
among recipients populations, instead of ‘empowering’ them to become self-realising entrepreneurs 
in a deregulated market economy (Ferguson, 1999; Bond, 2OOO; Smith-Carrier & Bhuyan, 2O1O). 
Governments are thus primarily intended to establish the necessary legislation, infrastructure and 
institutions to make the expansion and consolidation of ‘market forces’ possible, and to enable 
corporations and aspiring entrepreneurs to fulfil their economic potential. (Ferguson 2OO6; Sawyer, 
2OO4; Igoe and Brockington, 2OO7) 
In the neoliberal imagination, the ‘free market’ can more efficiently and effectively allocate 
resources and drive development than the old model of the nation-state administrator. Yet a key 
irony of neoliberalism, according to Newell (2OO8) is that, ‘contrary to narratives about state 
impotence, the architects of the contemporary global economy’ have been assemblies of nation-
states, particularly the EU, the US and Japan, now joined by the economic superpowers, China, India 
and Brazil (p. 1O67).  
Newell (2OO8) writes of these leading state governments: ‘they are the agents that negotiated the 
trade treaties, created offshore finance, relinquished capital controls, restricted the power of unions 
and developed competitive strategies aimed at creating an attractive ‘investment climate’’ (p. 
1O67).These states have thus pursued an international political-economic agenda, which has 
effectively opened the way for corporate-led globalization, and instituted the role of the nation-state 
















2.4 Mainstream Sustainable Development 
According to Escobar (1995), reality has been colonized by the development discourse to such an 
extent that those who wish to contest or resist its power have ‘to struggle for bits and pieces of 
freedom within it, in the hope that in the process a different reality could be constructed’ (p. 5).  The 
idea of development, ‘and the idea of modernity that lies behind it, limit the extent to which 
alternative futures - of justice and a new international economic order –can be imagined’ (Escobar 
2OO4 in Adams, 2OO9, p. 8). 
According to Adams (2OO9), mainstream sustainable development6 , is an ‘essentially reformist’ 
approach, which calls for a modification of current development practice, and not a radical shift in 
the goals and behaviour of powerful political and economic actors. Characterised by ‘market 
environmentalism’, ‘ecological modernisation’ and commitment to the ‘triple bottom line’ of social, 
environmental and economic sustainability, Adams argues proponents of mainstream sustainable 
development ‘hold that the world can literally grow out of global environmental and developmental 
problems, and consumption can be the engine through which sustainable development and 
livelihoods are to be achieved’ (Adams, 2OO9, p. 124).  
Adams (2OO9) characterises the mainstreaming of ‘sustainability’ as integrating forms of 
‘neopopulism’ and Western environmentalism into existing political and economic structures of 
societal organisation. Development practice is thus to be ‘greened’ in order to ensure its own 
sustainability. Capitalist forms of resource acquisition and utilisation; corporate control over systems 
of industrial production, trade, marketing and transportation are to be sustained; though these are 
to be more carefully managed according to ‘more technically sophisticated’ forms of accounting; 
enhanced technological efficiency; and the development of managerial systems able to assess, 
mitigate and, where possible, reduce, negative environmental impacts’ (Adams, 2OO9, p. 124-128). 
Adams (2OO9)  argues this version of more ‘sustainable’ development has successfully infused the 
mainstream of development rhetoric, if not so much achieved in practice, largely because it speaks 
the language of bureaucracies and politicians, and leaves the powerful position of corporations 
unchallenged. With promises of adjusting development policies and programmes to ensure the 
survival of humanity into perpetuity, and tweaking them to curb the worst excesses of industrial 
capitalism, the ‘juggernaut of development’ as politics- and business-as-usual can thus continue 
without addressing the ‘structural causes of poverty and environmental degradation’ that inhere in 
the pursuit of modernist development (Adams, 2OO9, p. 7).  
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2.5 Neoliberalisation of the Mining Industry 
South Africa’s industrial development over the last century has had at its core a Minerals Energy 
Complex (MEC), which has been established and maintained through the collaborative effort of the 
central government and private companies (Fine, 2OO8). Innes (1984) writes of the period following 
the granting of South African independence, ‘South Africa transformed from an undeveloped chattel 
of imperialism into an aggressive imperialist power which exhibits many of the characteristics of a 
monopoly capitalist society’ (p.241) Meanwhile, ‘the economic and political strength which South 
African capitalism acquired through its monopoly transformation enabled the sate to spread its 
influence throughout the whole of the southern African region during the 196Os and 197Os’ (Innes, 
1984, p.241). 
 
In the 198Os, Fine (2OO8) writes, capital controls on the South African economy led to 
conglomeration across the economy and expansion of a huge and sophisticated financial system, 
which brought to power large South African conglomerate companies, such as the Anglo American 
Corporation. Owned and controlled by the Oppenheimer family, Anglo American diversified 
investments in gold mining into other mineral resources, as well as other industries, property, and 
finance. 
Yet, the post-Apartheid context has seen MEC conglomerates pressing for ‘liberalisation’ of capital 
controls (Fine, 2OO8, p.3). South Africa’s post-1994 macro-economic policies have thus facilitated 
the gradual disinvestment of conglomerates, which are seeking to globalise their investments and 
establish themselves as multinational corporations (). Meanwhile, the government has sought to 
attract short-term capital inflows by way of compensation for conglomerate disinvestment; and to 
attempt to temper the worst excesses and consequences of this neoliberal transition (Fine, 2OO8, p. 
4 and 7). 
In his paper, ‘Global Disconnect: Abjection and the Aftermath of Modernism’, Ferguson (2OO2) 
explores the socio-economic crisis left in the wake of mining industry contraction in Zambia during 
the 197Os. On gaining national independence, the Zambian copper mining industry became the 
stronghold of the national economy, revenues from which were intended to fuel the country’s social 
and economic development, ‘hooking citizens up into a national – and ultimately universal – grid of 
modernity’ (p. 137). However these glorious ‘expectations of modernity’ were instead, by the mid 















burden of a debt crisis’. The nascent Zambian national economy thus underwent a ‘profound 
contraction’ (Ferguson, 2OO2, p.137). 
Processes of urbanization, proletarianisation and industrialisation – imagined to be emblematic of 
the forward advance of modernisation – thus underwent a reversal, characterised by mass layoffs of 
mine workers, the depopulation of mining towns and the privatisation of a state-held mining 
company, with the rehiring of white, expatriate management, who had briefly been replaced by 
qualified black Zambians (Ferguson, 2OO2, p.137). 
For many Zambians who had become enrolled in the copper-based modernisation project, the 
‘modernist story-line transformed in their lifetimes, from a marvellous promise to a cruel hoax.’ 
(Ferguson, 2OO2, p. 137). The hope of entering into the path of financial flows and connectedness to 
a modern ‘world society’, with its promise of ‘improved standards of living’ and hitherto 
unimaginable opportunities for personal and social advancement; were thus curtailed by shifts of 
interests and strategies of trans-national investors, and instead, the country, like others on the 
continent, has been ‘treated to a crash course in the most vicious aspects of free-market capitalism 
while being largely denied any of the benefits’ (Smith, 1997, in Ferguson, 2OO2, p. 141).  
Whilst copper mining continues within Zambia, and private companies continue to profit from the 
resource, the style of profitable extraction has become decidedly socially ‘thin’ (Ferguson, 1999). The 
idea that benefits from the mining industry should be used to develop the standards of living for the 
nation’s wider populace – providing social goods such as electricity, housing, jobs, educational and 
welfare services – has been replaced by the need to attract capitalist investment on any terms, in 
order to compensate for declining terms of trade and escalating foreign debt.  
Socially ‘thick’ modes of i dustrial development have thus been systematically disabled by a post- 
Cold War internationalised ‘structural adjustment’ agenda, which has empowered corporations and 
debtor nation-states and tied ‘developing’ country states into implementing neoliberal policies, at 
the expense of commitments to democratic accountability, to economic redistribution, to social 
welfare provision and the protection of social communities, both urban and rural; including their 
rights to land, livelihoods and natural resources; to education, good health and a safe environment. 
As Ferguson (2OO5) highlights, it would be misleading to believe that the neoliberalisation of Africa 
has seen the abandonment of the continent by global capital, instead, it seems capital investment 
has become increasingly concentrated, and selectively territorialized (p. 378).  The business of 















noteworthy is the extent to which this economic investment has been concentrated in secured 
enclaves, often with no or very little benefit to the wider society’(Ferguson, 2OO5, p.378).  
 
2.6 Neoliberal Governance and Democracy  
Newell (2OO8)suggests that neoliberalisation of contemporary systems of governance has incurred a 
‘crisis of legitimacy’, according to which there appears to be dwindling recourse for publics to hold 
increasingly powerful corporations accountable for their powerful influence over and detrimental 
impacts on social communities and the natural environment. Moreover, unlike the democratic 
nation-state, the supra-national private corporation need make no disguise of its mission of capital 
accumulation for its own sake, and for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders.  
Swyngedouw (2OO5) mentions that ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ is certainly ‘janus-faced’ 
(p.1991). Whilst promising to be more inclusive and participatory and thus more genuinely 
democratic, flexible and situationally adaptive than established hierarchical and bureaucratic forms 
of state governance; in fact, he writes, it is not previously disenfranchised and marginalised social 
groups and individuals who are most likely to become ‘empowered’ by this process of ‘de-
statisation’ of governance, but rather existing and new elite groups and private companies who are 
able to organise themselves into the informal, horizontally-organised and polycentric ensembles of 
power, characteristic of contemporary governance ‘beyond the state’ (Swyngedouw, 2OO5, p.1999).  
Whilst, at least in theory, governments established according to the principles of representative 
democracy, are bound by their constitutions and formalised elective procedures to remain 
accountable to their citizenry; according to Swyngedouw (2OO5) , a world in which state systems 
have been superseded or weakened by alternative organisations of power, might mean the loss of 
existing systems of popular representation, delegation and accountability, without substitute 
channels through which the majority of people can exercise political influence (Swyngedouw , 2OO5, 
p. 1991).  
Indeed, Swyngedouw (2OO5)  argues, the supposed ‘withdrawal of the state’ from the role of 
governance, might actually be interpreted as a technique for achieving neoliberal goals of 
privatization, deregulation and decentralisation of governance away from the nation-state (p. 1997); 
the up-scaling of governance to trans-national regulatory bodies and governing authorities 
favourable to the interests of corporate capitalism; and the downscaling of administrative 















Whilst proponents of neoliberalism believe policies such as privatization, deregulation, liberalization 
and decentralization will stabilize national economies and ‘establish the conditions essential for 
democracy to flourish’, Sawyer (2OO4) argues in her study of Ecuador’s neoliberal transition, 
‘contrary to its intent, neoliberal changes provoked a crisis of governance and representation...As 
the state threatened to retract from its role, however theoretical, of protecting citizens and 
transnational business was given more independence, citizens felt that they had fewer channels 
through which to voice their concerns’ (p. 93). 
Sawyer (2OO4) argues that there is a ‘fundamental inequality inherent in processes of transnational 
capital accumulation’ (p.116). Whilst increasing oil production in Ecuador was supposed to offer the 
‘economic, political and social stability of a “modern” nation, bringing the country ‘on par with those 
other liberalizing-globalizing economies around the world...it was the bodies and lives of subaltern 
subjects that enabled transnational capitalists to expand their profit margin. Comparative advantage 
included not simply enchanting foreign capital with attractive contracts. It similarly meant providing 
cheap natural resources, scant industrial regulations, cheap labour and a submissive population that 
would not protest’ (Sawyer, 2OO4, p. 116). 
 
2.7 Corporate Social Responsibility 
On the other hand, the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ or ‘democratic deficit’ (Swyngedouw, 2OO5) generated 
through neoliberal governance has led to a counter call for corporations themselves to curb their 
own exploitative and harmful excesses and to commit to minimum social and environmental 
responsibility standards. Many large and powerful trans-national corporations have thus adopted 
environmental management systems and report adherence to the internationally recognised ISO 
14OO1 standard7, to reassure critics and investors that they have moved beyond minimalist 
compliance with environmental regulations (Mason 2OO5).  
Meanwhile, concern for human rights, social development and environmental custodianship have 
been incorporated into a framework for voluntary corporate compliance, known as corporate social 
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responsibility (CSR) (Murphy and Bendell, 1997; Arts 2OO2; Ite, 2OO4), embodied in guidelines such 
as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 8 
Hamann and Acutt (2OO3) write that ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) ‘is seen to express a new 
relationship between private capital and the public interest. The notion of partnerships is based on 
the belief in common interests and ‘win–win solutions’ (p. 256). Whilst governments have been 
required to relinquish regulatory control of private business and the financial sector, Hamann and 
Acutt (2OO3) argue, ‘in its place was the notion of business as a partner in sustainable development, 
on par with all other ‘stakeholders’’(p. 256). Meanwhile, ‘large companies and business associations 
are arguing for CSR on the basis of the so-called ‘business case’: a more responsible, strategic 
approach to environmental management, labour relations and community development should lead 
to better relationships and improved reputation, and hence greater profits’ (Hamann and Acutt, 
2OO3, p. 256). 
Godden et al. (2OO8) argue that a recent ‘world boom’ in resource extraction offers ‘unprecedented 
opportunities for indigenous and local peoples to build wealth and promote sustainable social and 
economic development’ (p.1). Godden et al. (2OO8) mention key opportunities for ‘unlocking the 
social and economic potential of resource booms for indigenous and local peoples’(Godden et al., 
2OO8, p.2), including community consultation, equity and benefit-sharing agreements and 
investment of wealth generated from mining in the development of local economies, education, 
employment and training, and upgrade of local infrastructure.  
These arrangements agreed between indigenous and local peoples, mining companies and relevant 
government authorities are interpreted as constituting a ‘Third Space’ beyond the dichotomies of 
public/private, state/business and society/economy, in which the interests of historical marginalised 
and excluded groups can be ‘accommodated’ in the resource extraction industry (Godden et al., 
2OO8, p. 28) and local socio-economic development can be achieved through attracting corporate 
investment. 
According to Godden et al. (2OO8) postcolonial governments have a crucial role to play in 
enfranchising historically disadvantaged and excluded peoples through recognising and enforcing 
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 In 2OO9, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was reportedly the most widely used reporting framework for 
performance on human rights, labour, environmental, anti-corruption, and other corporate citizenship issues. 
The GRI is used by more than 1,500 organisations from 60 countries to produce sustainability reports, 
including corporate businesses, public agencies, smaller enterprises, non-governmental organisations, industry 
groups and others. The GRI includes ‘Sustainability reporting’, whereby an organization publicly communicates 
their economic, environmental, and social performance. GRI seeks to make sustainability reporting by all 
















their human rights, as well as their rights to land and resources, which have been denied by racist 
and colonising political regimes. They argue that CSR needs to be combined with supportive 
government legislation, highlighting, ‘law provides an important means of formalising relationships 
that have been forged at an economic and policy level – but also as an instrument that defines what 
those relationships are, and how they are to be managed’ (Godden et al., 2OO8, p. 29).  
Referring to recent government legislation in South Africa and the ‘landmark’ Richtersveld 
Constitutional Court decision9, Godden et al. (2OO8) claim ‘preconceived ideas about property, 
discrimination, dispossession, communities and cultural identities in South Africa’ are being 
significantly ‘reworked’, to the benefit of impoverished communities (p. 13). 
Hamann and Acutt (2OO8), however, are sceptical that this ‘Third Space’ offers a real transformation 
of unequal and hierarchical patterns of governance. They argue, ‘in a world that is more unequal 
with a small number of trans-national corporations (TNCs)  dominating each sector and exerting 
tremendous influence on governments, this concept of ‘partnership and stakeholders’ perpetuates 
the myth that there is a collective endeavour, and that all players are equal and conflicts of interest 
can be resolved by roundtables seeking consensus’ (Hamann and Acutt, 2OO8, p. 257). 
Where governmental regulation is weak and there is a deficit of institutionalised democratic 
recourses for publics, particularly for communities negatively impacted by corporate behaviour, 
‘where corporations perceive ‘trade-offs’ between fulfilling social and environmental responsibilities 
and sustaining economic efficiency, the temptation will be to give the impression of being 
responsible, perhaps making small, feasible changes to how things work (including cosmetic 
changes), so that demands for more significant changes can be precluded’ (Hamann and Acutt, 
2OO8, p. 259). 
Certainly, many companies seek to demonstrate their green credentials through mentioning their 
ISO14OO1 certification. Yet with the ISO standards, organizations are responsible for setting their 
own targets and performance measures, with the standard serving to assist them in meeting 
objectives and goals and the subsequent monitoring and measurement of these. This means that 
two organizations that have completely different measures and standards of environmental 
performance, can both comply with ISO 14OO1 requirements (Federal Facilities Council Report, 
1999). 
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 Republic of South Africa, 2OO3, ‘Alexkor Ltd and the Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Richtersveld Community, (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (Richtersveld). This case shall be discussed in detail in chapter 6 















Newell (2OO8) writes, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is ultimately and inherently a product of 
the neoliberal political economy from which it emerged, and which it aims to legitimate and 
advance, reproducing its modalities, technologies of governance, and failings.’ The new corporate 
responsibility hegemony casts companies that commit to improving on their poor records of social 
responsibility and environmental sustainability in the places where they operate as ‘good corporate 
citizens’, willing to do more than is necessary to win public appraisal and trust. These overtures are 
however, essentially reformist, based upon and rooted in historical relations of colonialist economic 
expansion and state formation.  
The CSR agenda from this perspective is merely intended to ameliorate the adverse sociological and 
environmental impacts of extractive industry and obtain a ‘social license to operate’ for mining 
companies. By itself the CSR agenda, devised and implemented by mining companies themselves, 
has at its foundation the economic interest of the companies, and neither respect nor concern for 
the social, cultural, economic and environmental rights and well-being of local communities and 
indigenous peoples. CSR could thus be seen as a part of a hegemonic consensus about sustainable 
development that is enabling companies to get away with se ming to change their practice and 
approach rather than radically transforming their role, (ab)use of local communities and natural 
systems where they operate.  
Cullinan’s (2O1O) proposal for ‘earth jurisprudence’ conceptualises a much stronger role for legal 
and democratic participation in the shift from consumerist to sustainable society. The first step, he 
argues, is to ‘expose the limitations of existing regulatory systems and how corporations have 
shaped the law so that it allows commercial interests to override the interests of local communities 
and facilitates the lawful degradation of Nature’ (p. 5). Cullinan (2O1O) further suggests that local 
communities should be supported in moving ‘beyond simply reacting to each attack on their health 
and wellbeing’ and instead empowered ‘to use the law proactively to support the establishment of 
sustainable, local economies’ (Cullinan, 2O1O, p.5).  
 
Cognisant of the fact that community wellbeing and sustainable livelihood depends upon ecological 
integrity and functioning, scholars and activists could thus support communities, government 
agencies and NGOs to a) (re)assert community rights to prohibit activities harmful to their wellbeing; 
(b) recognise rights for natural communities; (c) enable local governments and individuals to sue for 
damages to be used for the restoration of any damage to ecological communities; and (d) challenge 
corporations and governments who jeopardise the rights of human and natural communities in the 
















2.8 Environmental Governance and Social (In)justice in South Africa  
With high rates of unemployment in South Africa10 and millions suffering income-poverty (Leatte, 
2OO6), landlessness and restricted access to vital rights and resources (Cousins, 1997; Wisborg and 
Rohde, 2OO4; Lebert and Rohde, 2OO7; Benjaminsen et al. 2OO8; Bregman, 2O1O), it is critical that 
environmental governance and socio-economic development be transformed to re-embed economic 
enterprise within systems of democratic accountability, and environmental sustainability.  
Whilst ‘sustainability’ has been conceived of as a balancing act between social, environmental and 
economic interests, as the National Framework for Sustainable Development (DEAT, 2OO8) in 
suggests, ‘in South Africa, as in the rest of the world, the situation of continuing inequality, 
accompanied by a deteriorating resource base, makes it imperative for us to go beyond thinking in 
terms of trade-offs and the simplicity of the ‘triple bottom line’ (p. 14). 
The NFSD recognises that ‘social, economic and ecosystem factors are embedded within each other, 
and are underpinned by our systems of governance’, and argues that, as preconditions to meeting 
economic and social development objectives, ‘we must acknowledge and emphasise that there are 
non-negotiable ecological thresholds; that we need to maintain our stock of natural capital over 
time; and that we must employ the precautionary principle in this approach’ (DEAT, 2OO8). 
A number of governmental reports have indicated that South Africa is experiencing environmental 
crisis11. According to the Southern African Millennium Assessment (2OO4) , ‘the natural resources 
which contribute most to human livelihoods are declining in southern Africa…and many 
communities are facing increasing vulnerability due to changes in their environment, loss of natural 
resources and exposure to environmental hazards’ (Friedmann and King, 2OO8 p. 32). Meanwhile, 
Friedmand and King (2OO8) highlight that the country is experiencing deteriorating air and water 
quality, with fresh water resources declining in quantity and quality. Almost all exploitable water 
sources have been tapped; groundwater reserves are being depleted faster than they can recharge, 
and freshwater flows are dwindling (Friedman and King, 2OO8, p.32). 
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 In 2OO3, the official unemployment rate reached 37%; though this figure does not reflect those who could 
be considered ‘underemployed’. (http://www.indexmundi.com/south_africa/unemployment_rate.html 
accessed 13/O7/2O11). 
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 According to a 2OO6 State of the Environment Report, South Africa’s rich biodiversity is in a state of decline, 
as is critical ecosystem functioning. Almost 1O% of the country’s birds and frogs and 2O% of mammals are 
threatened with extinction (DEAT, 2006). Meanwhile, 34% of South Africa’s terrestrial ecosystems are 
classified as threatened in the 2OO4 National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment (DEAT, 2004). Marine 
ecosystems are also reportedly endangered by over-fishing, where twenty key commercial fish species have 















Friedmann and King (2OO8) argue that this environmental crisis ‘can unequivocally be said to be as a 
result of growing human consumption driven by a continually rising population and existing 
developmental models. The impacts are driven by factors such as overconsumption, overharvesting, 
and unsustainable development, trade, habitat fragmentation, land transformation, pollution and 
disturbance. Collectively, they are causing an overall and rapid decline in the quality of our 
environment and its life-sustaining ecosystems’ (Friedman and King, 2OO8, pg. 35). 
Crucially, for South Africa, Friedmann and King (2OO8) emphasise that the industrially strong 
national economy has been centred around a minerals-energy complex, dependent on a large but 
non-renewable supply of coal. Although coal is the most emissions intensive of all the fossil fuels, 
almost all of the nation’s electricity in 2OO4 came from coal-fired power stations (Winkler and 
Zipplies, 2OO8, p. 117). ‘Historically, South Africa’s economic and industrial growth was fed by the 
energy-intensive extractive industries and the early 2Oth century saw the development of the 
electricity-supply industry to feed the booming mining sector. As the minerals-energy complex 
continued to shape the economy, there was an expansion in energy-intensive sectors’ (Winkler and 
Zipplies, 2OO8, p. 116). In 1994, energy-supply industries and industrial energy use were responsible 
for 59% of all South Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions (Winkler and Zipplies, 2OO8, p. 116).   
According to Bond (2OO8) South Africa has witnessed GDP growth during the 2OOOs, but this does 
not take into account the depletion of non-renewable resources. If this factor plus pollution were 
considered, he argues, South Africa would have a net negative per person rate of national wealth 
accumulation12.  
Although the NFSD indicates that South Africa’s per capita ecological footprint is currently well 
beyond the carrying capacity of the earth’s ecosystems to sustain, 13 this national average disguises 
the stark inequalities between upper and middle-class populations and millions of resource- and 
income-poor groups, who have been historically disenfranchised and excluded from wealth and 
privilege enjoyed by energy and resource-hungry lifestyles of the national elite. 
Whilst wealthy consumers, provisioned by governments and corporations, are living well beyond the 
means of the earth’s life-support systems to sustain; those suffering the effects of pollution, 
                                                          
12 ‘South Africa would have a net negative per person rate of national wealth accumulation (of at least $2 per 
year), according to even the World Bank’ (Bond, 2008, online, accessed 21/O7/2O11). 
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 According to the NFSD (2OO8), using the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) estimate which gives the global “fair 
share” of 1,8 hectares per person ‘if we are all to live within the carrying capacity of the planet’s ecosystems’, 
the South African average of 4.O2 hectares ‘means that we would need two planets if everyone lived like the 















environmental degradation and resource depletion, are compelled to ‘adapt’ through eking out a 
living on the edges of overcrowded urban settlements or in degraded and impoverished rural areas 
(Harvey, 199O; Davis, 2OO4, 2OO6)  tied into industrial systems of production and consumption, 
‘without  chance of access to a share of global wealth’( Adams, 2OO9, p. 185). Meanwhile, industrial 
society continues to mine non-renewable resources, commodifying natural, human and immaterial 
resources to generate profit, and exercising hegemonic control over how the world’s landscapes 
should be divided up, utilised and managed. 
As Du Plessis (2OO8) highlights, ‘wealthy people often control access to ecosystem services, and 
because of their higher levels of disposable income, are better buffered from changes in the 
availability of those services…By contrast, the poor often lack choices and are highly vulnerable to 
ecosystem changes that result in famine, drought or floods…Degradation affects their very survival’ 
(p. 24). Capitalist political-economic organisation works to ‘reward those in a structural position to 
profit from it, but only at the expense of others elsewhere’ (Adams, 2OO9, p. 185). Indeed, Low and 
Gleeson (1998)  argue that unequal exposure to environmental risks and other ‘externalities’ of 
industrial production falls along contours of class and race, indicating the existence of 
‘environmental racism’.   
Furthermore, whilst a key strategy for meeting mainstream national and international ecological 
conservation objectives is through the expansion of conservation parks; critics argue that this 
approach can be experienced as a form of environmental apartheid, where protected areas are 
imposed on local and indigenous communities, who in many cases lose customary rights to land and 
resources (Cronon, 1995; Brockington, 2OO2; West, 2OO6; Benjaminsen et al., 2OO8). As Magome 
and Murombedzi (2OO3)  have highlighted, ‘game parks’ and ‘nature reserves’ were historically 
imposed on colonial subjects by European colonisers, who had little respect for pre-existing modes 
of natural resource use, farming and hunting. Traditional forms of livelihood and ways of engaging 
with the land were often dismissed as primitive or prohibited as harmful.  
European forms of social and economic development, urbanisation, industrialisation and commercial 
farming were promoted as the desirable path of ‘development’. Meanwhile sections of ‘nature’ were 
cordoned off as ‘wilderness reserves’, from which humans were imagined to be separate, even while 
increasingly elaborate forms of scientific and managerial control were devised to maintain them 
(Cronon, 1995; Scott, 1998; Adams and Mulligan, 2OO3) . Nature reserves and game parks thus 
continued to be recreational areas for a governing elite during the Apartheid era in southern Africa 















Furthermore, Chapin (2OO4) highlights that calls in the 198Os and early 199Os among international 
conservation organisations for a ‘democratization’ of conservation and support for ‘community-
based’ forms of ‘natural resource management’, has since fallen swiftly into the background, in 
favour of ambitious ‘eco-region’-wide, ‘strictly science-based’ modes of conservation. Indeed, 
Hutton et al. (2OO5)  suggest that we are seeing a ‘back to the barriers’ approach to nature 
conservation, which has meant a return to top-down, undemocratic and locally unaccountable 
approaches to environmental governance. It is this vision of ‘wild Africa’, without (local) people, that 
is receiving the support of influential conservationists, nationally and internationally. And it is the 
private property approach that is being pursued to bring areas under exclusive ownership, fence 
them, and where necessary (re)introduce selected wildlife populations (Igoe and Brockington, 
2OO7).  
Contrary to Bryant and Bailey’s (1997) assertion that ‘the environment in the Third World is largely a 
livelihood issue’ (p. 159), an integrated understanding of the root causes of continuing 
environmental deterioration, inequality and poverty in South Africa, requires a critical perspective 
on historical and contemporary forms of political and economic decision-making and systems of 
organisation that thwart attempts to achieve democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable 


























Chapter 3: Post-1994, A New direction in governance for South Africa? 
 
The ANC Government, elected by South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, inherited a legacy 
of environmentally unsustainable industrial development, as well as a national society marked by 
the racist population policies of the Apartheid regime. The democratic government thus developed a 
new legislative and policy framework which promised to address this legacy and achieve a more 
sustainable and socially equitable form of national development.  
The chapter thus introduces key legislation and policy relating to environmental management, 
coastal governance, land reform and reform of the mining industry, which have a bearing on systems 
of governance, resource use and development in the Namaqualand coastal region, post-1994. The 
promise and potential of new legislative and policy frameworks to achieve substantial social and 
environmental rights that have hitherto been denied is emphasised; though it is imperative to 
consider how these policy approaches are translating into practice. The chapter thus includes 
discussion on some of the key obstacles and challenges to achieving greater social equity, redress of 
historic discrimination, enhanced democratic participation and environmentally sustainable forms of 
socio-economic development through a legislative and policy-based approach. 
 
3.1 The Constitution and NEMA 
 
According to section 24 of the new Constitution, every person is ‘afforded with the right to an 
environment which is not harmful to their health and well-being’. Not only is every person entitled 
to enjoy this right, but the Constitution also places a constitutional mandate on Government to 
protect the environment through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent pollution, 
ecological degradation, promote conservation and secure ecological sustainable development and 
use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development (RSA 
Constitution, 1O8 of 1996, section 24).  
According to Clause 24 of the South African Bill of Rights, everyone has the right: a)  to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being; and b)  to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and 
other measures that i)  prevent pollution and ecological degradation; ii)  promote conservation; and 
iii)  secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources, while promoting 















Environmental Management Act (NEMA, Act 1O7 of 1998) was introduced to institutionalise this 
Constitutional commitment to environmental entitlement.  
According to the preamble of NEMA: 
 Everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to his or her health or well-
being;  
 The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the social, economic and environmental 
rights of everyone and strive to meet the basic needs of previously disadvantaged 
communities; 
 Inequality in the distribution of wealth and resources, and the resultant poverty, are among 
the important causes as well as the results of environmentally harmful practices; 
 Sustainable development requires the integration of social, economic and environmental 
factors in the planning, implementation and evaluation of decisions to ensure that 
development serves present and future generations; and 
 Everyone has the right to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures (RSA, NEMA, 1998, 
preamble). 
Intended to ensure environmental management policies are integrated into the mandate of all 
organs of state, NEMA is regarded as the cornerstone of South Africa’s sustainability planning 
policies (Friedmann and King, 2OO8, p. 37),  the importance of which is emphasised by van der Linde 
and Feris (2O1O), who argue that ‘the National Environmental Management Act can be described as 
one of the most progressive developments in environmental norm setting which guides individuals, 
institutions and government in environmental decision making’ (p. 5). The preamble of NEMA 
outlined that, ‘the law should establish procedures and institutions to facilitate and promote public 
participation in environmental governance; that the law should be enforced by the State and that 
the law should facilitate the enforcement of environmental laws by civil society’. NEMA thus 
provides for a range of key elements such as environmental principles, co-operative governance, 
duty of care, enforcement mechanisms and integrated environmental management.  
Meanwhile, the Act elaborates on what is meant by environmental justice and social equity. 
According to the Principles of NEMA, ‘Environmental justice must be pursued so that adverse 
environmental impacts shall not be distributed in such a manner as to unfairly discriminate against 
any person, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged persons’ (section 4. c); and ‘ Equitable access 















well-being must be pursued and special measures may be taken to ensure access thereto by 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination (section 4.d). 
Out of NEMA have come a selection of specific laws, including: the Protected Areas Act (57 of 2OO3), 
the Biodiversity Act (1O of 2OO4), the Air Quality Act (39 of 2OO4), the Waste Act (59 of 2OO8), the 
Integrated Coastal Management Act (24 of 2OO8), and the Water Act (36 of 1998). 
 
3.2 Protected Areas and Conservation of Biodiversity 
The Protected Areas Act (PAA, 57 of 2OO3) provides for ‘the protection and conservation of 
ecologically viable areas representative of the country’s biological diversity, its natural landscapes 
and seascapes. It further provides for the establishment of a national register of protected areas, the 
management of these areas, co-operative governance, public participation and matters related to 
protected areas’. The Act makes provision for the declaration and management of protected areas 
which will form a nationally representative network of protected areas on state, private and 
communal land, in order to manage and conserve biodiversity and preserve the ‘ecological 
character’ of such areas (Objectives of the Act, sections a-d). The Act promotes ‘sustainable 
utilisation of protected areas for the benefit of people’, and ‘participation of local communities in 
protected areas where appropriate’ (sections e- f). 
Meanwhile, the National Biodiversity Ac  (NBA, 1O of 2OO4) further promotes the sustainable 
management and conservation of biological diversity, outlining that indigenous biological resources 
must be used in a ‘sustainable manner’. The Act defines ecological sustainability as use of a resource 
in a way and rate that (a) would not lead to its long-term decline; (b) would not disrupt the 
ecological integrity of the ecosystem in which it occurs; and (c) would ensure its continued use to 
meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations of people (NBA, 2OO4, 1. 
definitions). Moreover, the National biodiversity Institute established by the Act is empowered to 
‘coordinate and implement programmes for the rehabilitation of ecosystems’ (11. m.i) and to 
coordinate programmes to involve civil society in: the conservation and sustainable use of 
indigenous biological resources; and the rehabilitation of ecosystems’ (11. n. i & ii). 
According to the 2OO4 National Spatial Biodiversity Assessment, the current national system of 
protected areas and conservation areas does not afford sufficient protection to the majority of 
biomes and marine bioregions. The National Protected Area Expansion Strategy (2OO7) mentions 
that ‘only four of the 11 biomes have more than their PA [Protected Area] target represented in the 















(34%) of the vegetation types have their protected area (PA) target met within the National PAS (p. 
6). 
The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (DEAT, NBSAP, 2OO5), and the National 
Biodiversity Framework (DEAT, NBF, 2OO7) thus reflect the intent of Government to ‘expand, 
consolidate and/or rationalise the protected area (system) through a range of implementation tools, 
focusing on priority areas for representation and persistence of biodiversity’ (NPAES, 2OO7, p. 6). 
The 2OO7 National Protected Area Expansion Strategy (NPAES) proposes that, in order ‘to meet the 
country’s international and national obligations and commitments to the expansion of its National 
PAS, nearly 3O OOO km2 of terrestrial PAs will need to be incorporated into the National PAS by 
2O12, and nearly 12O OOO km2 by 2O28’ (DEAT & SANBI, NPAES, 2OO7, p.7). Two ‘preferred 
mechanisms’ for achieving this goal were identified: 1) For public land, the declaration of available, 
under-utilised and strategic parcels of public land in concordance with the relevant legal 
requirements for disposal of such land; and 2) For private land, contractual agreements with the 
affected landowners (p. 7). 
Critics of this protected area expansion policy have highlighted the need to redress a historical 
legacy in which conservation agendas and exclusive access game reserves were imposed on rural 
communities, who were thus deprived of their right to derive a livelihood from the use of natural 
resources, whilst experiencing few of the benefits of protected areas (e.g. Murombedzi, 2OO3; 
Benjaminsen et al., 2OO8). Benjaminsen et al. (2OO6) highlight, in reference to Namaqualand, in 
view of a history of racial and social injustice, it is ethically problematic to privilege conservation of a 
maximum level of biodiversity and one particular perception of the ideal landscape at the expense of 
livelihood security and poverty alleviation. 
Cognisant of this legacy, the National Protected Areas Act makes provision for derivation of a broad 
range of benefits from National Parks, including, ‘spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and 
tourism opportunities which are environmentally compatible; and contribution to economic 
development, where feasible’ (PAA, 2OO3, 2O. c & d). In the case of declaration of nature reserves, 
the Act further recognises the need ‘to provide for a sustainable flow of natural products and 
services to meet the needs of a local community; to enable the continuation of such traditional 
consumptive uses as are sustainable; or to provide for nature-based recreation and tourism 
















3.3 Integrated and Sustainable Coastal Management 
The new Constitution and a growing awareness of the need for sustainable coastal development 
provided a ‘positive climate for promoting effective coastal management in the interests of all South 
Africans’ (DEAT, 1998). The 1998 government Green Paper, ‘Towards Sustainable Coastal 
Development’ proclaimed, ‘For the first time in our history, the transition to a democratic 
Government in 1994 allowed all South Africans to enjoy equal rights of access to and enjoyment of 
the coast’ (DEAT, 1998)14.  The 2OOO White paper for Sustainable Coastal Development further 
emphasised, ‘in the past, coastal benefits were enjoyed only by a privileged few in South Africa. 
Proactive facilitation of sustainable coastal development projects along the coast is essential to 
begin to address the great inequalities of our past’ (DEAT, 2OOO White Paper, section 2.2.2). 
The 2OOO White Paper heralded a new government approach to marine and coastal governance 
that would be accountable to the needs and interests of coastal communities, ecologically 
sustainable and integrative, with the various government departments involved in marine coastal 
management working together with resource users and coastal communities to reach an equitable, 
accountable and sustainable form of environmental governance and socio-economic development.  
The White Paper mentioned that ‘harnessing and sustaining the development potential of our coast 
will require a significant change in thinking about how to plan and manage the coastal development 
process’ (DEAT, 2OOO, White Paper, section 2.2.2). According to the White Paper, ‘the inter-
dependence between users and uses of coastal services requires a dedicated, co-ordinated and 
integrated approach to coastal management’. Such an approach will help to maintain the health of 
coastal ecosystems and the flow of services upon which coastal communities depend. It is only in 
this way that the full potential of coastal ecosystems will be realised and sustained (DEAT, 2OOO). 
The Integrated Coastal Management Act (ICMA, 24 of 2OO8), which was finally promulgated in 
2OO8, marks a culmination of this change in policy focus towards a more democratic and 
environmentally sustainable system of integrated coastal governance within the coastal zone. 
According to the preamble to the Act, ‘whereas much of the rich natural heritage of our coastal zone 
is being squandered by overuse, degradation and inappropriate management’; and ‘whereas the 
economic, social and environmental benefits of the coastal zone have been distributed unfairly in 
the past’; ICMA (2OO8) states the Government’s intention to retain the coast ‘as a national asset’, 
with public rights to access and benefit from the many opportunities provided by coastal resources.  
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 The 2OOO White Paper contains substantial changes from the initial 1998 Green Paper. Thus the two are 















This involves preserving, protecting and enhancing ‘the status of coastal public property as being 
held in trust by the state on behalf of all South Africans, including future generations’ and ensuring 
that the development and use of natural resources within the coastal zone is ‘socially and 
economically justifiable and ecologically sustainable’ (ICMA, 2OO8, preamble). Management of 
coastal public property and coastal resources, is thus to be according to the ‘interests of the whole 
community’ of South Africa. ICMA outlines that this ‘means the collective interests of the 
community’ determined by: 
a) prioritising the collective interests in coastal public properly of all persons living in the Republic 
over the interests of a particular group or sector of society; 
b) adopting a long-term perspective that takes into account the interests of future generations in 
inheriting coastal public properly and a coastal environment characterised by healthy and 
productive ecosystems and economic activities that are ecologically and socially sustainable; and 
c) taking into account the interests of other living organisms that are dependent on the coastal 
environment (ICMA, 2OO8, 1. definitions). 
However, the pro-democratic move to ‘opening up access’ to historically excluded users and 
transitioning to a more popularly accountable, inclusive and participatory approach to coastal 
governance has in practice been tempered by a reluctance to shift away from a highly centralised 
regulatory approach, which gives priority to large-scale commercial industry, private land ownership 
and a natural science-based, single stock assessment approach to marine management.  
As a 2OO6 report on the ‘Biological, Social and economic impact of rights allocation in the BCLME 
Region’15 highlights, the South African Government has attempted to retain tight regulatory control 
over every facet of commercial and artisanal fishing sectors, so that no fishing is permitted without 
governmental authorisation (EnviroFish, 2OO6, p. 3). This has been deemed necessary to halt over-
fishing and depletion of fish stocks, and to ensure the ‘optimum utilisation’ and ‘sustainable 
development of marine and living resources’, balancing ecological conservation with the objectives 
of ‘economic growth, human resources development, capacity building within fisheries and 
mariculture branches and employment creation’ (EnviroFish, 2OO6, p. 3)16. 
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 Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem, spanning the West coasts of South Africa, Namibia and Angola. 
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The National Government, through the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) 17, 
thus reserves the right to determine how rights of access to , use and sale of marine and living 
resources will be allocated, in a way strikes a ‘sound ecological balance, consistent with the 
development objectives of national government’ (EnviroFish, 2OO6, p. 3). 
As according the FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, South Africa’s governance 
approach assumes, ‘access must be limited to prevent over-exploitation resulting from open 
access…Closed access and regulated fisheries allow for effective management of natural resources 
exploited by certain persons. Where resources are held in trust by the government on behalf of 
citizens of the country, those privileged enough to be authorised to exploit fish stocks are able to 
account to regulating authorities how ,much harvesting [they are doing] and at what profit.’ 
(Envirofish, 2OO6, p.2, quoting the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries). 
Whilst the White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development (2OOO) committed the government to 
the alleviation of coastal poverty ‘through proactive coastal development initiatives that generate 
sustainable livelihood options’ and promotion of ‘diversity, vitality and long-term viability of coastal 
economies and activities, giving preference to those that are distinctly coastal or dependent on a 
coastal location’ (DEAT, 2OOO, section 7.2); in fact the governing approach has focused 
predominantly on ensuring the ‘significant contribution’ of commercial fisheries towards Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and their role as industrial sector employers, can be sustained.  
Environmental sustainability has been interpreted as the need to manage, mitigate and reduce 
adverse ecological impacts and over-fishing of commercial fish stocks, through, amongst others, 
restricting the amount of allocated fishing quotas and designating Protected Areas (PA’s) where 
marine harvesting can be forbidden or strictly limited. 
This is despite South Africa’s pledge to implement the SADC Protocol on Fisheries (2OO3), which 
committed the parties to promoting and enhancing food security, generating economic 
opportunities and safeguarding the livelihood of fishing communities; and to alleviating poverty of 
coastal communities in a way that ensures sustainable utilisation of renewable resources (Cullinan et 
al., 2OO5, p. 3-5). 
The SADC Protocol on Fisheries commits the South African Government to, inter alia, ‘develop and 
nurture small-scale commercial fisheries and optimise the economic and social benefits thereof; take 
measures to facilitate the provision of physical and social infrastructures and support services to 
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develop artisanal, subsistence and small scale fisheries; and to involve and consult these fishers in 
the control and management of their fishing and related activities’ (Cullinan et al., 2OO5, p. 3-5).  
Yet, Cullinan et al. (2OO5) highlighted that, though a government Task Group18 recommended that a 
small-scale/artisanal fishery policy be developed, the South African government had yet to develop a 
legal and institutional framework that would recognise and support small-scale fisheries. The 
government has since drafted a small-scale fishery policy (DAFF, 2O1O), though this has yet to be 
promulgated. This has meant no special legal provisions have existed to protect and support small-
scale commercial fishers (Cullinan et al., 2OO5, p. iii). 
Furthermore, a 2OO8 study of small-scale fishery management in South Africa, on behalf of the 
Coastal and Marine Committee’s National Environmental Advisory Forum, recommended that 
‘current institutional arrangements are not conducive to integrated fisheries and coastal zone 
management’, and that ‘national, provincial and local government institutional structures need to 
coordinate their activities’, through adopting a ‘holistic and integrated approach’, which engages 
small-scale fishers in key decision-making processes that will determine their livelihood options 
(EEU, 2OO8, p. 3-4).  
It is only through realising the inter-connections between factors such as poverty, unemployment, 
food insecurity and resource-depletion; and facilitating the participation and collaboration of those 
who have historically been excluded from systems of marine and coastal governance, that 
complementary livelihoods can be developed, which satisfy criteria for social, economic and 
ecological sustainability. 
 
3.4 Land Reform 
The revolutionary voice of the ANC pre-1994 politicised land, making it a key symbol of dignity, 
freedom and hope. In the public imagination, substantial land reform would lead to an end of 
poverty, racial oppression and inequality in South Africa (Hall, 2OO9). The position of the ANC in 
1994 was, ‘Land is the most basic need for rural dwellers. Apartheid policies pushed millions of black 
South Africans into overcrowded and impoverished reserves, homelands and townships. In addition, 
capital-intensive agricultural policies led to the large-scale eviction of farm dwellers from their land 
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 The Subsistence Fisheries Task Group Report ("SFTG Report") recommended the creation of a small-scale 
fisheries sector in order to cater for those fishers who did not fit the subsistence criteria, who wished to gain 
access to commercial fishing rights but would operate at the lower end of the commercial fishing spectrum. 















and homes…Only a tiny proportion of black people can afford land on the free market.’ (ANC, 1994, 
19, in Hall, ed., 2OO9, p. 1). 
The apartheid legacies of dispossession and poverty were addressed through a legislative framework 
which sought to formalise informal and traditional systems of land tenure; to redistribute land to the 
landless and those confined by policies such as the Natives Land Act19 to overcrowded ‘homelands’; 
and to restore land or provide compensation for those whose land rights were denied through racist 
government policies. The three-pronged government approach included, ‘fostering the conditions 
that facilitate equitable access to land’ through land redistribution; ‘provision of tenure security or 
comparable redress to those whose tenure is legally insecure’, through tenure reform; and 
‘restoration of land rights or equitable redress’ through restitution (Constitution, Act 1O8 of 1996, 
section 25 (5-7)).  
The promise of the new government was to radically transform patterns of land ownership and land 
use in a way that would be pro-poor, and supportive of rural communities in meeting their living 
from the land (May and Lahiff, 2OO7; Lebert and Rohde, 2OO7; Ntsebeza and Hall, 2OO7). The 
target was set at 3O% of agricultural land to be redistributed to black South Africans.  
However, as of 2OO8, around only 4% of white-owned agricultural land had been redistributed 
through all aspects of land reform combined (Hall, ed., 2OO9, p. 2). Whilst approximately one 
thousand land redistribution projects had achieved the transfer of 2.2 million hectares of land 
through land redistribution by July 2OO6; only one million hectares had been transferred through 
land restitution. Moreover, as Lahiff (2OO8) highlights, much of this land actually remains 
incorporated into nature reserves and state forests, and, in terms of restitution agreements 
between claimants and the state, is not accessible for direct use by the restored owners (p. 4).  
Usually land redistribution has taken the form of a ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ agreement, where 
the Land Commission negotiates purchase of a farm the owner is willing to sell at the going market 
price. This land is then redistributed to large groups, which form a Community Property Association20 
or other legal entity to own and manage the land jointly. Alternatives have included part-ownership 
through for instance equity sharing arrangements on commercial farms; or state ownership where a 
Municipality holds the land in trust for community use as a commonage pasture. 
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 The Natives Land Act 9, 1913, prevented African peoples from purchasing non-agricultural land, and 
confined them to historic or traditional lands, thereby reinforcing the exclusion of African peoples from the 
more commercially-oriented sectors, and placing the bulk of land in white ownership. (Godden et al., 2OO8, p. 
11). 
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 The Communal Property Association (CPA) is a juristic person formed by a group, in order to acquire, hold 
and manage property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a written constitution 















Critics have blamed a ‘minimalist’ approach to land reform for the disappointing performance of 
government (SPP, 2OO4; May and Lahiff, 2OO7; Hall 2OO9). Due to the ‘Property Clause’ in the new 
Constitution, the powers of the government to expropriate land from existing land owners; limits 
right of restitution to only those cases occurring after 1913; and ensures a market-based programme 
is pursued to achieve land redistribution (Cousins, 1997). According to the organisation the Surplus 
People’s Project (SPP), this is despite a ‘broad-based consensus within society that the current 
market based land reform strategy would not resolve the agrarian question in our society. The most 
significant impediments include property relations (willing buyer, willing seller approach) and the 
limited role of the state’ (SPP, 2OO4, p.4). 
Lahiff (2OO8) highlights, ‘the combination of a private property regime –modelled on the prevailing 
system of freehold in South Africa – and group ownership creates multiple tensions, which to date 
have barely been acknowledged in South African policy debates’. Whilst the Department of Land 
Affairs facilitates the establishment of Communal Property Associations, as according to the 
Communal Property Act (CPA, 28 of 1998), the DLA provides no continuing support to CPA’s to 
ensure they fulfil their intended functions and meet criteria for social equity and democratic 
accountability.21 
Monopolisation of resources by group leaders or powerful individuals and uncertainty regarding 
access to and utilisation of resources, as well as ‘widespread problems of inadequate and 
inappropriate planning of resettlement projects, a chronic lack of support from state agencies and a 
general failure to make effective use of land for the benefit of group members’ (PLAAS, 2OO6, 
quoted in Lahiff, 2OO8, p.8) is leading to a situation where the majority of beneficiaries of land 
restitution projects ‘are receiving no material benefit whatsoever from restitution, whether in the 
form of cash income or access to land’ (p.9) 
Lahiff (2OO8) identifies as a key problem official reluctance to accept the need for ‘more radical 
restructuring of the [agricultural] sector – in particular, a transition from large-scale commercial 
farming to smaller, low-input, family-based production that would include at least a portion of self-
provisioning’ (p.5). Continuing to prioritise large-scale, capital intensive agriculture for a commercial 
market, The Department of Land Affairs has forced land-seekers to organise themselves into groups 
and to pool their resources in order to collectively attempt to manage large farms as a single 
commercial unit (Lahiff, 2OO8, p.5).  
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 The Constitutional Principles of the Communal Property Association, outlined in the Communal Property Act 
(28 of 1996) include: fair and inclusive decision making; equity of membership democratic processes; fair 
access to property; accountability and transparency; security of tenure; sustainability; and compliance to 















In some cases, where communities lack the necessary skills and resources to do this, the Commission 
on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) has imposed a model of ‘strategic partnerships’ where farm 
management is turned over to a professional (usually white) farm manager or outsourced to 
commercial management companies for a number of years  (Lahiff, 2OO8, p.5). But more commonly, 
‘large groups have been simply incapable of implementing the imposed business plan, and strongly 
discouraged from exploring alternative models of land use, with the result that resource use, and 
benefits of participants, have fallen far short of expectations’ (Lahiff, 2OO8, p. 5-6).   
In addition, Wynberg and Sowman (2OO7), highlight that there has been a significant neglect of 
long-term environmental sustainability considerations in land reform. They argue that the political 
objective of attempting to fast-track land reform settlements has contributed to a situation where 
over 8O% of land reform projects are failing to meet their developmental aims (Diako et al., 2OO6) 
or achieve environmental conservation and sustainable livelihood outcomes.  
 Although the Director General in 2OO1 and the Minister of Land Affairs in 2OO3 formally recognised 
‘the need for incorporating environmental issues into land reform processes, in order to improve the 
quality of land reform’, agreeing to policy guidelines to establish ‘sound land use practices and 
enhance the quality of land reform delivery to improve sustainability and livelihood opportunities for 
land reform participants’ (DLA, 2OO3, p. vii, quoted in Wynberg and Sowman, 2OO7, p. 79O); 
according to Wynberg and Sowman (2OO7), these principles were never institutionalised or 
implemented (p. 79O).  
Wynberg and Sowman (2OO7) argue that a key problem is that environmental factors are seldom 
integrated into planning and d cision-making processes in land reform cases, or across other 
government departments and agencies. Instead, environmental safeguards are often perceived as a 
hindrance to economic development (Wynberg and Sowman, 2OO7). Whilst the Constitution and 
NEMA promote an integrated environmental management approach which is to be applied to the 
formulation and implementation of all policies, programmes, plans and projects; in reality, 
environmental management remains a ‘highly fragmented legal landscape’ and government 
departments continue to ‘work in silos, tightly linked to their political mandates, priorities and 
sectoral budgets’ (Wynberg and Sowman, 2OO7, p. 789). 
  
3.5 Reforming the Mining Industry 
Prior to the 1994 election, the ANC had threatened nationalisation of South Africa’s diamond mines, 















would be enjoyed by the previously disadvantaged non-white majority of the nation (Roberts, 
2OO7). The 1955 ANC Freedom Charter stated ‘the mineral wealth beneath the soil, monopoly 
industries and banks shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole’ (ANC, 1955 
Freedom Charter, clause 3). Whilst white-owned mining companies had extracted much mineral 
wealth from the country, according to the Government’s Department of Finance, in 1993-4, the year 
before the election, the taxes paid by the diamond mining industry totalled just 1.2% of the value of 
the diamonds it sold (Roberts, 2OO7, p. 3O3).  
A direct nationalisation of mining industries in order to ensure it met the requirements of the new 
democratic order would likely have been met with significant resistance from the industry22. 
Mandela, South Africa’s first democratically elected President, thus pursued a reconciliation strategy 
that moved away from direct nationalisation, proposing instead that mining companies should 
reform themselves voluntarily to ensure their structures and benefit flows should be more 
equitable.  
Yet, in 2OO2, the new government officially (re)claimed the country’s minerals ‘for the Nation’, 
legislating to vest mineral rights in the government. According to the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRDA 28 of 2OO2), the mineral resources of South Africa belong to 
‘the people of South Africa’, and are held in trust by the state for the benefit of all South Africans23. 
The MPRDA legislates ‘equitable access to, and sustainable development of, the nation’s mineral and 
petroleum resources’ and necessitates environmental protection and rehabilitation in cases of mine-
closure.  
According to section 38(d), mining lease holders ‘must as far as is reasonably practicable, rehabilitate 
the environment affected by prospecting or mining operations to its natural or predetermined state, 
or to a land use which conforms to the generally accepted principle of sustainable development’. 
Sections 24.3 (b-d) and 39(1) also require that mine operators conduct Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) and submit Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) as well as Social and 
Labour Plans (SLPs) to the Department of Minerals and Energy (now DMR) to be approved before 
mining leases will be granted or renewed. 
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 Indeed, according to Roberts (2OO7), by the time of the release of a government research paper suggesting 
the countries mineral resources should belong to the state, DeBeers had already established a Swiss entity, ‘De 
Beers Centenary’, to divert its revenues away from the tax reach of the new South African government (p. 
3O5). In addition, the company had already shipped out South Africa’s gems to stockpile in London prior to the 
1994 elections. (p.3O6). 
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A ‘Mineral Regulation Branch’ of the Department of Mineral Resources (replacing the DME) has been 
established to ‘ensure the execution of the provisions of the MPRDA, 2OO2 through processing 
applications, issuing or granting rights and permits, approving environmental management 
programmes (EMPs), monitoring performance, undertaking corrective actions and issuing closure. 
The directorate is also responsible for reporting on the performance of the "environmental right" in 
terms of South Africa's Constitution to the South African Human Rights Commission on an annual 
basis’ (DMR official website, accessed 18/O7/2O11). 
Mining activities also come under the jurisdiction of specific environmental management legislation. 
For example, according to the Air Quality Act (39 of 2OO4), communities are to be protected from 
air pollution by ‘providing reasonable measures for the prevention of pollution and ecological 
degradation’ (Mohamed, 2OO6, p. 35 ref. Air Quality Act, 39 of 2OO4). Specifically in relation to 
mine closure, the Act requires that within 5 years prior to cessation of the mine, the owner must 
notify the Minister of DEAT of post-mining rehabilitation plans and measures to prevent atmospheric 
dust pollution, which must use the ‘best practicable means’. 
 Meanwhile, the Water Act (36 of 1998) should ensure that the owner or person in control of a 
water resource has the responsibility of avoiding pollution of the water resource and is liable for 
damaged cause, costs of clean-up and remedial expenses for benefits derived from polluting 
activities. Mining companies are required to submit Environmental Management Programme 
Reports to the Department of Water Affairs, and their management programme should involve 
systems and structures of water use that avoid contamination of clean water systems with polluted 
water, that will remain functional for at least 5O years subsequent to mine closure (Mohamed, 
2OO6, p. 35). 
In 2OO2, the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME, now DMR) also promulgated a Broad-Based 
Socio-Economic Empowerment Mining Charter for the South African Mining Industry (DME, BBSEE 
Mining Charter, 11 October 2OO2).The Mining Charter established the objective of achieving 26% 
black ownership of South Africa’s mining assets by 2O14; and further highlighted seven key areas 
that are thus to be transformed through a Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment (BBSEE) 
approach. These include: 1) human resource development, 2) employment equity, 3) migrant labour, 
4) mine community development, 5) housing and living conditions, 6) procurement and 7) 
beneficiation and procurement.  
 However, the 2OO9 Mining Charter Impact Assessment Report (DMR, 2OO9), the first governmental 















the target for black ownership of mining enterprises had been set for 15% within the first five years; 
in fact only 8.9% black ownership had been achieved (p. 17). Transformation of the sector had been 
disappointingly slow and top management and technical positions continue to be dominated by 
white men and women (p. 16-17), who earn more than their black counterparts, regardless of skills 
or experience (p. 9). 
 The Mining Charter Impact Assessment Report found that ‘progress on employment equity [has 
been] minimal’24; and a ‘narrow’ black economic empowerment approach is evident, in which 
mining companies make use of ‘handpicked individuals disguised as representing the broader 
interest of host communities’ (DMR, MC IAR, 2OO9, p. 1O).  
Moreover, the review found ‘no direct link between proposed and implemented community 
development projects as far as affected communities are concerned.’ The disjuncture between 
company CSR projects and local community needs and interests was determined to be the ‘result of 
inefficient consultation processes, poor, or lack of collaboration with communities and lack of 
alignment to established LED [local economic development] frameworks’ (DMR, 2OO9, MC IAR, p. 
1O). 
The 2OO9 review criticised empowerment deals on the grounds of their ‘structural malaise’, through 
which Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) entities were placed in an ‘invidious financial position’ 
through being tied into repaying high interest loans on acquired assets that in numerous cases 
continued beyond the predicted life of the mine and had ‘onerous conditions attached’, thus 
discouraging broader Historically Disadvantaged South African (HDSA) 25 participation (DMR, MC IAR, 
p. 18). A disappointing 9% of HDSAs achieving ownership in the mining industry is further 
undermined when the incidence of ‘fronting’26  of HDSA individuals is taken into consideration.  
The updated BBSEE Charter for Mining and the Minerals Industry, which amends the MPRDA of 
2OO2 (DMR, 2O1O), thus reinforced the earlier commitment to redressing the results of past or 
present discrimination of HDSAs in the mineral and petroleum industries and secondary industries. 
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 ‘White South Africans continue to occupy top management positions, earning more than blacks, regardless 
of skill or experience’. (DMR MC IAR, 2OO9, p.8). 
25
 ‘Historically Disadvantaged South Africans’ refers to South African citizens, category of persons or 
community, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination before the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1993, (Act 2OO of 1993) came into operation, which should be representative of the demographics of the 
country.’ (MPRDA, No. 28 of 2OO2, 1. Definitions). 
26
 According to the DMR Mining Charter Impact Assessment Report, 2OO9, ‘’Fronting’, whereby a HDSA 
individual is hired to fulfil BBSEE criteria, but remains excluded from real decision-making fora, is an insult and 















Meaningful participation, according to the Amendment, should take the form of involvement of 
HDSAs in ownership and management of mining interests and socio-economic investment in mining 
communities to improve their welfare, educational and employment opportunities (DMR, 2O1O, p. 
iii). The amendment emphasised the need to integrate the socio-economic development of mine 
workers, host communities and major labour sending areas, and areas which were becoming ‘ghost 
towns’, due to irresponsible practice of the mining industry. 
 
3.6 Discussion: Fast-Tracking Economic Growth in South Africa 
Despite a much-acclaimed new environmental management policy framework, the 2OO6 South 
African Environmental Outlook Report clearly indicated that there has been a serious lack of 
implementation and enforcement, and that South Africa’s ecosystem processes and natural resource 
base have continued to decline (DEAT, 2OO6).  
Friedmann and King (2OO8) report that environmental policies have been increasingly been actively 
undermined by the very government that shaped them (p. 37). They criticise the promulgation of 
strategies such as the Government’s Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(AsgiSA, 2OO6) for fast-tracking an agenda for economic growth that seems to be premised on 
‘unlimited natural resources and an environment with limitless resilience and recuperative ability’ 
(Friedmann and King, 2OO8, p. 36). Indeed, according to AsgiSA, the Environmental Impact 
Assessment process, established by NEMA in 1998, is listed as a key constraint on achieving its 
ambitious targets. 
Friedmann and King (2OO8) argue that non-implementation of NEMA is coupled with similar attacks 
on environmental legislation by politicians who see it as an inconvenience to their plans for 
economic development. They claim that ‘the Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs (DME) is 
arguably the government department responsible for the single greatest contribution to 
environmental destruction across the country as a result of coal and mineral mining, water and air 
pollution, and habitat loss. It has increasingly been able to circumvent NEMA’, as the MPRDA 
positions the DME beyond NEMA’s jurisdiction for the process of granting approval for mining 
permits (Friedmann and King, 2OO8). 
In response to this criticism, the MPRDA was amended in 2OO8 (Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Amendment Act 49 of 2OO8). According to the Amendment, environmental 
authorization in respect of mining activities was transferred to the Department of Environmental 















Both the DMR and DEA agreed to effect the necessary legislative changes to the MPRDA and NEMA, 
so that ‘the transfer of this function would then be effective 18 months from the date on which the 
last amendment act came into effect’ (CER Report, August 14 2O1O). Yet, the Center for 
Environmental Rights reported in 2O1O that the Minister of Mineral Resources had yet to bring the 
Amendment to the MPRDA into effect.27 
Meanwhile, according to Bond (2OO8), South Africa’s post-apartheid government has reneged on its 
visionary social and economic promises in favour of pursuing neoliberal policies, which ‘excus[e] the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution [GEAR] policy28 while departing from it’. Bond argues that 
‘the rise of the ‘developmental state’ is a matter of appeasing critics of the government’s economic 
and social policies. In particular, there has been the failure to address high and worsening levels of 
unemployment and impoverishment while black economic empowerment has mainly flourished as a 
source of elite enrichment’ (Bond, 2OO8, online, accessed 21/O7/2O11).  
Although, new policies and legislation relating to social equity, environmental governance and the 
transformation of the minerals sector post-1994 seem extremely progressive and democratically 
empowering; this perception needs to be tempered with a grounded assessment of how legislative 
and policy commitments are being translated into action.  
The power of South Africa’s diamond mining industry to circumvent or ignore calls for enhancing 
democratic accountability and adherence to higher standards of social and environmental 
responsibility, needs to be understood through exploration of the historical context in which mineral 
extraction industries became established as the ‘backbone’ of the country’s national political-
economy (Innes, 1984) and conglomerated into powerful monopolistic corporations (Fine, 2OO8). 
The way in which the Minerals Energy Complex of South Africa has been adapted and changed post-
1994 then needs to be considered in order to critically evaluate the governing approach to national 
development that has gained ascendancy in the post-Apartheid context, and to consider how this 
governing approach is currently determining the course of events in the Namaqualand coastal 
region. 
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 According to the CER Report, August 14 2O1O, although the ‘National Environmental Management 
Amendment Act 62 of 2OO8 was promulgated on 5 January 2009, and came into effect on 1 May 2OO9, 
making all the necessary changes to NEMA’; the Minerals and Petroleum Resource Development Amendment 
Act 49 of 2OO8 was promulgated on 19 April 2OO9, but has not yet been brought into effect by the Minister of 
Mineral Resources.’(http://cer.org.za/virtual-library/mineral-and-petroleum-resources-development-act-
2002/ accessed 19/O7/2O11). 
28
 The Government of South Africa introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 
1996. The policy set government the goals of achieving sustained annual real GDP growth of 6% or more by 
the year 2OOO while creating 4OO,OOO new jobs each year. GEAR was meant to increase investment, 















Chapter 4: The Diamond Mining Industry, Past and Present 
4.1 Historical Background to the Diamond Mining Industry 
With the discovery of diamonds along the north-west coast of South Africa by prospector, Jack 
Carstens, in the 192Os, diamond diggers, merchants and foreign investment flooded into what had 
previously been perceived as a remote and desolate corner of British Empire. On seeing this influx of 
diamond hunters roaming the sands of Namaqualand, white farmers, who had historically staked out 
their farms on land from which indigenous San and Khoi people had been disenfranchised, J. 
Carstens wrote, ‘For us to be on the hunt for diamonds in their territory was the greatest joke they 
had ever heard. The idea was crazy’ (Carstens, 1962, p. 69). 
Yet the diamond rush would see most of the coastal land of the region bought up by mining 
companies, and, with the facilitation of an array of Government legislation, national policies and 
international investment, Namaqualand’s coastline became monopolised under the control of a 
small number of diamond companies. The two major companies that have long dominated diamond 
production along the Namaqualand coastline are De Beers, a multinational diamond mining 
company, and Alexkor, which has historically been wholly owned by the government of South Africa. 
Roberts (2OO7) writes that De Beers was originally established by Cecil Rhodes as the ‘ultimate 
imperial company’ (p. 83), intended to fund the extension of the British Empire in southern Africa. As 
Prime Minister of the Cape, Rhodes used the Cape legislature to pass laws securing cheap labour, 
resources and capital necessary to exploit diamond deposits at Kimberley, and by 1892, De Beers 
had consolidated its control over all the mines at Kimberley (Van Wyk et al. 2OO9). Furthermore, 
‘after securing the Charter for the British South Africa Company, Rhodes secured all diamond rights 
in Bechuanaland (Botswana); Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and eventually a controlling interest 
in Premier Mine, near Pretoria, for De Beers’ (Van Wyk et al. 2OO9, p. 7). 
When new diamond fields were discovered along the Atlantic coastline, with abundant alluvial 
deposits that could be mined at a cost of 1% of their value, ‘thousands of diggers poured into the 
area between Kleinzee and the Orange River29. The diggers threatened to seize the fields by force’ 
(Van Wyk et al. 2OO9, p. 7). The Government promulgated 1927 Precious Stones Act (No. 82 of 
1927) to prevent flooding of the market with cheap gems. The Act made it illegal to be found in 
possession of diamonds not registered with the police. Any diamonds confiscated under this Act 
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 The Orange River marks the current political border between Namibia and South Africa. The river is also 















would then go to the London Diamond Buying Syndicate, formed in 1893 to market the gems of all 
South Africa’s main producers. 
 
 
Figure 2: Map showing the contemporary Northern Cape Province which includes the 
Namaqualand coast in the west and Kimberley in the east, both key historical sites for diamond 
mining. 
 
Van Wyk et al. (2OO9) write, ‘this set the tone for the mining industry throughout the history of 
South Africa From this time on the industry continued to exert undue influence over government, 
with the lines between the industry and the state, and the interests of powerful mining personalities 
















The Union Government30 wished to open mining opportunities to white nationals eager to mine 
along the coast. Thus eighty kilometres of the Namaqualand coast was brought under government 
control and an Amendment to the Precious Stones Act made it illegal to prospect on private or 
Crown land without a license (Precious Stones Amendment Act of 1927, Proclamations Nos. 5O and 
51). Sixty percent of the diamonds found by those given licenses were then to be sold to the 
Government to market itself. ‘Non-whites’ were not allowed leases or to mine their own stones. 
Black and coloured people were however employed by whites to mine for them, using picks and 
shovels. Roberts (2OO7) even reports that the government organised races for prospective miners to 
peg claims on land newly released for mining. 
With the defeat of Germany in World War One, Ernest Oppenheimer, a German entrepreneur, 
secured the rich diamond field of South West Africa from the German Government31. Initially 
Oppenheimer, operating through his company Anglo American, was in competition with DeBeers. 
But in 1926 Oppenheimer finally got a seat on the Board of DeBeers and in 1929 he was appointed 
Chairman of the company. This effectively joined a South African mining monopoly with the London-
based marketing syndicate, uniting DeBeers and Anglo American32 under the Oppenheimer family 
empire. 
Roberts (2OO7) writes that the South African Government was wary of the Oppenheimer’s control 
over South Africa’s diamonds, even while they appreciated the Syndicate’s ability to fix prices and 
ensure South Africa’s diamonds were guaranteed market advantage (p. 91-92). The Government 
stipulated it would retain the right to supervise the marketing of the former German diamonds, thus 
becoming business partner in the diamond trade. The Diamond Control Act of 1925 (no. 39 of 1925, 
section 16:1) gave a government control board the power to fix diamond quotas, set minimum 
prices, to demand and receive diamonds from producers and to create a monopoly for both 
diamond sales and exports. The Union Government also sought to establish a diamond cutting 
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 The Union of South Africa was a dominion of the British Empire, established in 191O with the unity of the 
previously separate colonies of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The Union was 
superseded by the Republic of South Africa in 1961 under the Apartheid national government 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_of_South_Africa, accessed 2/O8.2O11). 
31
 In 1917, with considerable backing from the financier J.P. Morgan, Oppenheimer formed the Anglo American 
Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., to exploit the east Witwatersrand goldfield. Two years later he formed 
Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, Ltd. (reformed as the Namdeb Diamond Corp. in 1994). 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica. Search: Sir Ernest Oppenheimer). 
32
 Anglo American is a global mining company headquartered in London, United Kingdom. Founded as a gold 
mining company, the Anglo American Corporation (AAC) became the majority stakeholder in the De Beers 
company in 1926. Two years later, the AAC began mining in the Zambian copper belt. Currently, Anglo 
American is a major producer of diamonds, copper, nickel, iron ore and metallurgical and thermal coal and the 
world's largest producer of platinum, with around 40% of world output. It has operations in Africa, Asia, 
















industry in South Africa, in order to reserve the largest gems for white South African cutters (Roberts 
2OO7). 
Though the ‘roaring twenties’ in the USA provided an eager market, consuming 8O% of the world’s 
production (van Wyk et al., 2OO9, p. 9), with the US stock market crash in 1929, De Beers took the 
lead in reigning in production and trade in diamonds, initiating a new Syndicate. The Diamond 
Corporation Limited, of which the government was a member33, had the power to fix production 
quotas for mining companies, and to ensure that uncut diamonds could only be sold at three 
locations, Kimberley, London and Amsterdam, at predetermined prices (Van Wyk et al., 2OO9, p.1O). 
The Diamond Corporation also negotiated with companies mining diamonds in the Belgian Congo 
(now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Angola and British West Africa (now Namibia) to 
ensure they also sold through the Syndicate, agreeing to its terms. Van Wyk et al. (2OO9) write, ‘thus 
the Namaqualand diamonds became locked into a global producing and marketing cartel which set 
up an economic relation of dependence between African production and European marketing which 
skewed the industry in favour of London, Antwerp and after World War 2, Tel Aviv’ (p. 1O). 
 
4.2 The ANC Government and the Diamond Mining Industry 
In 2OO6, DeBeers Consolidated Mines (DBCM) officially merged with Ponahalo Investments, a Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) entity, with the latter acquiring 26% of the ordinary capital share in 
DBCM from De Beers Societé Anonyme.34 Ponahalo Investments is controlled by Ponahalo Holdings, 
a ‘dormant company, which has never engaged in any commercial activities’ but which is a BEE 
company. The transaction enables DBCM to comply with the 2OO2 Mining Charter. According to 
Ponahalo’s Chairperson, Manne Dipico, former Premier of the Northern Cape Province and current 
Chairman of the Board of De Beers South Africa, “Ponahalo will play a valuable role in supporting the 
transformation of DBCM, creating significant wealth for its shareholders and beneficiaries and 
generally adding value to the wider South African economy” (M. Dipico, quoted by Brown and 
Mackenzie, 8/11/2OO5, Mail and Guardian online, accessed 18/O7/2O11). 
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The Diamond Corporation was a producers’ association, ‘in which each member, including the government 
(who was also a producer) received a fixed percentage of trade, and the sale of diamonds became the fixed 
preserve of the Diamond Trading Company Limited, which was a subsidiary of the Diamond Corporation 
Limited’. (Van Wyk et al, 2OO9, p.9.)  
34
 Competition Tribunal, Republic of South Africa, ‘In the large merger between: Ponahalo Investments (Pty)  















The investment company intended to achieve this by using R1O million a year of its dividend income 
to make investments in South Africa, setting aside R5 million a year over the first 1O years for trusts 
for the benefit of disadvantaged women, people with disabilities and communities around DBCM’s 
mines. The balance of Ponahalo’s dividend income was to be used to pay off its debt to South 
Africa’s Standard Bank, which had funded the purchase (Brown and Mackenzie, 8/11/2OO5, Mail 
and Guardian online). 
However, according to a 2O1O news report, Ponahalo Investments was struggling to pay off its debt, 
and DBCM threatened to withdraw its dividend policy, on the grounds that it was having to pay a 
‘disproportionate’ dividend to the BEE entity. Chief Financial officer of De Beers, S. Brown told 
reporters De Beers “could not continue with the disproportionate dividend policy because it created 
expectations among other shareholders that dividends would be caught up. There would be interest 
to pay on unpaid dividends”, he said (McKay, 23/O7/2O1O , Mining Mx online, accessed 
18/O7/2O11). 
Van Wyk et al., (2OO9) suggest that the Ponahalo deal indicates that the new ANC Government has 
forged its alliance with the mineral and energy industries, in a way that implies continuity and 
business as usual rather than a radical restructuring in favour of redressing the stark gaps between 
rich and poor; and substantial integration of environmental and social sustainability objectives into 
business practice. They write, ‘South Africa is probably the only country in the world where several 
former Premiers suddenly emerge as leaders in the corporate world in minerals in which their 
provinces Sexwale (Gauteng) in gold’ (van Wyk et al., 2OO9, p. 21). 
Whilst Roberts claimed in her 2OO7 work that the ANC Mbeki government sought a share in the 
DeBeers Company similar to the deals struck by the Namibian and Botswanan Governments with De 
Beers35. In return DeBeers wanted the Illicit Diamond Buying Act to remain in force, outlawing the 
public possession of rough diamonds, and maintaining the existing monopoly (Roberts, 2OO7, p. 
313). 
According to Roberts (2OO7), De Beers pre-empted Black Economic Empowerment legislation and 
decided to ‘empower’ a number of black-run companies by selling mining rights where De Beers was 
not currently mining. However, one company thus ‘empowered’, the New Diamond Company [NDC], 
remains substantially under control of De Beers, agreeing to sell to them all its finds and remaining 
‘partner’ to De Beers in any enterprise related to the mining and marketing of diamonds (p. 315). 
                                                          
35
 The Namibian Government acquired shares in De Beers’ Namibian branch, forming ‘Namdeb’; whilst the 















Meanwhile, the ANC Government attempted to ‘privatize’ Alexkor in 2OO3, awarding an initial 
management contract to the Nabera consortium, a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) group of 
companies. Their plan had been to sell a 51% share of the company, retaining 49% state ownership 
(Roberts, 2OO7, p. 316). However, following an unprecedented court case, Alexkor was compelled 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 2OO3 to restore land and mineral rights to the Richtersveld 
Community36 (the case will be discussed in detail in chapter 5).  
 
4.3 The Changing Diamond Mining Industry of Namaqualand 
The two major companies, Alexkor and De Beers Consolidated Mines have long dominated diamond 
production along the shores of Namaqualand in the Northern Cape. Alexkor 37operates from the 
Orange River mouth to just south of Port Nolloth, while De Beers operates from Alexkor’s border to 
slightly north of the Olifants River (See Figure 3). De Beers Consolidated Mines secured a monopoly, 
gaining title to 27O,OOO hectares of land along the coast. Around these major concessions are a 
number of smaller concessions operated by companies like Trans Hex Investments38. There are 
offshore and onshore mining activities in the west coast area. Three companies dominate the 
offshore diamond industry: De Beers Consolidated Mines (mainly mid-to deep-water concessions), 
Alexkor (mainly shallow-water concessions) and Trans Hex (shallow and deep-water concessions). 
Onshore mining methods have changed dramatically over the decades, from the use of picks and 
shovels, or even picking by hand by moonlight, to mechanical extractors and concentration devices, 
to today, where ‘large mining plants process millions of tons of gravel per year, utilising heavy-media 
separation, cyclones and x-rays in the concentration process’ (Van Wyk et al., 2OO9, p.1O). 
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 Republic of South Africa, 2OO3, ‘Alexkor Ltd and the Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Richtersveld Community’, (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (Richtersveld).  
37
 Alexkor Ltd was established in 1989 when the State Alluvial Diggings was taken over from Government and 
transformed into Alexander Bay Development Corporation. Since 1992 Alexkor Ltd. was run as a public 
Company with the State as its sole shareholder. 
38
 Transhex was established n 1963 as Buffelsbank Diamante as contractor to the Small Business Corporation 
of South Africa to prospect on the state-owned Komaggas farm. The company acquired additional mines 
through the 197Os and 198Os, becoming Transhex Beleggings in 1973. A 5O% share in Transhex was acquired 
by the Rembrandt Group in 198O, and the company became listed on the Johannesburg and Namibian stock 
exchanges. The company currently operate two mining operations directly in South Africa (Baken and 
Richtersveld) along the Orange River, as well as shallow-water marine mining and through a contracted 


















Figure 3: Map depicting the onshore mining concessions of De Beers and Alexkor 
  
Marine mining off the west coast of southern Africa began in the 196Os, but operations were halted 
due to an oversupply of diamonds. Whilst some near-shore, shallow water diamond diving 
continued, deeper water and more intensive marine mining only took off in the 199Os. According to 
van Wyk et al. (2OO9), ‘These deep-water operations now represent the pinnacle of technological 
development in the diamond mining industry, requiring dedicated mining vessels, complex 















A company representative for De Beers explained that there were three forms of mining taking 
place, including shore-based diving, inshore small vessel mining, and deep-sea mining. The third 
method is undertaken by large ships, which he compared to ‘oil rigs’, and which stay out in the deep 
ocean for months at a time. The crew arrive and depart by helicopter, staying on board for up to a 
month at a time. Crew operate ‘remote vehicles that actually crawl on the ocean floor’. Guided by 
cameras, the operators of these machines suck up selected gravels to be processed on board, before 
dumping waste gravels back into the sea (DBCM Town Manager, pers. comm., September 2O1O). 
Van Wyk et al. (2OO9) reported that ‘De Beers, which commands 9O% of the diamond output in 
South Africa - estimates that the global retail market for diamond jewellery grew from US$2O-billion 
in 198O to more than $56 billion in 2OO3, with sales of diamond jewellery pieces tripling in the same 
period’ (p. 18).Yet, due to reputed decrease in demand and an ‘unfavourable global economic 
environment’, top mining companies predicted in2OO8 that they would reduce production by up to 
4O% (Hanard, 2OO8, CE of Antwerp World Diamond Centre, quoted in van Wyk et al., 2OO9, p. 18), 
which would inevitably have a detrimental impact on South African communities dependent on the 
mines.  
Downscaling, retrenchments and mine closure in South Africa have thus occurred, despite the fact 
that, according to Godden et al. (2OO8), in recent years a number of countries have seen an 
‘unprecedented boom in resource extraction’ (pg. 1). Bond (2OO8) suggests that the discrepancy is 
explained by a concerted shift of corporate funding flows and primary share listings to overseas 
stock markets.39  
Bond (2OO8) highlights that, though ‘businesses did invest their South African profits’, this was ‘not 
mainly in South Africa: dating from the time of political and economic liberalization, most of the 
largest Johannesburg Stock Exchange firms — Anglo American, DeBeers, Old Mutual, SA Breweries, 
Liberty Life, Gencor (now the core of BHP Billiton), Didata, Mondi and others — shifted their funding 
flows and even their primary share listings to overseas stock markets. The outflow of profits and 
dividends due these firms is one of two crucial reasons South Africa’s current account deficit has 
soared to among the highest in the world...and is hence a major danger in the event of currency 
instability’ (Bond, 2OO8, online, accessed 21/O7/2O11) 
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 ‘Most of the largest Johannesburg Stock Exchange firms — Anglo American, DeBeers, Old Mutual, SA 
Breweries, Liberty Life, Gencor (now the core of BHP Billiton), Didata, Mondi and others — shifted their 
















According to the company’s website, De Beers’ mining efforts are currently focussed on its 
Botswanan Jwaneng open-cast mine, which is reportedly ‘the richest diamond mine in the world’, 
producing 11.5 million carats in 2OO9; offshore marine deposits in South African and Namibian 
waters; and new mines in Canada. The new Victor Mine in Ontario, Canada, which was opened in 
2OO8, involved expenditure of a billion dollars to construct the mine, processing plant, workshop, 
warehouse, offices, fuel storage, pit dewatering, accommodation, airstrip, potable water facilities, 
sewage treatment works, waste management facilities, 1OO tonne trucks, large front-end loaders, 
dozers and support equipment.40 
 
 
Plate 1: DeBeers’ ‘dragliner’ at Namaqualand Mine has facilitated the company’s large-scale 
excavations in search for diamonds41 
 
Meanwhile, De Beers decided to halt production and sell its South African Northern Cape Mines in 
Kimberley42 and Namaqualand.  
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 De Beers also opened their other Canadian mine, Snap Lake, in 2OO8, which required comparable 
construction costs. (online: www.debeersgroup.com accessed 21/O7/2O11). 
41
 De Beers claim that the machine is now assisting with the rehabilitation effort at Namaqualand Mines 
(DBCM Environmental Manager, presenting on MCEN Tour, January 2O11). 
42
 Finsch Mine, west of Kimberley, was sold to Petra Diamonds Limited for R 1.425 billion in 2O11 (De Beers 
Group, January 2O11, online, accessed 1/O8/2O11). Petra Diamonds also bought De Beers’ underground 
















According to Bregman (2O1O), ‘Namaqualand first came to the attention of colonists because of its 
copper wealth’ (p. 63).  As Bregman (2O1O) highlights, whilst copper mining in the 18OOs proved to 
be a highly lucrative industry, the main beneficiaries were only a small number of companies, whose 
fortune was made possible by the labour of impoverished Namaqualanders (p. 74) and the 
despoliation of the natural environment.  
While the mines were responsible for entrenching a ‘wage labour system’, which tied the fate of 
employees to the boom-and-bust cycles of an export-oriented mining economy, little of the fortune 
made from copper were experienced by Namaqualanders, even as they were enrolled in its 
generation. In the wake of copper mining in the 193Os, Carstens (1962) wrote that Namaqualanders 
were ‘in absolute poverty…it really is a wonder that the people continue to exist…The coloured 
people, in particular, are in the throes of starvation and are beginning to die of want’ (p. 113).43 
Similarly, Van Wyk et al. (2OO9)  claim, ‘after almost a hundred years of diamond mining on the 
West Coast communities have little to show in terms of community development, infrastructural 
development or an existence much above that of a subsistence level’ (p. 53). Despite progressive 
governmental and corporate responsibility policies, van Wyk et al. (2OO9), found ‘the 
implementation and monitoring of these policies also seem to be problematic. As a result, serious 
environmental and social problems exist throughout the region…In a regulatory sense, it seems that 
the industry on the West Coast is embedded, like the mining in the rest of South Africa in an 
unfolding legislative environment in which the primacy of the mining industry is often in conflict with 
environmental and community concerns’ (p.53, emphasis in the original). 
According to Ferguson (2OO5) , the characteristics of colonial-era corporate paternalism, which saw 
the construction of vast company towns and far reaching social investment have been identified by 
the advocates of privatization and neoliberal reform as ‘inefficiencies’ inhibiting profitability. Whilst 
offshore mineral extraction (precious gems, oil and gas) employ very few local people, ‘relying for its 
skilled labour on crews of foreign workers brought in on short-term contracts’ (Ferguson, 2OO5, p. 
378-379). These workers live in gated compounds, which are in many places protected by private 
armies and security forces. 
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 J. Carstens, 1962, writes ‘when the Cape Copper Company shut down and its labourers were thrown out of 
work, with other chances of livelihood ‘taken away from people by the Government’, illicit diamond hunting 
had thus become the only hope for local people. ‘The result is that these men gather together, make raids on 
the sea shore, gather sand and flee to the dunes or to the mountains to wash it’. With the police in pursuit, 
these diamond diggers would flee to the next place, ‘ever more enlarg[ing] the area which must be guarded’ 















Ferguson’s observation (2OO2 and 2OO5) is pertinent to the current situation on South Africa’s 
North West ‘diamond coast’, where onshore mines are closing or ‘down-scaling’ through 
subcontracting. Thousands of mine workers have been retrenched; meanwhile core diamond mining 
is now taking place offshore, substantially bypassing Namaqualand’s income-poor communities. 
Meanwhile, a number of companies are reportedly busy drilling for gas off the coast of 
Namaqualand, including the Government’s Petrol SA, in partnership with a private company, as well 
as the multinationals Shell and BHP Billiton. (E. Julius, NCPG, pers. comm., December 2O1O); and 
another company, Urafields South Africa, is currently prospecting for uranium near the town of 
Garies.44 Whilst new mining initiatives have been promoted as positive signs of investment in 
Namaqualand’s economic development, this claim needs to be assessed against the legacy nearly a 
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 The company claim that ‘Urafields has consolidated 14 exploration licenses obtained by predecessor 
companies run by its founders, in widely recognised uranium-rich areas of Namibia and South Africa. They 
cover more than 800,000 hectares, equivalent to 3 times the size of Luxembourg or 1.5 times the size of the 
State of Delaware in the USA. The exploration targets for the land covered by these licenses contains several 















Chapter 5: The Legacy of Diamonds 
De Beers, claimed in 2OO7 and 2O1O, that the company is 1OO% certified to the internationally 
recognised environmental management system standard of ISO 14OO145. As required by the MPRDA 
2OO2, all of the company’s operations are according to the 2O1O Report to Society, covered by 
environmental impact assessments (De Beers, 2O1O, p. 83).  In addition, according to their 2OO7 
Report to Society, De Beers claims to have an impeccable Corporate Social Responsibility ‘character’. 
This includes an A+ application of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines as well as their Communication on Progress to the United Nations (UN) Global Compact46.  
The company claim to be committed to making a ‘lasting contribution to the communities in which 
they live and work’, and according to their Chairman, Nicky Oppenheimer, ‘the company will play its 
economic role in such a way that it will contribute to an ‘ever more prosperous Africa’; and specific 
mention is also being made of De Beers’ aim to facilitate sustainable, long-term economic growth as 
a platform for socio-economic development’ (van Wyk et al., 2OO9, p. 26). 
Yet, as the following discussion explores, in the case of Namaqualand, global shifts in the diamond 
economy has meant, mass-retrenchments, closure of mines and mining towns, transfer of core 
mining efforts to offshore deposits, and an attempt on behalf of both De Beers and Alexkor to 
dispense with costly environmental rehabilitation responsibilities. 
 
5.1 Forecasting Mine Closure in the 199Os 
Despite the fact that, according to the company’s own reports, Namaqualand Mines were proving to 
be De Beers’ richest diamond mines in South Africa, the company announced in 1994 that they 
intended to cease production and close the mines in 1O-12 years (Roberts, 2OO7, p.295).  
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 The ISO 14001, as with other ISO 14OOO standards, is voluntary, with its main aim to assist companies in 
continually improving their environmental performance, whilst complying with any applicable legislation. 
Organizations are responsible for setting their own targets and performance measures, with the standard 
serving to assist them in meeting objectives and goals and the subsequent monitoring and measurement of 
these (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_14OO1). 
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 The United Nations Global Compact, launched in 2OOO, is a principle-based framework to encourage 
businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on their 
implementation. The Compact states ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment and 
anti-corruption. The Global Compact is the world's largest corporate citizenship initiative and as voluntary 
initiative has two objectives: “Mainstream the ten principles in business activities around the world" and 
















In 1992 De Beers had commissioned a group of students from the University of Cape Town to assess 
the likely social and economic impacts of mine closure in Namaqualand. These assessments 
indicated potential impacts of variety of closure scenarios, such as gradual phased closure vis-à-vis 
rapid total closure of mining operations and withdrawal of the mining company (Beaumont, 1992; 
Gosling, 1992; Lochner, 1992). The assessment anticipated that the impacts of closure would be 
‘extreme and far-reaching’, ‘compounded by little diversification in terms of industry in the region to 
provide jobs for a great number of people’ (Bregman, 2OO9, p.92). In some towns, where up to 9O% 
of households depend on mine employment for their income, potential adverse outcomes of 
retrenchment were identified as: depression, drop in social status, break down of family units, 
impoverishment, and overexploitation of natural resources, e.g. increased recourse to farming of 
livestock in already overstocked rangeland (Beaumont, 1992, p.xvi; Bregman, 2OO9, p.92).  
The impact assessments further differentiated between likely impacts on three tiers of employees, 
corresponding to the company’s apartheid labour force structure. White employees for whom 
management positions were reserved, faced potential retrenchment, transfer to an alternative 
mine, loss of school and medical cover provided by the company, and enjoyment of recreational 
facilities, housing, free electricity and water provided by the company. Coloured workers from local 
communities and blacks from the Transkei had enjoyed fewer of these benefits, but would likely be 
severely adversely affected by job losses (Beaumont, 1992); withdrawal of company transportation 
and subsidised groceries; and with fewer resources to draw on or alternative opportunities available 
to them, retrenched workers could face poverty, rising crime and alcoholism (Gosling 1992; Lochner, 
1992).  
The impact assessments suggested crises such as: deterioration of infrastructure and services, drop 
in standards of education, loss of community cohesion, and loss of quality of life, could be averted or 
at least mitigated through a proactive mining company approach which would slow rates of 
production to extend the life of the mines; pursue gradual, phased closure; and support the 
development of alternative job opportunities and industries for the region (Gosling 1992; Lochner, 
1992).  
Yet, despite the recommendation to slow the process of mine closure, Roberts (2OO9) reports that 
De Beers instead decided to increase production dramatically, from 6OO,OOO to 1 million carats a 
year (p.295). De Beers Namaqualand Mines reported an annual profit of 44O%, or $22O per carat 
(Roberts, 2OO9, p. 295-6). The company was predicted to recover 12 million carats of diamonds over 















Instead of reinvesting increased profits into mine and local communities, and supporting a positive 
post-mining transition, the company pursued a ‘privatization’ strategy, cutting costs of operation 
through subcontracting. Roberts (2OO9) mentions that De Beers already paid its miners lower wages 
than any other mining company in Namaqualand (p.296). The use of subcontracted workers, as 
opposed to employees directly employed by the mine, at another of De Beers’ South African mines, 
had meant use of non-unionized workers receiving a third of the pay of unionized workers (p.296). 
Meanwhile, as shall be discussed in detail in sections 3 and 4, De Beers began to take an interest in 
the environmental impact of long-term mining activities. The company hired an ecological 
consultant in 1996/7 to collect information on the natural ecology, to begin to assess the adverse 
impacts of mining and to look into potential methods of achieving recovery of vegetation cover 
(Carrick, pers. Comm., October 2O1O). 
 
5.2 Mine Closure and Unemployment 
Clark et al. reported in 1999 that the number of employees in South Africa's onshore diamond 
mining industry as a whole has declined from over 19,5OO in 1992 to less than 15,OOO in 1997 (a 
rate of approximately 2.5-3% per annum) (Clark et al., 1999, section 6.3.1). In this period, between 
Alexkor and De Beers, a minimum of 18OO jobs had been lost. Clark et al (1999) wrote that ‘the 
majority of employees in onshore diamond mines are from Namaqualand, about 8O% of which are 
low-skilled workers. The researchers anticipated that further mine retrenchments would therefore 
exacerbate the already dire unemployment situation in Namaqualand unless alternative 
employment sources could found. The unemployment rate in rural areas of Namaqualand was 
estimated at 6O%; a problem that had been compounded by the decline of the fishing industry, 
particularly the rock lobster industry’ (Clark et al., 1999 and see chapter 7). 
Evidence suggests that De Beers had been contemplating closure of its Namaqualand Mines for 
some time. According to Roberts (2OO7), in 1993 De Beers laid off 1,OOO workers from its 
Namaqualand Mines due to an oversupply of Russian and Angolan diamonds. Although production 
at Kleinzee dropped from one million to 6OO,OOO carats a year, these were being mined at a higher 
grade than at De Beers’ other South African mines, meaning Kleinzee was still the company’s richest 
mine in the country (p. 294). Yet, to the surprise of employees, De Beers announced in 1994 that it 
intended to close its Kleinzee-Koignaas operations within 1O-11 years (De Beers Namaqualand 















Although a De Beers commissioned Socio-economic Impact Assessment of mine closure (Lochner, 
1992, Gosling, 1992) emphasised that slowing production to prolong the life of the mine and a 
phased closure plan, combined with good post-retrenchment support, such as investment in the 
diversification of the regional economy, could help to alleviate negative impacts of mine closure47; 
instead the company reportedly sped up production from 6OO,OOO to one million carats a year, and 
announced it intended to ‘privatize’ all town and mine services by setting up a system of 
subcontractors to cut costs (Roberts, 2OO7, p. 295). According to Conservation South Africa (CSA), in 
its ‘hey day’ De Beers directly employed up to 3,OOO people; whereas now it maintains around one 
hundred staff (CSA, September 2OO8, p.2). 
Meanwhile, ‘downscaling’ of operations at Alexkor has meant the retrenchment of the majority of 
the company’s employees, from 669 directly employed in 2OOO to just 1O5 in 2O1O/11 (Alexkor’s 
Briefing, 31 August 2O1O, PMG online, accessed 18/O7/2O11). In order to drastically cut costs of 
mining activities and turn an annual loss into a profit, the company decided to operate through 
subcontracting mining rights.  
Both Alexkor and De Beers have shifted their core diamond mining operations on the west coast 
offshore. According to Alexkor’s 2O1O Annual Report, the marine mining operations were 
contracted to 27 companies, with 67 ‘production units’, which produced over 7O% of Alexkor’s total 
annual diamond output; whilst land operations continue with two contracted companies which 
yielded the remaining 3O% (pg. 1O).  
As Clark et al. (1999) have highlighted, ‘marine mining is a highly specialised activity, requiring high 
capital inputs in the form of purchasing, maintaining and equipping mining vessels with technical 
processing equipment. Relative to onshore mining, marine diamond mining requires lower inputs of 
low-skilled labour - up to 1O% (in contrast to the 8O% in onshore mines). With the present lack of 
alternative job sources in Namaqualand, the majority of workers retrenched from onshore mines in 
the next decade have little chance of finding work in the offshore industry (Clark et al., 1999). 
Whilst subcontracting has been portrayed as a black and local economic empowerment opportunity, 
through which companies can abide by government BBSEE criteria, according to Roberts (2OO7), 
where De Beers had introduced this system into other South African mines in the 199Os, sub-
contracted miners were now on a third of the union-negotiated minimum pay, unable to join a mine-
workers’ union and had no healthcare provision or other protections (p. 295). Whilst the company 
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anticipated 12 billion Rand from mining 12 million carats over 12 years, many mine workers were 
receiving as little as 1OOO Rand a month, or 7OO Rand after deductions (Roberts, 2OO7). 
In Namaqualand, one of the consequences of this discrepancy of earnings, coupled with halted 
mining operations, has been a proliferation of illegal mining attempts by members of local 
communities. According to a local government official (DENC official, pers. comm., August 2O11), a 
number of local people have illegally entered into mining areas at night to search for diamonds, 
which they sell on to diamond dealers on the black market. The official mentioned that reduced 
security in diamond mining areas and severe economic hardship among local communities was to 
blame for the illegal mining activities, which are concentrated on unrehabilitated mining areas, 
which pose a serious risk of injury to illicit miners.  
Indeed the government official mentioned that two individuals had recently been killed when 
excavations the illegal miners had made collapsed on top of them. According to a news report, a 
retrenched De Beers employee and his nephew were crushed to death on the 21st July 2O11. The 
two were ‘among hundreds of unemployed men from Komaggas and other small towns who illegally 
dig for diamonds after closure of the mines’ (Nicholson, 1/O8/2O11, Cape Times online, accessed 
5/O8/2O11).   
Whilst De Beers’ representatives responded that ‘the company had taken many steps over the years 
to eradicate illegal mining’ and ‘dozens of people had been arrested and prosecuted for illegal 
mining in the past two years’ (Nicholson, 1/O8/2O11, Cape Times online); arguably this approach is 
attempting to deal with the symptom rather than the cause of a wider problem. According to a local 
government official, whilst few sustainable livelihoods projects have succeeded in the region, the 
temptation among those who were once employed in the mines to meet their need for an income 
through illegal mining is compelling, despite the risks involved (DENC official, pers.comm., August 
2O11). Indeed, the sister of the deceased illegal miner mentioned, ‘the deaths did not scare any of 
the men in the town who were seen going back to the mines the night after the accident’ (Nicholson, 
1/O8/2O11, Cape Times online).   
 
5.3 Mine Sale at Namaqualand Mines 
In late 2O1O, De Beers announced its intention to sell rather than close Namaqualand Mines. The 
company claim that an ‘open and rigourous selection process that evaluated prospective bidders on 
a number of criteria determined by De Beers [is] critical to ensuring the long term sustainability of 















South Africa (CSA), ‘De Beers has ignored CSA’s suggestions for general good practice and has 
pursued a process that has gone against the intent of South Africa’s Mineral and Petroleum 
Resource Development Act of 2OO2 and the provisions of the country’s Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (Act 3 of 2OOO)48’ (CSA, Press Release, 2O11, p.1). 
CSA argue that De Beers denied requests for CSA and local community representatives to be 
involved in the process of assessing bidders on their socio-economic practices, and ignored 
international mining guidelines as credible review criteria (CSA, Press Release, 2O11, p. 1-2). The 
suggestion to involve an external and independent review panel on assessing social commitments 
and environmental restoration track records of potential buyers was ignored, despite being common 
mining company practice (CSA, Press Release, 2O11, p.1).  
Indeed, the chosen buyer, Transhex, has, according to ecological consultant, P. Carrick, “to 
date…made no real attempt at any environmental rehabilitation at any of its Namaqualand 
operations, even those that they have been trying to close for many years. For example, another 
mine in the region, Hondeklip Bay has large areas with unstable slopes and standing open water, 
presenting a safety hazard to the neighbouring community” (Carrick, quoted in CSA, Press Release, 
2O11, p.2). 
CSA suspects that the financial quantum attached to the environmental liability at Namaqualand 
Mines and the process of calculation of that quantum (as required by the 2OO5 DME Guidelines) is 
insufficient to the task of environmental rehabilitation after over 8O years of mining by De Beers. 
CSA highlight that liability costs have been calculated entirely by De Beers and have not been 
verified by any sufficiently independent external consultants or other third party auditors (CSA, Press 
Release, 2O11, p.2).  
Given that the financial quantum for rehabilitation by the departing mining company determines the 
extent the new mining company or any other party can meet legally required and internationally 
established standards for best practice for social and environmental responsibility; if these 
provisions are inadequate, CSA highlight, these responsibilities will become liabilities of the state 
(CSA & Bench Marks, 2O11, p.2). 
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5.4 The Environmental Legacy of Mining 
Namaqualand is famous for its unique biological diversity and high levels of endemism. Lowland 
Namaqualand forms part of the Succulent Karoo Biome, recognised as a ‘biodiversity hot spot’, 
deserving special conservation attention. With 63OO plant species, of which 163O are endemic and 
9O5 are near endemic (Botha et al., 2OO8, p. 885). According to Botha et al. (2OO8) , ‘although there 
are relatively few land-use pressures on lowland Namaqualand ecosystems, the greatest threat to 
biodiversity is from surface mining, which has transformed discontinuous areas along much of the 
4OOkm adjacent to the coast… Surface mining results in the complete destruction of above ground 
vegetation and the associated soil processes’ (p. 885). 
Where mining activities have been concentrated in coastal Namaqualand, the landscape has been 
utterly transformed, deep pits have been dug down to bedrock, using manual labour and heavy 
machinery, to a depth of 4Om in places (De Beers, undated, ‘Sustainability Initiatives in 
Namaqualand’, online, accessed 18/O7/2O11). In addition to deep mining pits and high ‘overburden’ 
dumps, the diamond coast is pockmarked by intermittent prospecting trenches and track marks 
from heavy machinery. According to Van Wyk et al. (2OO9), mined out areas ‘look like moonscapes 
and will probably take hundreds of years to recover’ (p. 3O).  
 
Plate 2: Aerial view of a De Beers Consolidated Mines overburden dump at Koignaas (Google 
















Whilst onshore surface mining has been practiced for a century, ecological restoration in the wake of 
mining has only been piloted in the last 1O-15 years on the Namaqualand coastline and ‘is localized 
in extent’ (Botha et al., 2OO8, p. 886). According to Carrick and Kruger (2OO7), the neglect of 
environmental rehabilitation and ecological restoration up on the part of mining companies up to 
the 199Os has been enabled through poor governmental regulation of mining environmental 
impacts, prior to 1991; and weak implementation of the Minerals Act (5O of 1991), which required 
for the first time that holders of mining and prospecting permits restore the land surface to its 
‘natural state’ (Carrick and Kruger, 2OO7, p.768-9). 
Whilst Botha et al. (2OO8) mention that scientific understanding of the ecology of lowland 
Namaqualand has recently improved, and experience of restoration after mining elsewhere have 
contributed to a the development of methods that could work along the coast, they highlight that 
‘few properly controlled restoration trials have been conducted, and many gaps exist in our 
understanding of what factors impede ecological restoration, and what methods are successful at 
overcoming these’ (p. 886). 
Given the lack of comprehensive restoration efforts on the part of the mining companies, Botha et 
al. (2OO8) draw on the ‘traditional’ and experiential knowledge of mine operators, who had 
experimented with restoration methods as well as local farmers, most of whom had grown up in the 
area, observing the lowland ecology, and had experience of restoring ploughed croplands and areas 
invaded by alien vegetation (p. 887).  
Recommended restoration methods included: site-specific assessments and interventions (adapted 
to either the coast or inland areas, dependent on slope and soil types); reducing the slope of dumps 
and introducing contours on dumps to reduce erosion, catch and sink water and to create 
microhabitats for plants; stripping, storing and re-applying topsoil within  few years of mining; 
creating surface micro-topography, to trap wind blown seed, organic matter and water; 
transplanting of indigenous succulent vegetation; harvesting and sowing seed; treating salt-affected 
soil; and the use of netting to prevent wind erosion (Botha et al., 2OO8, p. 889-891). 
Barriers to effective restoration that were highlighted by interviewees included: lack of continuity in 
restoration efforts, lack of sufficient restoration equipment, inexperienced staff, shortage of 
manpower and insufficient funds (Botha et al., 2OO8, 882). Undertaking restoration as part of the 
mining process itself was cited as the most effective means to improve and reduce the costs of the 
restoration process (Botha et al., 2OO8). It is thus interesting to note that mine operators and local 















efforts; instead they indicated the main obstacles were ones related to designated funds, 
management personnel and good planning. 
Whilst it has been demonstrated that good rehabilitation after mining depends on a priori planning 
and ‘double stripping’, in order to safeguard topsoil49, which must be reapplied soon after an area 
has been mined, mining has been going on in Namaqualand since the 192O’s, when little was known 
or required in terms of environmental management. In the words of restoration ecologist, P. Carrick, 
“Much of what you see now is legacy issues…the topsoil is long gone, lost” (pers. comm., October 
2O1O).  
Decades of mining, when ‘there was little appreciation of the biodiversity of the land’ and no 
expectation or standards for rehabilitation, have left ‘large, often barren areas without any topsoil 
that require restoration’ (Botha et al. 2OO8, p.887). Clark et al. (1999) wrote ‘although some areas 
are back-filled, topsoils are generally not stored and the loss of topsoil means that recovery of plant 
communities to their former state depends on the formation of new soils - in the order of decades to 
centuries. Loss and recovery of animal fauna presumably follows the same route’ (section 6.5.1). 
Clark et al. (1999) mention that roads and heavy vehicle movement have tended to ‘compact the 
soil, thus rendering the area unsuitable for re-colonization by new plants’, whilst ‘areas denuded of 
vegetation, such as trenches, mining blocks and tailings are inherently unstable, with the result that 
sand plumes frequently develop due to the strong winds and flat topography characteristic of the 
mining area. These sand plumes can be quite extensive, smothering vegetation and causing a 
significant secondary impact. It is believed that sediment plumes may have been a triggering force in 
the collapse of the saltmarsh ecosystems of the Orange River wetlands’ (Clark et al., 1999, section 
6.5.1).  
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 Botha et al. (2OO8) explain that topsoil ‘the uppermost soil layer that contains the highest concentration of 

















Plate 3: Aerial view of Alexkor’s operations between Alexander Bay and Port Nolloth (Google 
Earth, 28°43'08.24" S 16°34'00.99" E).  
 
P. Carrick, restoration ecologist, confirmed this assessment, “Alexkor, the state company…have got a 
massive problem there of secondary degradation, particularly the slimes dams…They’ve cleared 
massive areas and used them as dumps. Particularly where they concentrate salts and these blow. 
There’s a very strong southerly wind, and north of those…there’s a straight plume that’s killed 
everything in its path” (Carrick, pers. comm., October 2O1O). In Carrick’s opinion, “the main problem 
is there’s been no environmental responsibility. So they have a lot more slimes dams than, for 
instance, De Beers, and they’ve been left for 2O years with nothing done about them. If DeBeers 
does that, the same will happen” (Carrick, pers. comm., October 2O1O). 
 
5.5 De Beers’ Approach to Environmental Management at Namaqualand Mines  
DeBeers claims to have halted terrestrial mining operations in Namaqualand, concentrating their 
remaining efforts on rehabilitation and restoration of the degraded landscape, as is required by law 
and international environmental responsibility standards50. The company claim in their publication, 
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‘Sustainability Initiatives in Namaqualand’, that their Namaqualand Mines are ‘constantly work[ing] 
towards creating a sustainable environment’.  
According to a DeBeers’ publication, the work of ecological rehabilitation is well under way with 
‘Two teams of local people trained by the NRI [Namaqualand Restoration Initiative] conduct[ing] the 
restoration activities… excellent progress was made during the year’ (DeBeers, undated, online, 
accessed 18/O7/2O11). According to their 2O1O Report to Society, ‘extensive rehabilitation has 
been undertaken in the Namaqualand region of South Africa over the past few years with guidance 
from an independent ecological expert’ (De Beers, 2O1O, p. 9O).  
The company thus claim that they are fully committed to achieving best practice in environmental 
rehabilitation, aiming to leave a positive legacy for Namaqualand. In order to assess the extent to 
which the company is living up to its reputation, their claims must be checked against what the 
company are actually achieving in practice. 
P. Carrick, restoration ecologist51, explained in an interview (October 2O1O) that he had been 
employed by DeBeers as ecological consultant to conduct research and advise on the best course of 
action to achieve current best practice in environmental rehabilitation. He mentioned he had been 
working with a team of ecologists since 1996 or 1997 on a project called the ‘Namaqualand 
Restoration Initiative’. The researchers began by ‘collecting tiny bits of knowledge from farmers and 
mine managers’, followed by pilot erosion control projects, such as establishing wind netting, to 
prevent loose sands from blowing in the wind, and thus enabling vegetation recovery.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
international best practice in environmental responsibility. See the Company website: 
www.debeersgroup.com.  
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 P. Carrick, a professor of Botany at the University of Cape Town, has also set up his own consultancy, 
Nurture, Restore and Innovate, which has focused on post-mining rehabilitation and restoration. (Interviewed 
















Plate 4: The green netting established on mined sites of DeBeers’ territory, intended to prevent 
further environmental degradation, and to encourage the re-growth of vegetation. 
 
Carrick mentioned that he had hoped Namaqualanders might be able to benefit from employment 
opportunities afforded by restoration; and thus a locally owned business, Namaqualand Mines 
Restoration, was established with two managers and 15 workers. Around 1OO people also received 
training in rehabilitation techniques, with the idea that the pilot project could be ‘rolled out’ over 
many years and expanded to involve numerous teams of workers contracted by the mining 
companies.  
Carrick explained that he had envisioned three components to restoration “to make the system 
work; you need somebody who’s paying, usually (the one) who’s degraded the landscape, that’s 
usually a mining company. And then you have a restoration contractor”, who is supported and 
advised by a team of ecologists, who act as consultants to the company. Carrick thus set up his own 
consultancy, ‘Nurture, Restore, Innovate’ (NRI)52, which was intended to fulfil this role (pers. comm., 
October 2O1O).  
The role of the ecological consultant, according to Carrick involves advising on earth moving and 
profiling, as well as setting specifications for best practice in restoration. His consultancy developed 
a ‘product’ called the ‘restoration pack’, which Carrick explained, “is a kind of concept – a package. 
Each one is designed differently depending on the area” (pers. comm., October 2O1O). The 
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cardboard boxes containing a selection of seeds for indigenous plants was intended to appeal to the 
mining companies, who, Carrick explained, had historically been hostile to ‘greenies’ and were 
accustomed to mining in a way that is ecologically illiterate. “If you speak to a mine manager about 
different species, when seeds ripen, whatever, their eyes just glaze over, they don’t want to know. 
They want to know that when they pay for this thing called a restoration pack, then that makes 
plants come” (Carrick, pers. comm., October 2O1O). 
Carrick had thus hoped that, by designing a management ‘system’ and restoration ‘products’, his 
consultancy might be able to speak the language of the mining companies. Through marketing a 
product they could buy and offering assurance of the effectiveness of these products, it might be 
possible that the mining companies could engage in restoration “without having to understand too 
much about this weird ecology thing”. Restoration of the natural environment could then be 
achieved to the satisfaction of legal requirements, expert standards of best practice, and to the 
benefit of local Namaqualanders who would find employment.  
Yet, it seems this ideal ‘synergy’ is far from being realised. Whilst the relevant knowledge and labour 
force is available, the necessary corporate and governmental will-power to make use of them has 
apparently been lacking. Carrick mentioned that despite progressive environmental legislation, 
“we’re a long way, a long, long way from the department [in charge of mining] ever taking that and 
using that”53. Carrick believed the real problem to lie in the fact that “the department doesn’t 
embrace their environmental role. They’re more concerned about hopefully developing the 
economy and trying to facilitate mining in some cases” (pers. comm., October 2O1O). 
Meanwhile, De Beers have recently reduced their estimated environmental liability costs from 24O 
million to 15O million Rand, though the Department of Minerals and Energy reportedly assessed De 
Beers’ liabilities at 5O4 Million Rand in 2OO4 (S. Frazee, CSA, pers. comm., March 2O11). Using the 
DME Financial Quantum Guidelines (2OO5), and the De Beers’ own stated commitments in their 
Amended Environmental Management Programme Report (De Beers NM Amended EMPR, 2O11), 
CSA’s conservative estimate of Namaqualand Mines minimum liability for restoration is R 
738,O94,742 (CSA and Bench Marks, 2O11, section 4.9; see synthesis in annex 5). Whilst the 
company claim to have made a ‘large investment’ of 1 million Rand over two and a half years 
(Salgado, 5 April 2O11, Cape Times online, accessed 18/O7/2O11), undoubtedly this sum would pale 
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 Carrick added, “the best case scenario of what happens at the moment is somebody with no particular 
background in ecology or skills in natural history at all might go to a mine and drive a bakkie to a site, look at it 















in comparison to the investment needed to restore the degraded landscape to something 
approximating its pre-mining state.54  
Certainly, De Beers have attempted to avoid rehabilitation liability for historical mining through 
claiming that liability for rehabilitation is limited to those operations that took place after the 
coming into effect of the amendment to the Regulations to the Mines and Works Act on 21 March 
198O. However CSA and Bench Marks (2O11) argue that, in addition to any environmental 
obligations that may have existed under governing legislation and regulation prior to 198O, section 
28 of NEMA (1998) obliges De Beers, or any subsequent right holder, to take measures to remediate 
environmental degradation even if it was caused prior to the legislation coming into effect 55 (CSA & 
Bench Marks, 2O11, section 4.7).  
According to their review of the Amended EMPR, Conservation South Africa  and the Bench Marks 
Foundation (2O11) highlight, ‘an objective and systematic mine closure plan does not appear to have 
been used by Namaqualand Mines in the calculating the total financial liability of the mining areas. 
There is a lack of rigor in the calculations for cost deductions in a number of components, and some 
of the cost deduction items are not based on generally accepted engineering or scientific principles 
(e.g. FRDs and re-vegetation). Additionally, opportunities for soliciting stakeholder support and IAP 
[Interested and Affected Party] benefits have been ignored’ (CSA and Bench Marks, 2O11, section 6). 
Whilst De Beers claims to have sought the expertise of external specialists to develop their EMP, 
Rehabilitation Strategy and Mine Closure models (Amended EMPR, 2O11, p.92 and Appendix F, p.2); 
the company’s actual commitments mentioned in their EMPR and Closure Liability Report, indicate a 
very weak commitment to meeting the recommended requirements for social and environmental 
responsibility (see annex 5). 
 Instead of re-vegetating all of the disturbed (mined) areas, the company commits itself to half of 
this (CSA and Bench Marks, 2O11, section 4.5) and to desalinisation of only 1O% of compacted mine 
roads (section 4.1). Meanwhile, the total area disturbed is quoted as 1O,OOO hectares out of 
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 H. Smith, of the Legal Resources Centre, mentioned that the estimated costs of rehabilitation for the 
DeBeers owned farms was “not 3OO million, as some of their documents say, not 7OO million, it’s into 
billions” of English pounds, or “trillions” of South African Rands. (H. Smith, LRC, pers. comm., October 2O1O). 
55 NEMA (Act 1O7 of 1998) creates a retrospective duty of care and remediation for environmental damage. 
Section 28(1) provides that “Every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or 
degradation of the environment must take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation 
from occurring, continuing or recurring or ... to minimise and rectify such pollution or degradation to the 
environment.” S.28 (1A) provides that this obligation also applies to significant pollution or degradation that 
occurred before the commencement of NEMA or that arises or is likely to arise at a different time from the 
















27O,OOO owned by the company. However, when the disturbed areas of each of the mining 
concessions quoted in the individual EMPRs are added together, the total area mined is closer to 
17,OOO, not 1O, OOO hectares (section  4.9).  
In addition, whilst earth-moving is mentioned as the company’s strategy to ‘stabilize slopes and 
prevent erosion by shaping and contouring to emulate the natural stable land forms which will 
provide suitable conditions for sustaining vegetation’ (Appendix F: Section 8.3, p.17); the CSA and 
Bench Marks’ review (2O11) highlights that the mentioned slope profile of 1:3 is far too steep to 
form a stable land form on the west coast and ‘mine overburden slopes and dumps of this angle on 
the west coast show deep erosion scars and extremely little re-vegetation’ (CSA & Bench Marks, 
2O11, section 4.8).  
Whereas mined coarse residue deposits (CRDs) generally do not lead to significant secondary 
degradation; fine residue deposits (FRDs) ‘become self-perpetuating and expanding forms of 
degradation, unless deliberate and serious intervention is made’ (CSA & Bench Marks, 2O11, section 
4.3). According to De Beers’ Amended Environmental Management Plan Report (2O11), the 
company state that, fine residue deposits (FDRs) on the Namaqualand Mines ‘are stable, but 
provision is made for the netting of areas which may be ffected by dust plumes in extreme cases’ 
(Appendix F: Section 7.1O, p.13) 
CSA highlight that this is misleading as dust plumes are clearly already evident, and have been 
netted, at a number of FRDs at Namaqualand Mines (CSA & Bench Marks, 2O11, section 4.3). 
Moreover, CSA and Bench Marks (2O11) emphasise that the real problem of FRDs will only be 
realised once they dry out and the fine material becomes carried by the wind. In this situation, 
‘netting will be wholly inadequate to stem the problem at its source’ (section 4.3). Whilst the 
company’s earlier EMP (2OO4) outlined the areas where fine tailings (slimes) had been discharged 
into mined-out areas and natural pans, rather than dedicated tailings facilities; this information is 
omitted from the 2O11 Amended EMPR (CSA & Bench Marks, 2O11, section 4.3). 
In addition to causing air pollution, and smothering of coastal flora and fauna, evidence suggests 
mining operations have had a negative impact on surface and ground water, affecting local 
communities. Van Wyk et al. (2OO9) mention that when researchers tested water from the 
Swartlintjies River below a major De Beers tailings dam near Koignaas, results indicated that the 
water was extremely salinated and could cause severe health effects if consumed (p. 28-29).56 
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Meanwhile, marine diamond operations make use of land-resourced water, which is contributing to 
the serious water shortages currently experienced by local communities.57 
CSA and Bench Mark’s review of De Beers’ Amended EMPR (2O11) (see synthesis in annex 5) 
indicated a serious lack of stakeholder engagement in the EMPR review or mine sale process and 
“sufficient and accessible information” has not been provided to the IAPs (section 5). At a public 
meeting called at short notice, participants were reportedly informed it was not a consultation but 
an ‘opportunity for De Beers to share information on their sale plan’ (CSA and Bench Marks, 2O11, 
section 5). Moreover, post-mining land uses proposed by De Beers have not been developed in 
consultation with local IAPs who will be left with the legacy of the company’s plan (section 4.4). 
Meanwhile, poor efforts to achieve environmental restoration and stability, ‘could leave easily 
degraded lands that can trigger secondary disturbance and leave massive environmental and 
livelihood impacts to adjacent communities who will seek to graze livestock on this land in the 
future’ (section 4.4). 
CSA and Bench Marks (2O11) conclude that the critically inadequate provision the De Beers 
company have made to meet social and environmental responsibility requirements, both loses the 
opportunity to create significant jobs through restoration activities, and ‘increases the risk to 
environment and communities in Namaqualand as the region is made up of complex and fragile 
ecosystems and is a place where few economic alternatives exist and specialist input is likely to be 
essential to ensure the goals of the MPRDA post mining are achieved’ (section 3.3). 
 
5.6 Marine impacts from Mining 
According to Clark et al. (1999), ‘the seaward pumping of fine tailings on sandy shores can have a 
profound effect on communities associated with these habitats. Fine fractions of tailings are 
suspended in the sea and advected offshore, whereas coarser fractions settle rapidly onto the 
beach. If large volumes of tailings are pumped seaward, this can lead to severe alterations of the 
physical state of the affected beach’ (section 6.5.1). Clark et al. (1999) add, ‘following mine closure, 
recovery of the affected beaches to a pristine state will depend on the speed at which the beach 
returns to pre-mining physical conditions. This could take decades or even centuries’ (section 6.5.1).  
                                                          
57 De Beers’ 2O1O Report to Society mentions that onboard marine mining vessels ‘domestic fresh water 
requirements are obtained from desalination plants. This does not always meet the demand, so additional 
water is transported from shore. Although this requirement is relatively low, the fresh water is drawn from the 















Smith et al.’s (2OO6) study of the Namibian shoreline, where mining sediment is discharged into the 
sea from mining operations, reported adverse effects include smothering of marine plant and animal 
life, through the reduction in light, nutrients and oxygen, and the clogging of feeding apparatus; 
accretion and steepening of beaches, which leads to a steeper and more turbulent surf zone, 
reducing the surf habitat and making it unsuitable for some surfzone organisms. The reduction of 
benthic invertebrates, for example, may negatively affect fish, waders and coastal birds which feed 
on them (p. 14)58. 
In order to mine within 1OO meters of the shore line, the mining operation requires protection from 
wave action by means of means of massive sea walls, 8 meters high and 2O meters wide59. As the 
sand is eroded by wave action, it is mechanically replenished by means of bulldozers and dredgers 
(Smith et al., 2OO6, p. xi). The construction of such sea walls, which have been erected across 
1OOkm of coastline, are likely to have a ‘severe and sudden impact on beach fauna and flora’ (Smith 
et al., 2OO6, p. 14).  
Smith et al. (2OO6) highlight that this mining activity could well have an adverse impact on west 
coast rock lobster populations, which it acknowledges, would impact heavily on fisher communities 
in Port Nolloth and Hondeklip Bay, who depend on lobster fishing as a key source of income (p. 3O). 
And, given that much of this fishing is confined to shallow water (less than 3O meters from the 
shore, most within 15 meters), using hoopnets and small dinghies, most of the fishermen would 
have little option to fish elsewhere or through more intensive methods. 
Smith et al. (2OO6) also highlighted the potential adverse impacts from the practice of releasing 
sediment into slimes dams of onshore diamond mining in South Africa. If these slimes dams dry out, 
loose sediment blown by the wind out to sea can lead to scouring of reefs, abrasion and irritation of 
reef flora and fauna; as well as smothering of fauna and flora from deposition of discharged 
sediments on the reef or sea bed (p.21). 
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 Smith et al. conducted a study for the CSIR (Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research) in 2OO6 on the 
cumulative effects of sediment discharge from onshore and near-shore diamond mining activities on the 
Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem for the CSIR.  The study’s terms of reference was only the shallower 
water, less than 4O meters in depth, where sediment is discharged from onshore mining operations, and data 
was mostly relevant to Namibia, for which there was existing information from monitoring programmes, which 
they were able to expand on using computer simulation. 
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 Seawalls are constructed to push the shoreline between 200 and 500m into the sea, permitting access to 
diamond deposits of the subtidal. The seawalls require constant maintenance as rough seas typical of this 
















Plate 5: Diagram depicting the horizontal deep-sea mining method. 
 
Plate 6: Diagram depicting a vertical deep-sea diamond mining method, with pipes sucking gravels 
from the ocean floor, and the dumping of wastes back into the sea. 
 
According to horizontal deep-sea mining methods, a remotely operated vehicle crawls across the 
seabed, equipped with sensors, suction tubes and equipment to sort and select stones of the right 
size. Once on board, workers sort through the slurry of gravel and sand, separating the diamonds 
from the gravel and dirt. The refuse goes back over the side (see Plates 5 and 6). 
Offshore ship-based mining involves material processed on board the offshore ships and tailings 
being discharged overboard. This is of particular concern because its environmental impacts remain 
largely unseen, and thus, without dedicated monitoring and ecological impact assessment, it is very 















Clark et al.’s study (1999) mention numerous adverse impacts of mid- and deep-sea mining, 
including, ‘the destruction of benthic fauna, and modification of the benthic habitat in the mining 
path and in adjacent areas where disturbed sediments are re-deposited. This causes direct mortality 
of organisms through the dredging and discharging process, potential smothering of organisms 
affected by the fallout, and possible aggravation of oligoxic conditions causing migration or even 
death…The recovery rate of a perturbed area has been estimated to take as long as eight years, but 
habitat modifications may be permanent resulting in a persistent environmental impact and change 
in the associated communities. This may potentially affect the food chain and have important 
implications for the distribution and abundance of other marine organisms such as rock lobsters and 
fish’ (Clark et al., 1999, section 6.5.4) 
Much more extensive research would have to be done in order to begin to piece together an idea of 
the cumulative impacts of all the different forms of coastal and marine mining over time across the 
whole Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem. This would involve a long-term assessment of on-
shore open-cast mining and prospecting, near-shore sea-wall mining and dredging, small-vessel 
diamond diving, and offshore ship-based mining. Gathering such longitudinal ecosystem data should 
be prerequisite to determination of the environmental ‘costs’ of mining and, thus, the 
responsibilities of mining companies during and subsequent to mining. 
Although Clark et al. (1999) suggest possible mitigatory action that could be taken to limit adverse 
ecological impacts of marine mining60; De Beers has mentioned that a lack of scientific research into 
ecological impacts of marine mining is a constraint on effective environmental management and 
mitigation. In De Beers’ 2O1O Report to Society, the company claim that, ‘in the marine 
environment active rehabilitation is not possible, so activities need to focus on monitoring the direct 
(sediment removal) and indirect (plume) impacts of mining and the associated recovery of 
sediments and marine life’ (De Beers, 2O1O, p. 9O). The company admitted the need for further 
research and monitoring to determine the ‘continued indirect influence from mining’ in targeted and 
adjacent areas (De Beers, 2O1O, p.9O). 
                                                          
60 These included 1) Using material for seawall construction that is equivalent to that which is stripped from 
the shore allows for a more rapid recovery of affected communities; 2) In-water mining needs to be limited to 
boat based operations only; 3) Tailings must be dumped away from rocky reef areas and boulder movements 
need to be kept to a minimum. Restrictions are to be placed on the width of lanes cut, clear-cutting and/or 
repeated cutting; and 4) Leaving lanes of undisturbed sediments between mining areas. (Clark et al. 1999, 

















Though, as discussed in chapter 2, governmental legislation such as the South African Bill of Rights 
(1996), the National Environmental Management Act (107 of 1998), the Air Quality Act (39 of 2OO4), 
the Water Act (36 of 1998), and the Minerals and Petroleum Development Act (28 of 2OO2) have the 
potential to significantly raise the legal standards for environmental custodianship and social 
responsibility among by mining companies; this requires that the definition of ‘unacceptable’ 
pollution, ecological degradation and environmental harm is based on extensive research on 
ecological and health impacts, and social assessments of how people are adversely affected by 
mining activities and their long term repercussions. In the absence of ‘insistence on tangible 
standards and targets, combined with joint industry, civil society and government monitoring 
arrangements’ (Hamann and Acutt, 2OO3, p. 261), the legislation will be little more than paper law. 
The performance of the two mining companies discussed in this thesis, indicate weak commitment 
to fulfilling environmental rehabilitation responsibilities. Whilst De Beers seeks to sell off its 
potential rehabilitation liabilities to another company through sale of Namaqualand Mines; Alexkor 
reports that it is currently unable to meet anything further than very minimal rehabilitation efforts, 
without substantial funding from the National Government.  
According to their Annual Report for 2O1O, Alexkor ‘is exploring opportunities to cap [its 
environmental] liability and exploring alternative ways to discharge this liability as cost effectively as 
possible over the remaining life of the mine’ (p. 4). Whilst in 2O1O their estimated cost for legally 
required levels of acceptable rehabilitation was R256.6 million, the company report to having 
received only R32.8 million thus far in government funding; and of their intention to meet the 
requirements of their EMP by ‘restoring the visual impact’ after mining (Alexkor, 2O1O, p. 23)61, the 
company report that ‘budget constraints’ are the reason why, instead, all that had be achieved was 
some backfilling of the southeast side of their Boegoeberg mine site and some wind-netting on the 
southeast side (p. 6). 
With the State’s own mining company performing so poorly in post-mining environmental 
rehabilitation, the allowance is de facto given to private companies to avoid meeting even the legally 
required minimum, which is itself apparently being interpreted very superficially – as a matter of 
changing the aesthetic appearance of mined sites to reduce ‘visual impacts’. This extraordinarily 
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 Alexkor (2O1O) reported intended rehabilitation work ‘in the vicinity of Boegoeberg and stabilisation of the 















narrow conception of environmental integrity totally diminishes the intention of NEMA, which 



















                                                          
62 NEMA defines the environment as ‘the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of: i)  
the land, water and atmosphere of the earth; ii)  the microorganisms, plants and animal life; iii)  any part or 
combination of i)  and ii)  and the interrelationships among and between them; and iv)  the physical, chemical, 
aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the foregoing that influence human health and well-being’, 















Chapter 6: Community Land Claims 
Land reform through land redistribution or restitution has been identified as potential recourses that 
will enable communities to regain land their predecessors were historically deprived of through 
racist colonial and Apartheid systems of land tenure.  In Namaqualand, a number of communities 
are making land claims in order to gain a formal stake in what remains of the mining industry; and to 
gain the right to pursue alternative socio-economic opportunities through access to land, natural 
resources, and compensatory capital.   
The chapter thus explores the claims and progress of two communities seeking rights and 
recompense and through the land reform process. A brief historical overview of land reform in 
Namaqualand sets the context for these case studies; as dissatisfaction with mainstream land 
reform, coupled with dwindling job prospects and socio-economic opportunities, has motivated 
communities to pursue ambitious multiple claims on mining companies as key land owners and asset 
holders. The response claimants have received from mining companies and the government largely 
determines the success of the claims and the prospects that will be afforded to local communities. 
Thus the way in which claims are negotiated and settled must be analysed for evidence 
commitments to social equity, democratic accountability, and long-term social, economic and 
environmental sustainability.  
 
6.1 Background to Land Reform in Namaqualand 
As Wisborg and Rohde (2OO4)  discuss, in Namaqualand, whilst white settlers were able to receive 
legal recognition of their right to private ownership of land on which they had settled, San and Khoi 
peoples were deemed of inadequate civilisation to merit recognition of their rights to the land and 
its resources. The colonial administration issued ‘Tickets of Occupation63’ to mission stations and 
their resident populations, granting permission to occupy ‘communal areas’, which would later 
become ‘rural reserves’ for those the apartheid government classified as ‘coloured’. These also 
became convenient labour reserves when, first the copper and, then diamond mining industries 
became established in Namaqualand. 
                                                          
63 ‘Coloured’ rural areas were officially recognized by the government of the (British) Cape Colony shortly after 
the territory north of the Buffels River was annexed in 1847. The form of this recognition comprised ‘tickets of 
occupation’ issued by the Cape government which afforded the inhabitants ‘‘a sort of guarantee of their land’’ 
(Carstens, 1966, p. 17). ‘This was, however, in itself an act of dispossession, since the state refused to 
recognize the inhabitants’ claim of ownership, instead awarding them only occupational status’ (May and 















Through the Mission Stations and Communal Reserves Act 2 of 19O9, the State took administrative 
control of the areas and successive apartheid governments attempted to reform the areas, including 
the attempt to force individualisation of community lands in the ‘economic units programme’64 
(Wisborg and Rohde, 2OO4, p. 4). According to Wisborg and Rohde (2OO4), ‘these top-down tenure 
policies created lasting suspicions of tenure reform as neglecting the real problems of resource 
distribution and forcing inappropriate institutions…People in the Namaqualand Act 9 Areas65 feel 
strongly about the loss of ancestral lands to the state, white farmers and mining companies within a 
legal system which that did not recognise their land rights as semi-nomadic pastoralists’ (Wisborg 
and Rohde, 2OO4, p.4). 
The 1998 Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act 94 (TRANCRAA) aimed to transfer state land in 
23 former ‘coloured rural areas’ to locally elected municipalities or other locally accountable 
institutions, such as Communal Property Associations (CPAs). After an extensive consultative process 
involving workshops and conferences with civil society organisations, local people, municipalities 
and the Department of Land Affairs, in 2OO1-2 the Act was introduced in six of the ‘coloured 
reserve’ areas in Namaqualand, in the Northern Cape Province (Bregman, 2O1O). TRANCRAA 
legislated the transfer of land tenure to local Municipalities or Communal Property Associations on 
behalf of the communities of Komaggas, Pella, Steinkopf, Concordia, Leliefontein and Richtersveld 
(see Figure 4). 
According to Wisborg and Rohde (2OO4), ‘The TRANCRAA process represents a small but significant 
investment by government, but the time, funding and institutional support required to carry out 
effective tenure reform was seriously underestimated’. They highlight ‘strengthened tenure rights 
appear vulnerable if isolated from training, finance and integrated development initiatives. A 
neoliberal assumption that ‘property rights’ and ‘markets’ by themselves will transform rural areas 
in deep crisis due to unemployment, HIV/AIDs, corruption and food insecurity appears ill-founded 
and dangerous’ (Wisborg and Rohde, 2OO4, p. v). 
 
                                                          
64 According to Rohde et al., 2OO1, ‘Governments toyed with this idea throughout the 20th century. It was 
embodied in a series of policies, enacted in legislation and finally enforced in the 1980s…In 1984, it was 
decided to subdivide the Leliefontein reserve into 47 economic units, the rationale being that privatisation of 
land would encourage entrepreneurship and the development of the region, since lessees would run farms 
profitably (Archer et al 1989)’ (p. 9). However, Rohde et al. add, ‘Most of the communities in the Namaqualand 
reserves never accepted the .economic units initiative because it further marginalised the majority of 
communal farmers’ (ibid). 
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 The Rural Areas Act (9 of 1987) replaced the 1963 Rural Coloured Areas Act (Act 24 of 1963), which 
established rural reserve areas designated for ‘coloured’ South Africans. A number of these reserves had 
developed around church mission stations and had been issued ‘Tickets of Occupation’ by the colonial 
















Figure 4: Map showing the extent of the Namaqualand rural reserve areas prior to land 
redistribution. 
 
In Namaqualand, post-apartheid land redistribution through municipal commonage has resulted in 
the acquisition of 312,777 ha between 1997 and 2OO3. This has involved the negotiated transfer 
and registration of 48 farms from private owners to four local authorities in the region (Wisborg and 
Rohde, 2OO4). Land redistribution has thus increased the area of land available to the ‘communal 
areas’ by 21%, increasing the share from 25% to 3O% of the total area of Namaqualand.  
Yet in rural Namaqualand, approximately 6OO white commercial farmers still own over 5O% of the 
land66, while approximately 3O,OOO residents of coloured communal areas have entitlement to only 
3O%.  And according to a 2OO1 estimate, approximately one third of these families depend on 
livestock farming for their livelihood. (DA, 2OO1, in Wisborg and Rhode, 2OO4).  
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 Approximately 67O farm properties, held under individual title by people of European descent, cover over 
25OOOkm² or 52% of Namaqualand, averaging 37OO ha each. The number of farmers is actually much lower 
as many of these farmers own multiple farm properties. ‘Despite land redistribution, privately-held farms are 
















In this context of dissatisfaction with the government land redistribution programme, and the very 
slow process of land reform, due to the state’s ‘wiling buyer, willing seller’ approach, and with many 
of the relevant communities currently suffering high levels of unemployment due to large-scale 
retrenchments from the mines, the exclusive ownership of extensive coastal land and mineral rights 
by a few mining companies, and the restrictions they impose on access to other coastal resources, is 
being challenged, through pursuit of land restitution premised on ancestral/aboriginal entitlement. 
 
6.2 Case 1: Alexkor v. The Richtersveld Community 
In 1998 the Richtersveld Community applied to the Land Claims Court under the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 1994 for restitution of their indigenous land and mineral rights, which had been taken 
from them by Alexkor. The case involved restitution of land and mineral rights, redistribution of 
additional land, tenure reform, township establishment, provisions for environmental rehabilitation 
and proposals for joint equity sharing arrangements in mining (May and Lahiff, 2OO7, p. 792). 
May and Lahiff (2OO7), highlight that through settling the claim, the state had the opportunity to 
‘restructure economic relations in a manner which may have a lasting and positive effect on the 
economy of the region as a whole’ (p. 792). Whereas most of the land restitution cases in the region 
had hitherto restored subsistence farming rights to impoverished families and communities, the 
Richtersveld case ‘provides an opportunity for communities to participate in the mainstream 
economy and share in benefit that goes beyond mere survival. The successful resolution of the 
Richtersveld claim, in favour of the claimants, will significantly change patterns of landholding and 
distribution of wealth in Namaqualand, and will serve as an important precedent for restitution in 
other parts of the country, and potentially, internationally’ (May and Lahiff, 2OO7, p.792). 
According to Barry (2OO4) , the Richtersveld Community arose from Khoi Khoi and San who survived 
colonisation and remained in ‘Little Namaqualand’ south of the Gariep (Orange)  River, combined 
with others, such as the ‘basters’ (people of mixed descent) , missionaries and trekboere (p. 363). 
Until 1957, the Richtersveld people were self-governing, with a ‘number of family clans, each headed 
by a chief’ together forming ‘a tribe, lead by a headman and a raad (council), comprising the chiefs 
of each clan’ (Barry, 2OO4, p. 364). Barry (2OO4) adds, ‘The Richtersveld people had extensive rules 
regarding land, access to grazing land, the number of livestock community members could graze, 
and liability to contribute to repair work’ (p. 364). 
Yet, on annexation the colonial government considered the whole of ‘Little Namaqualand’ to be 















ever issued to the Richtersveld people (Barry, 2OO4). After the discovery of diamonds near Port 
Nolloth, the government successfully claimed mining rights at the mouth of the Orange River, 
extending its claim through the 192Os. The Richtersveld Community were designated a reserve area 
in 193O, which comprised approximately 44% of the land that had been occupied by the community, 
according to an 189O survey (Barry, 2OO4, p. 365). 
According to a 1999 District Planning Report, most communities could make a land claim based on 
prior occupation, but, with the official cut-off date set at 1913, according to the Restitutions Act 22 
of 1994, many communities would not qualify for land restitution through the courts (SPP, 1999 for 
DLA). Nevertheless, in 1998 the Richtersveld Community applied to the Land Claims Court under the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 1994 for restitution of their indigenous land and mineral rights, which 
had been taken from them by Alexkor. 
 In 2OO1 the Land Claims Court dismissed the case, citing that it could not ‘consider the broader 
issue of the effect of colonial acquisition of territorial sovereignty on pre-existing customary land 
tenure system, or rights in land’ (Bregman, 2O1O, p. 111). However, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
upheld the claim of the Community in 2OO3, determining that the Community had a customary right 
to the lands and minerals, akin to common law ownership, which were ignored but not extinguished 
by the colonial government, prior to 1913 (May and Lahiff, 2OO7, p. 792)  
According to the verdict the annexation of the Richtersveld by the British Crown in 1847 did not 
extinguish the original inhabitants’ customary rights to the land, which is ‘akin to common law 
ownership’. Thus, the court found that this customary ownership continued until after the 1913 cut 
off date established by the 1994 Land Right Act; their entitlement was only officially ended with the 
consolidation of the mining industry, which saw the expropriation of indigenous lands without due 
compensation. 
An appeal made against the decision by Alexkor Ltd. and the State, resulted in the case being heard 
in the Constitutional Court, which eventually confirmed the judgement, entitling the Community to 
restitution of the right to ownership of the subject land, including precious stones, and to the 
“exclusive beneficial use and occupation thereof” (ATNS, online, accessed 2O/O7/2O11).67 
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 The case was referred back to the LCC to determine a fair settlement, but an agreement was reached out of 
court, signed between community representatives and the Minister of Public Enterprises, and approved by the 
















Figure 5: Map Depicting Alexkor’s diamond mining concessions between Alexander Bay and Port 
Nolloth and including marine mining licenses. (The Richtersveld Community is composed of people 
from the towns of Sanddrift, Kuboes,  Eksteenfontein and Lekkersing). 
 
6.3 The Settlement 
The eventual settlement (See Annex 2), including a part-share in the mining company, compensation 
of R 19O million, and ownership of Alexkor’s ‘non-core’ assets, seemed an unprecedented victory for 
the historically disadvantaged inhabitants of the Richtersveld. The settlement gave promise of access 
to, not only the land, but also to some of the wealth that has historically been generated thereof, 
and access to current and future economic potential of mining company property.  
However, since the agreement was reached, it seems that few expected benefits of the deal are 
being realised. According to an August 2O1O media report, ‘by the middle of 2O1O only two 
settlement processes were legally complete: the agricultural farms plus the R5O million to 
recapitalise them had been handed over, and all three instalments of the R19O million reparation 
payment had been made. The money appears not to have been spent but is being kept in trust. 
Neither the title deeds to Alexander Bay nor the community’s mining rights…has been transferred to 
the community’ (G. Ntsaluba, 27 August 2O1O, iol online, accessed 18/O7/2O11). 
In a 2O1O Annual Report, Alexkor Ltd., however, claims to have made ‘significant strides with 















mining rights to the community was approved by the Department of Mineral Resources, though the 
cession of mineral rights was yet to be completed. ‘Significant progress’ with achieving municipal 
standards for the Alexander Bay township were reported, with a projected hand over to the CPA 
anticipated on completion. The farms that ‘could be transferred’ in 2O1O, i.e. Beauvalon, the ostrich 
farm, ‘were…the rest will be in 2O11, when the town establishment is complete’ (Alexkor, 2O1O, 
p.4). 
Whilst Alexkor successfully converted old order land and marine mining rights in 2O1O, intensifying 
their marine mining effort through contracting out deep sea, middle sea and shallow water mining 
to smaller companies, land mining operations were curtailed; the company claim this was in order to 
‘preserve the asset being transferred to the community’ (Alexkor, 2O1O, p. 6).  
Although the national government has provided substantial funds to cover Alexkor’s legal costs (R 
9.6 million), environmental rehabilitation obligations (R32.8 million plus a further 223.8 million from 
the Department of Public Enterprises) , R313 million for township establishment, compensation for 
lost assets (R41.2 million for Beauvalon farm and mining rights, R164.8 million for buildings that will 
be transferred t the CPA), Alexkor nevertheless claim that the company will continue to operate at a 
loss until the Pooling and Shared Joint Venture with the Richtersveld Community acquires the 
necessary ‘recapitalisation’ to make up for the company’s substantial ‘liabilities’ (Alexkor, 2O1O, p. 4 
and 35).  
On the other hand, the company claims to now be ‘reaping the benefits’ of a 2OO9 ‘restructuring 
programme’, which saw the transition to a ‘contractor model’, which had the intended effect of  
‘lowering overall costs’, due to mass lay-offs of workers and lower wages paid to contracted 
workers. It is difficult to see how this ‘privatisation’ of company operations and services has 
‘empowered members of the local community and past employees’ as the company claims (Alexkor, 
2O1O, p. 5). 
Whilst the company reported increased revenues from diamonds in 2O1O, due to increased yields 
from the marine concessions, which provided over 7O% of their total production, in just 13 days at 
sea (Alexkor, 2O1O, p. 1O), Alexkor’s 2O1O Annual Report explicitly states that the company are 
finding ways to ‘cap’ their ‘liabilities’ of environmental rehabilitation and obligations of post-















for not paying any taxes for a number of years and for ‘ring-fencing’ state funds intended to be spent 
on meeting their legal obligations according to the Deed of Settlement.68 
Meanwhile, media reports have focussed attention on conflicts emerging among Richtersveld 
community members. One report claimed, ‘there are simmering tensions between various factions 
in the broader community over how best to manage the large mining and agricultural holdings of the 
local community association’ and ‘factionalism is apparently rife in the community with Namas 
competing with Basters, Khoi and amaXhosa’ (anon, August 17 2O1O, iol online, accessed 
18/O7/2O11). Another mentioned ‘the community is now fraught with infighting, fuelled by outside 
interests that have sought to insert themselves as business partners’ (G. Ntsaluba, 27 August 2O1O, 
iol online, accessed 18/O7/2O11). 
The Richtersveld Communal Property Association, known as the Sida !hub (Our Land) , which is the 
legal custodian of the assets won by the community, was reportedly being opposed by another 
group, the Nama Council. According to a 2O1O report, the Nama Council had already taken the CPA 
to court four times since September 2OO9, on the grounds that the CPA does not represent them 
and is mismanaging community assets (anon, August 17 2O1O, iol online, accessed 18/O7/2O11). 
 A local government official mentioned in August 2O11 (DENC official, pers. com. 5/O8/2O11), that 
the CPA had finally managed to put aside their differences and elect a new Committee. The DENC 
official was optimistic that this would enable progress to be made on key environmental 
management issues, such as rehabilitation of the Orange River Mouth estuary, which had been 
severely degraded through mining activities and poor environmental management (pers. com. 
5/O8/2O11 and interview September 2O1O)69.   
Yet, according to H. Smith, of the Legal Resources Centre, the settlement agreed to between Alexkor 
and the CPA “can’t work – it’s unimplementable” (H. Smith, LRC, pers. comm., October 2O1O). H. 
Smith, who had been providing legal advice and support to the Community when they asserted their 
claim, argues that, contrary to his advice, the claimants were “bulldozed” into the agreement. He 
explained, “the main problem is this: that Alexkor keep the upper hand. The state company, a 
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 ‘Acting chief financial officer for Alexkor Berno Lategan…noted that the state provided R29m for the 
township establishment and R100m in the 2010 financial year. This funding was "ring-fenced" and only R5.8m 
had been spent’. ’DA spokesman on mineral resources Hendrik Schmidt said it was "extraordinary" that the 
company had built up ring-fenced reserves - the product of injections from the state - of nearly R300 million.’ 
Pressly, D., August 12 2010, highbeam online, accessed 1/O8/2O11). 
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 The Department of the Environment and Nature Conservation (DENC) has been attempting to ensure the 
Orange River Mouth retains its Ramasar status and is recognised as a World Heritage Site and Protected Area. 
Whilst a Orange River Mouth Advisory Committee had been established to pursue these objectives, a DENC 
official mentioned that the dysfunction Richtersveld CPA had hindered consultative and decision-making 















completely inefficient mining company, is the majority shareholder. It cannot and will not invest in 
it…it needs a huge capital injection to mine properly, which it will not and cannot do. And they’re 
supposed to get a third party contractor, but no one is interested in mining for Alexkor…and the 
Community as contractor” (H. Smith, LRC, pers. comm., October 2O1O).70 
Alexkor initially demonstrated considerable reluctance to respect the Richtersvelders’ entitlement to 
the coastal land and resources, which may also be contributing to the weakness of the ‘partnership’ 
arrangement. The relationship between Alexkor’s management and community representatives was, 
throughout the court case, reportedly “very, very bad” (H. Smith, LRC, pers. comm., October 2O1O). 
The company evidently did not want to enter into partnership with the Richtersveld Community, 
seeing their demand for restitution, compensation and benefit-sharing instead as significant 
obstacles to achieving profitability in a time when leading international corporations of the mining 
sector, including South Africa’s dominant diamond mining company, De Beers, are ‘streamlining’ 
operations to cut costs and to reduce their social and environmental ‘liabilities’. 
For the meantime, Alexkor Ltd. remains in de facto control of the coastal territories it has historically 
held title to, including mineral wealth, the majority of which it now accesses by means of contracted 
companies who mine land deposits, and near-shore waters and through operating its own larger 
deeper water diamond pumping vessels.  
 
Plate 7: Near-Shore marine diamond mining, Alexkor contracted operators, south of Alexander Bay 
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 H. Smith said that the LRC’s proposal was different, but due to pressure exerted by the politicians involved, 
the Community were persuaded to accept the agreement and to refuse the assistance of the LRC for at least 
five years. Though, he claimed, “they ask us every day to come and save them”, there is nothing the LRC will be 
able to do on the basis of the agreement made between the Community representatives, the Company and 















6.4 Case 2:  Komaggas Community Claims 
Represented by the Karusab Land Claims and Development Committee, members of the Komaggas71 
community are, with assistance of the Legal Resources Centre, currently pursuing an ambitious land 
claim on numerous farms currently owned by DeBeers, the state and private individuals. Their claim 
of ancestral title includes all the farms along the coast between Hondeklipbaai and Oubeep, and 
between the coast and the Komaggas reserve’72 (See Figure 6 and annex 3).   De Beers in the formal 
owner of most of these farms, most of which have not been mined, but are currently used for 
limited livestock farming or conservation.73  
Members of the Karusab Committee explained (Karusab Committee members, pers.comm., 
December 2O1O) that they hope to secure land title and permission to commence a variety of 
income-generating activities, such as mariculture, windfarming, and tourist facilities. As landowners, 
they envisage they will be able to start some of these projects themselves, or to potentially attract 
outside investors to partner with them. Their priority is thus to initiate businesses and generate 
ongoing employment, in such a way that members of their community stand to benefit, as well as to 
remain in a position of authority over the course of development on their claimed property. 
According to a letter sent to DeBeers from H. Smith of the Legal Resources Centre, on behalf of the 
Komaggas Community, in the 199Os, the then Minister of Land Affairs, Mr. Hanekom, ‘entered into 
negotiations with De Beers and proposed the transfer of De Beers land to communities’. A meeting 
in September 1994, ‘and subsequent deliberations between the Minister and the company resulted 
in De Beers undertaking that any of its land not needed for its core functions would first be offered 
to the state for land reform purposes before being put on the open market’ (H. Smith, LRC to DBCM, 
26 August 2O1O, p. 3).  
However, it seems that since then DeBeers have been reluctant to make land available to the DLA 
for land redistribution purposes, though a number of their farms have been sold to WWF or leased 
to SAN-Parks for conservation purposes. This is despite the fact that the Komaggas community 
registered a claim to De Beers farms in 1994 (H. Smith, LRC to DBCM, 26 August 2O1O).74 
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 Komaggas is a rural reserve of approximately 7O,OOO hectares in size, located in the Nama Khoi 
Municipality. The Komaggas reserve historically developed around a mission station in the late 182Os, and 
received was established as a reserve by order of a governmental Ticket of Occupation’ in 1843.  
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 Copy of Letter sent from H. Smith of the LRC to DBCM on 26 August 2O1O, pg. 1. 
73
 This includes a number of farms transferred to management of San Parks as part of the expanded Namaqua 
National Park. 
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Figure 6: Map depicting the Komaggas Reserve in relation to farms owned by De Beers 
Namaqualand Mines and the state farm, Brazil, subject to land claim. 
 
The claim for land restitution comes after years of futile attempts on behalf of the committee and 
the community to enter into discussions with De Beers about their mine closure plan and 















commissioned by De Beers in 1993, which involved extensive community consultation, anticipated 
that mine closure would have significant negative impacts on neighbouring communities, employees 
and the local economy75, advising that the company consult and cooperate with workers unions and 
affected to communities to develop a socially responsible mine closure plan; the Karusab committee 
complain that they remained excluded from discussions (H. Smith, LRC to DBCM, 26 August 2O1O, p. 
3) The committee’s hope to be involved in plans for environmental rehabilitation of mined sites, and 
the employment of community members in rehabilitation efforts was also apparently ignored by the 
company (H. Smith, LRC to DBCM, 26 August 2O1O, p. 3-4).  
Thus, perceiving themselves excluded from the political platform on which decisions about the post-
mining transition are being made, the Karusab committee are attempting to compel De Beers, San 
Parks, WWF, private farm owners and the relevant government authorities to recognise them as 
rights holders that must be consulted on the future of the land; and with whom benefits deriving 
from land and resource use must be shared. 
Through H. Smith, of the LRC, Karusab have sent letters of notification to the relevant land owners to 
initiate a negotiation process, they hope will allow them to reach a settlement out of court. If this 
does not prove possible, the community hope that, with the assistance of the LRC, they will be able 
to gain recognition of their ancestral entitlement as equivalent to ownership rights in customary law. 
For this to stand in court as a restitution case, they would have to demonstrate these rights were not 
extinguished by the granting of farm land to registered whites, privatisation of crown land and the 
granting of land to mining companies (Bregman, 2O1O). 
Bregman (2O1O) writes, ‘the Komaggas community, represented by Karusab (Land Claims and 
Development Committee), maintains that the original inhabitants of Komaggas and their ancestors 
were the rightful owners of a much larger portion of land…The claim for ancestral land is bordered 
by the Buffels River in the north, the Swartlentjies River in the south, the Kamiesberg in the east and 
the Atlantic Ocean in the west’ (p. 14).  
Sharp (1994) argues that historical evidence supports a community claim for land restitution, given 
that predecessors of current community members continued to access and make use of much of the 
‘waterless coastal plains between the rivers, and between Komaggas and the sea’, which had been 
declared Crown Land. Sharp (1994) adds, ‘there was, of course, no fence around Komaggas until well 
into the twentieth century, and the inhabitants of the reserve had unrestricted access to land all the 
way down to the coast. Komaggas was completely encircled by colonists' farms only in 1915, but 
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 De Beers commissioned a group of UCT students to research the likely socio-economic and environmental 















even so the people appear to have had access to coastal grazing for many years after that date, 
partly because many of these farms were not permanently occupied’ (Sharp, 1994, p. 4O4). 
Members of the community claimed they had been issued land title by the British colonial 
government.76 However, ’for at least the last 7O years the inhabitants of Komaggas have faced an 
impenetrable wall of indifference to their land claim’; as Sharp (1994) highlights, ‘De Beers held the 
title deeds to the land and had no reason at all to listen to the people’s case. During the apartheid 
era, moreover, the area between Komaggas and the coast was absolutely beyond their reach, it was 
regarded as an area for exclusive white ownership’ (p. 4O5). 
A historical study commissioned by ESKOM in the 199Os77 discovered no support for Kommaggas 
community claims, ‘in the form in which they made them’ (Sharp, 1994), i.e. premised on grant of 
title by the colonial British government. Members of the community have since sought an 
alternative legislative premise for their claim, which might be more effective in achieving the 
recognition of their rights over the areas held by the state and De Beers. They have thus formulated 
their claim as one of Aboriginal entitlement, following legal precedent in other former colonies, and 
a growing international support for indigenous peoples in their claims for restitution of land and 
rights vis-à-vis colonising governments and corporations78.  
However, according to the 1997 White Paper on Land Policy in South Africa, to open the possibility 
of land restitution according to Aboriginal Title in South Africa ‘would create a number of problems 
and legal-political complexities that would be impossible to unravel…The entertainment of such 
claims would serve to awaken and/or prolong destructive ethnic and racial politics’ (Bregman, 2O1O, 
1O7-8). Given the situation where ‘large parts of South Africa could be subject to overlapping and 
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 Whilst apartheid discriminatory legislation regarding access to land ownership remained in place, claims of 
traditional use held little political or legislative weight. Members of Komaggas argued that the British colonial 
government had recognised their land rights and they requested researchers find documentary evidence of 
the grant Queen Victoria gave their forebears, or the authentic 1831 map demarcated by a land surveyor, 
Wentzel, which they believed ‘set aside a portion [of land] within the larger grant…to accommodate the 
mission station’ (Sharp 1994, p.4O5-6).  
77
 In the early 199Os, ESKOM, the state electricity supplier, planned to buy two coastal properties on the coast 
between the Swartlentjies and Buffels Rivers, one of which was owned by De Beers and the other, Brazil, was 
registered as state land. ESKOM was interested in finding a suitable site for the future construction of 
additional nuclear power stations. The company, however, faced vigorous opposition from members of the 
Komaggas community, who did not want a nuclear facility near their settlement, and who claimed prior rights 
to the land. Yet, the historical inquiry into these claims commissioned by ESKOM found the colonial record to 
provide no backing for the people’s claims in the form in which they made them. (Sharp 1994). 
78 In the USA the legal concept of aboriginal title became institutionalised in the 182Os onwards as courts 
upheld the rights of Native Americans to certain lands (Bregman, 2O1O, p. 1O7). And, more recently, a 
landmark case, Mabo vs Queensland (no. 2) in 1992 became the foundational case for aboriginal title in 
Australia. In this case, the British colonial declaration in 1788 that much of Australia was terra nullius (land 















competing claims where pieces of land have been occupied in succession by, for example, San, Khoi, 
Xhosa, Mfengu, Trekkers and British’, recognising aboriginal entitlement might mean up to 8O% of 
the population could make claims to land rights, perpetuating racial political conflict (Bregman, 
2O1O, 1O7-8, quoting from Ulgem, 2OO2, 134). 
Sharp (1994)  mentions that many members of the Komaggas community ‘realise that such a claim 
would be problematic in the national context…They know that if they did take an aboriginal rights 
action to court, they might never live down the opprobrium which resulted from setting a precedent 
that proved difficult to control’ (p. 412). Yet a claim based on continued de facto use of Crown Land 
until the 193Os may prove to carry little legal weight, particularly as the community could not claim 
to be the sole occupants or users of this land, which has also been accessed by white migrant 
farmers into the twentieth century (Sharp, 1994, p. 413). The perceived ‘weakness’ of a claim based 
on de facto historical access, might thus be strengthened if the community could successfully claim 
unique rights of aboriginality.  
In their attempts to gain a greater stake in the economic opportunities and political recognition 
associated with land tenure along the Namaqualand coast, the Komaggas community have been 
inspired by the perceived success of the neighbouring Richtersveld community. The Karusab 
Committee are aware however that achieving their ambitious claim could take many years; they 
have thus already prompted the government to recognise their claim to the state farm Brazil. 
 
6.5 Occupation of Brazil Farm 
Karusab Committee members say that they had received confirmation from the Department of 
Public Works that they can occupy the state farm Brazil79 on behalf of the Komaggas community. At 
the time of fieldwork (December 2O1O and January 2O11) Karusab had erected a gate and stationed 
two people to charge entry to holiday makers who visit Brazil for recreational purposes. This 
reportedly enangered some local white holidaymakers, who felt entitled to access Brazil’s coast 
without paying, as they have customarily done for many years (Karusab Committee members, pers. 
comm., December 2O1O; and DENC official, pers. comm., December 2O1O). A diamond diver who 
operates a concession off the coast at Brazil was also reportedly hostile to the new access control 
regime, and has, according to Committee members, threatened to have the men stationed at the 
gate removed by the police (Karusab Committee members, pers. comm., December 2O1O).  
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 The farm lies on the coast between Komaggas and the ocean. It has been a choice destination for white 
campers and anglers, as well as the launch site for a small-scale marine diamond mining operation, contracted 















When members of the Provincial Environment and Nature Conservation Department (DENC) visited 
the farm in December 2O1O, it was also argued that this system of access control would be 
considered illegal according to the Integrated Coastal Management Act (2OO8) , which has declared 
the coastal strip of the state farm as ‘coastal public property’. The Act stipulates such property may 
not be subject to restricted access without consent of the Minister of Environmental Affairs80.  
Karusab Committee members argued in their defence (pers. comm., December 2O1O) that many 
visitors, particularly those from outside the region, are supportive of the community. Recognising 
the charge for entry is voluntary and intended to fund local economic development projects, they 
are more than willing to pay the minimal 2O Rand. From their perspective, they are trying to ‘open 
up’ the coast for the benefit of their community, by harnessing the natural resources and tourism 
potential to create livelihoods and much needed income.   
Committee members felt (pers. comm., December 2O1O) that termination of their occupation of the 
farm on grounds that it infringed stipulations laid down in ICMA would be unjust, given that the 
individual operating a diamond diving concession at Brazil has been able to fence off a section of the 
coast at Brazil, erecting no entry signs to protect his building and boat, effectively privatizing a 
section of state land in the coastal public property zone. It seems, however, that for the meantime 
his mining lease exempts him from the legal prohibition.  
 
6.6 Discussion 
It thus seems ironic that, for members of the Komaggas community, their efforts to ‘open up’ part of 
the Namaqualand coast, long experienced as off-limits to them, should be hindered by legislation 
intended to ensure South Africa’s coastline is maintained and enjoyed as public property81. This is 
particularly pertinent when the Karusab occupation of the Brazil farm is seen in the wider context of 
large-scale extensive environmental degradation and social exclusion incurred by mining along the 
Namaqualand coastline. 
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 ICMA No.24, 2OO8, 13.3 states ‘No fee may be charged for access to coastal public property without the 
approval of the Minister’. 
81 According to the preamble of ICMA, ‘whereas much of the rich natural heritage of our coastal zone is being 
squandered by overuse, degradation and inappropriate management’; and ‘whereas the economic, social and 
environmental benefits of the coastal zone have been distributed unfairly in the past’; ICMA states the 
Government’s intention to retain the coast ‘as a national asset’, with public rights to access and benefit from 
















Whilst the Karusab Committee’s entitlement to occupy Brazil is as yet formally ambiguous, the 
Committee has attempted to develop a detailed management plan for the farm, with the 
incorporation of possible business prospects such as wind energy generation, small-scale diamond 
mining, mariculture, and eco-tourism. However the committee have yet to gain governmental 
permission or attract investment in these enterprises; which would require feasibility studies and 
sustainability planning, as well as development of local skills and management capacity to run these 
operations.  
Without security of tenure to the farm, it is unlikely outside investors and developers will negotiate 
with the Committee, but instead, with the land owner, the Department of Public Works. Moreover, 
as the Richtersveld Community case demonstrates, gaining formal recognition of land rights does 
not automatically mean significant benefits will be channelled to Namaqualand rural communities. 
 A number of factors will determine what can be achieved through agreements reached between 
government departments, private businesses and community organisations and whether these will 
promote democratic accountability, social equity and environmental sustainability. Significant 
factors include the balance of power between collaborating agents; the resource(s) chosen to be 
developed (e.g. renewable/non-renewable); the kind of business and the way in which the 
enterprise is embedded within social, political and economic systems, locally, nationally and 
internationally; the way in which resources, business assets and potential income is owned and 
apportioned; and whether financial benefits derived from enterprises are re-invested into local 
community infrastructure, education, and services etc, or used to pay the income of outside 
consultants and add to the profit margins of non-local companies.  
These issues will be further discussed in the final chapter. The following chapter, chapter 7, explores 
some of the alternative economic enterprises that have been promoted for the Namaqualand 
coastal region, post-diamond mining. The discussion further contextualises the community claims 
detailed in this chapter, indicating the potential and also some of the pitfalls of pursuing 




















Chapter 7: Exploring Alternatives to Mining on the Namaqualand Coast 
The current situation of mine sale and closure in Namaqualand, after almost a century of diamond 
mining, presents opportunities as well as challenges to realise the key post-1994 governmental 
objective for pursuing integrated and sustainable coastal development that will address problems of 
coastal poverty and unemployment. 
 A 2OOO White Paper (DEAT, 2OOO, section 7.1) committed the government to pursuing an 
integrated approach to ‘Sustainable Coastal Development’ that would include the following 
objectives: 
 To promote the diversity, vitality and long-term viability of coastal economies and activities, 
giving preference to those that are distinctly coastal or dependent on a coastal location (C1). 
 To ensure that the public has the right of physical access to the sea, and to and along the sea 
shore, on a managed basis; and to ensure that the public has the right of equitable access to 
the opportunities and benefits of the coast, on a managed basis (B2). 
 To alleviate coastal poverty through proactive coastal development initiatives that generate 
sustainable livelihood options (C3). 
 To use non-renewable coastal resources in a manner that optimises the public interest and 
retains options for alternative and future uses (D4); and 
 To rehabilitate damaged or degraded coastal ecosystems and habitats (D5). 
The 1998 Green Paper, ‘Towards Sustainable Coastal Development’82 identified the following  key 
challenges to be addressed along the Namaqualand coastline: limited public access to the coast due 
to exclusive control of mining companies; the prevention of the development of alternative use of 
the environment and ecosystem services for activities such as harvesting marine organisms or 
tourism and recreational activities; and inappropriate coastal development and pollution of coastal 
and marine ecosystems, which might be contributing to declines of marine species (DEAT, 1998, 
chapter 6). 
The 2OO4 Namakwa District Integrated Development Plan83  mentions the ‘huge challenge to reduce 
unemployment and poverty’ among local communities might be addressed through exploiting the 
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 In the finalised White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa 2OOO, this section is 
omitted. 
83 Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) are planning documents produced by South Africa’s government 
municipalities as part of an integrated system of planning and service delivery. The IDP process is meant to 
‘arrive at decisions on key issues such as municipal budgets, land management, promotion of local economic 















‘unique environment the district offers for biodiversity conservation linked with economic 
development and job creation’; and exploitation of the ‘huge potential’ of processing of natural 
resources, particularly those to be found along the coast (section 4.2).  
The 2OO2 Richtersveld District Municipality IDP also mentioned, that with growing unemployment, 
decommissioned mining areas could be made available for tourism, conservation and mariculture 
development (p. iii), which might help alleviate socio-economic depression of local communities. 
However, realisation of potential land use ‘synergies’ post-mining would require the cooperation of 
mining companies in improving access to the coast and supporting the creation of post-mining 
livelihoods (p.iii).  
With mass retrenchments from the mines, the Northern Cape Provincial Government envisaged that 
the promotion of mariculture and fishing in the province could replace the mining sector as key 
industry and regional employer. The 2OO3 Fishing and Mariculture Sector Development Strategy for 
the Northern Cape Province mentions as key objectives:  ‘small, medium and micro enterprise 
(SMME) development and black economic empowerment as well as those of global competitiveness 
and profitability’ (DEAT, FMSDS, 2OO3). Though many of South Africa’s fisheries elsewhere are 
operating at or above maximum sustainable capacity, in Namaqualand, the possibilities for fishing, 
harvesting and mariculture farming of marine species are, according to the 2OO3 FMSD, 
‘significantly under-developed’84.   
Whilst De Beers claim that their plans for mine sale and post-mining land uses form part of their 
commitment to a “lasting contribution to the communities in which they live and work” (CSA Press 
Release, 2O11, p.1); evidence suggests that, despite the recommendations of a socio-economic 
impact study commissioned by the company themselves in the early 199Os85, De Beers is attempting 
to avoid fulfilling post-mining social responsibilities. The company have instead pursued their own 
plans for conservation, tourism, mariculture and wind energy generation projects without 
substantial consultation with local Interested and Affected Parties (IAPs). Though initially the 
company showed interest in promoting inclusive sustainable socio-economic development and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not only informs municipal management on key issues, but also guides the activities of other spheres of 
government, corporate service providers, NGO’s and the private sector’ 
(http://www.thedplg.gov.za/subwebsites/idp/documents/IDP%20brochure.pdf accessed 1O/O8/2O11). 
84
 The FMSD Strategy mentioned that ‘findings of the fisheries Information System over the period 1995-7 
indicated there are at least 1O commercial species with the potential for exploitation off the Northern Cape 
Coast. These include deep and shallow-water hake, monkfish, snoek, horse mackerel, kingklip, squid and west 
coast sole.’ In addition there are limpets, mussels and seaweed that can be harvested, and historically the 
large fur seal colony at Kleinzee has seen seal culling for commercial use. Though now the seal colony is 
serving as a tourist attraction for De Beers’ tourism operations. 
85 De Beers commissioned a group of UCT students to research the likely socio-economic and environmental 















creation of significant jobs in environmental rehabilitation and other ‘green’ developments; the 
company’s current approach is instead unlikely to bring substantial benefits for local communities, 
or leave for them a thriving natural environment on which to base sustainable livelihoods. 
 
7.1 The ‘Living Edge of Africa Project’ 
The 2O1O De Beers Report to Society mentions that ‘alternative land uses are being considered in 
place of full rehabilitation. These include tourism and mariculture projects, wind power generation 
and the expansion of oyster and abalone farming’ (De Beers, 2O1O, p. 8O). 
In a presentation delivered to MCEN participants in January 2O11 (Marine and Coastal Educators 
Network Conference, Namaqualand, January 2O11), S. Frazee, director of CSA86, was invited to speak 
about the alternative industries and livelihoods De Beers had sought to support in order to offset the 
socio-economic disaster of mass retrenchments, unemployment and decline of dependent 
secondary businesses in the region, due to mine closure. S. Frazee spoke of the Living Edge of Africa 
Project (LEAP) initiative CSA had developed as consultants to De Beers over the past four years. CSA 
had agreed to assist De Beers in ensuring a ‘positive legacy’ would be left in the wake of mining. 
They envisaged the development of a ‘green’ economic hub on the mined land, with such innovative 
projects as mariculture, sea-water greenhouses, ecotourism, land art, a wind farm, as well as 
ecological rehabilitation where feasible.  
LEAP was thus conceived as a means of creating jobs from conservation. Frazee explained that only 
7% of the North West coastline remained ‘untouched and undisturbed’ by mining activities, and thus 
CSA saw it as crucial that these pristine sections should remain protected from further degradation. 
However they recognise that conventional conservation approaches – specifically conservation parks 
– provide limited benefits or opportunities for local communities. Whilst a few might access 
employment or revenues from tourism, the thousands impoverished by mine lay-offs, would likely 
see no direct benefit.  
CSA thus framed LEAP as a means of integrating conservation and sustainable development goals, 
hoping to achieve agreement between ‘local people’, ‘experts’ and mining authorities on ‘a common 
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 Conservation International is nature conservation organisation with headquarters in the USA. The South 
African branch, Conservation South Africa (CSA) seeks to protect the unique flora and fauna of the Succulent 
Karoo biodiversity hotspot, the majority of which falls within the Namaqua District. This mission has motivated 
their work in the Kamiesberg mountain region, where they run a number of projects working with local 
communities and Municipal government to achieve more ecologically sustainable farming practices, and 
promote alternative livelihoods and small enterprises, particularly in ecotourism (S. Frazee, MCEN 















vision’. This envisioning exercise was followed by a Business Case intended to attract potential 
investors, a pre-feasibility study and feasibility study, completed in September 2O1O (CSA,2OO8, for 
De Beers). CSA had also provided funding to facilitate the expansion of Namaqua National Park and 
research and development of best practice for rehabilitation and restoration, which De Beers had 
piloted on a number of experimental sites.  
However, Frazee announced, “there’s been a change of management and a change of vision. De 
Beers are now looking at selling the mine. So they decided they are not going to move forward with 
the (LEAP)” (S. Frazee, MCEN presentation, January 2O11). In 2O11, De Beers admitted in a public 
press release that they no longer intend to pursue LEAP (I. Salgado, 5 April 2O11, Cape Times, 
accessed 18/O7/2O11), but that they intend instead to sell Namaqualand Mines on to another 
mining company87. 
What mine sale might mean in practice is that De Beers will attempt to dispense with the social and 
environmental responsibilities they had initially agreed to take on, selling on instead to a smaller 
company without pretensions to, or capacity to achieve high corporate responsibility standards (see 
previous chapter and annex 5). Whilst S. Frazee complained that it was proving exceptionally difficult 
to access information about what exactly is in the terms of sale that DeBeers is negotiating with 
prospective buyers of the mine, she believed however that the company were making no provision 
for rehabilitation or social responsibility requirements – other than meeting certain legally required 
BEE criteria (S. Frazee, pers. comm., March 2O11). 
S. Frazee reported that relationship between her organisation and the mining company was now 
“very strained”, complaining that De Beers’ decision to sell the mine lacked any transparency or 
public accountability (S. Frazee, CSA, pers. com, March 2O11). When the company did eventually 
make available a copy of their Amended Environmental Management Programme Report (EMPR) in 
2O11, they placed only one copy in a library in Springbok, beyond the reach or awareness of many 
affected local community members (CSA & Bench Marks, 2O11, 5). It seemed to Frazee that the 
company were attempting to circumvent any delay on achieving a quick sale; and as Frazee aptly 
puts it, their short-sighted approach seems indicative of a mindset “we’ve got to get out yesterday” 
(pers. comm., march, 2O11). 
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 A De Beers’ presentation from 2O1O, entitled ‘Project Oasis’, describes its Mine sale plans, claiming 
‘Namaqualand Mines offers a significant business opportunity to an operator with the ability to successfully 
and profitably operate the alluvial diamond mining asset. This opportunity should accelerate the consequent 
benefits to the local industry, community and business partners through job creation, renewed business 















Whilst the company have decided not to pursue the LEAP, evidence suggests that they are 
nevertheless capitalising on their current ownership of much of their coastal territory, with the 
intention of attracting investment for a number of private developments. A key question is thus to 
what extent these initiatives include local communities as partners and co-managers, and will 
redress historical environmental degradation and social exclusion. 
 
7.2 Town transfer and Coastal Development 
In an interview, De Beers’ town manager at Kleinzee mentioned that the mining towns of Koignaas 
and Kleinsee would be transferred to municipal management, and a property estate agent would be 
marketing individual houses to buyers who would find the exclusivity appealing. When asked 
whether the high-security fencing and controlled access points would be removed for proclamation 
as municipal towns, the town manager explained, “the residents (remaining De Beers employees 
and their families) want to keep that. But, by law these towns…you can’t actually prevent anyone 
showing an ID book and getting through. But really that’s what makes these towns so attractive and 
will be a selling point when we do actually start selling properties here” (Town Manager, DBCM, 
pers. comm., September 2O1O). 
S.Frazee mentioned that CSA had developed plans to make the old mining towns into model ‘green’ 
towns, retrofitted with renewable energy infrastructure. However, since De Beers decided not to 
pursue plans developed with CSA, Frazee doubted the company would take up the 
recommendations, and instead, the company had made an agreement with a private estate agent, 
Pam Golding, to sell the properties, with first priority to be given to current or previous employees 
(S. Frazee, pers. comm., March 2O11).  
 De Beers’ town manager outlined other post-mining plans of De Beers; the company intended to 
lease land to private developers to establish a wind farm and mariculture enterprises. Although 
these enterprises offer the possibility of generating employment, business opportunities and 
benefits such as low-cost energy and sea food for local communities; realising these possibilities 
requires the company making the necessary links and ensuring local community benefits and 
involvement is a key objective in planning and implementation processes. Without consciously 















as wind farms and mariculture farms will be oriented to national and international investors and 
markets instead.88 
Whilst local ‘coloured’ communities are struggling to attain land or recompense for their 
landlessness through the South African land reform process, with the Department of Land Affairs 
excusing disappointingly slow redistribution, on the grounds that the government agency is unable 
to afford properties subject to land claims; De Beers’ town manager put the situation in perspective, 
indicating DeBeers was in a good position to market land to private investors: “there’s lots of land; 
land is cheap”, he said (Town Manager, DBCM, pers. comm., September 2O1O). 
The town manager further highlighted that the De Beers territory would be ideal for abalone 
farming; “this being so remote and this farming taking place behind barbed wire, that’s been put 
there to protect the diamonds can also be used to protect their product, which is like gold. You 
know, abalone is very, very pricey. People pay a fortune for it” (Town Manager, DBCM, pers. comm., 
September 2O1O). The company could offer security to mariculture operations to ensure their 
protection from poaching, which he highlighted was a major problem in the highly populated 
Western Cape. 
Another strategy to capitalise on the secured access infrastructure, and consequently ‘remote’ and 
unpopulated diamond territory mentioned by the town manager was to attract a private investor to 
establish a prison. He quickly elaborated, “Prison is the wrong word…it’s a correctional services 
training centre. The idea is to get young offenders, between the 18 and 25…to bring them to a 
facility where they can learn a trade”. However, he mentioned it was proving difficult to get 
governmental approval for the plan for reasons that were “political” (Town Manager, DBCM, pers. 
comm., September 2O1O). 
CSA and Bench Marks (2O11), in their response to De Beers’ Namaqualand Mines Amended 
Environmental Management Programme Report (2O11), highlight that the company have 
prematurely removed alternative land use areas from their liability costing. Although the company 
have mentioned a proposed correctional facility, marine aquaculture, wind energy (electricity 
generating turbines) and a hazardous waste disposal site; there is no public information available for 
the correctional facility or hazardous waste disposal site, nor evidence that these have yet been 
approved by the authorities and implemented (section 4.6). 
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 The town manager indicated that the wind farm was “not really (designed)  for the towns”, but would be 
funded by “private money…On the strength of our national utility company Eskom, who have said they are 
















CSA and Bench Marks (2O11) further highlight that in the company’s EMPR, ‘no information is 
presented in the Amended EMPR as to the size of alternative land use areas but indications are that 
the area is significant’; ‘the length of time for the development of these new enterprises is not 
indicated and information on how this relates to the anticipated life of the mine by 2O23 and the 
associated transition plan has not been provided to Interested and Affected Parties’; and ‘no 
technical reports have been included in the draft EMPR provided to CSA’ (section 4.6). Furthermore, 
the review highlights that in their EMPR the company is unclear whether revenues from sale or lease 
of land will be used as a contribution to the wider liability of post-mining restoration or social 
development (section 4.6). 
Instead of continuing with community consultation processes undertaken  for the LEAP initiative, the 
company seems intent on sustaining high levels of exclusivity, maintaining private ownership and 
secure access control over coastal territory; whilst compiling a portfolio of businesses and industries 
that ensure the coast remains ‘economically productive’ for selected investors.  
 
7.3 Diamond Route Tourism 
According to the company’s brochure, ‘Diamond aren’t the only treasures found in this area, this 
stretch of coastline has many unique offerings –and is unspoiled and evocative… Soft sand dunes 
and nostalgic shipwrecks, as well as a 3O,OOO hectare game farm’ comprise the DeBeers 
Namaqualand experience, which is marketed as a choice destination on the ‘Diamond Route’ (De 
Beers, Diamond Route Tourism Brochure, undated).89 
The largely unpopulated and  ‘undeveloped’ De Beers’ owned stretch of Namaqualand’s coast is, for 
the purposes of a certain tourist market, conjured as ‘pristine wilderness’, which can be explored ‘in 
the luxury of your own 4x4 vehicle’ as part of two guided tours, run exclusively by the company’s 
own operators. The exclusivity of the diamond fields is intended to be attractive to wealthy urban-
based tourists, who seek a wilderness getaway experience, somewhere where ‘calm reigns and 
stillness pervades’ (De Beers, Brochure, undated).90 
                                                          
89
 A tourism route linking nine nature reserves owned by DeBeers and the Oppenheimer family across the 
north of South Africa; from the ‘Venetia Limpopo’ Nature Reserve in the east, to Namaqualand in the West, 
including ‘Tswalu Kalahari’ Reserve, which is ‘the biggest privately owned reserve in South Africa at about 
1OO,OOO hectares’, and the Brenthurst Oppenheimer family estate, ‘filled with indigenous plants completely 
organically sustained’ (De Beers, The Diamond Route Tourism Brochure, undated). 
90
 A number of the destinations on the Diamond Route are relatively close to major cities; for example for 















De Beers thus hopes to attract a select clientele of high-paying visitors who can afford the luxury 
‘package’ tour they provide, and who will find the exclusivity appealing. Though, some members of 
local communities might receive employment in maintaining tourist facilities, it is questionable 
whether the kinds of adventure and ‘ecotourism’ being promoted is likely to be of significant benefit 
to local communities, suffering high levels of unemployment and income-loss due to mine closure. 
The all-inclusive ‘package’ tours offered by De Beers actually enable visitors to the area to largely by-
pass local-communities and the local economy, whilst paying to gain exclusive access to the 
company’s mining territory.  
Although the tourism brochure is decorated with the words ‘conservation, environmental 
awareness, tourism and social upliftment’ (front cover of De Beers, Brochure, undated), with the 
abandonment of LEAP, and reluctance to negotiate for land redistribution and restitution purposes, 
it does not seem that DeBeers is interested in ‘opening’ the coast to local socio-economic 
development or community-based natural resource management. 
The Diamond Route is primarily marketed as a form of ‘eco-tourism’; the private nature reserves and 
their conservation research projects are presented as a means of preserving ‘a piece of old Africa’ 
and an opportunity for visitors to ‘glimpse into the past’ of South Africa’s rich heritage of biological 
diversity, impressive wilderness landscapes and archaeological remains (De Beers, Brochure, 
undated). The Brochure mentions, ‘combined, the habitats of the Diamond Route are home to more 
than half of South Africa’s bird species –over 5OO in total –including 4O endemics and 69 species on 
the Red Data List…Adding to the lengthy bird list are over 5O mammal species, including white and 
black rhino, sable and roan antelope.’ (De Beers, Brochure, undated). 
Through maintaining extensive private nature reserves across South Africa, the mining magnates De 
Beers and Anglo American, controlled by their founding family, the Oppenheimers, claim to 
demonstrate their ‘green’ credentials and passion for South African indigenous wildlife. However, 
this portrayal requires critical interrogation. There are various reasons to be cautious of appraising 
the Diamond Route Tourism initiative as a positive development for the new South Africa, and 
particularly for local communities in Namaqualand. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
families and friends overnighting in the Kimberley area or an ideal weekend getaway from the hustle and 















7.4 De Beers and Conservation 
In a presentation delivered to the Marine and Coastal educators Network in Kleinzee in December of 
2O1O, the DBCM Environmental Manager, claimed that the larger portion of De Beers-owned land 
has not been intensively mined, and is thus in “pristine condition” (MCEN presentation, January 
2O11). The company’s environmental manager indicated on a map that of the 27O,OOO hectares 
owned by De Beers, 261,OOO were in “pristine condition”. Indeed he claimed this land was far 
better preserved than areas outside of DeBeers’ control, which have been farmed by livestock. By 
claiming that under De Beers’ management, Namaqualand’s coastline has actually been well 
preserved, the company both seek to mitigate or off-set the 9,OOO hectares or so of significant 
environmental degradation their mining activities have incurred; and to imply that De Beers has 
been a responsible environmental custodian during its period of ownership. 
However, there are a number of problems with De Beers’ professed commitment to the cause of 
conservation that deserve critical scrutiny. Firstly, the claim that only 9,OOO hectares has been 
disturbed by mining does not stand up to scrutiny, even of the company’s own estimates provided 
elsewhere (e.g. Environmental Manager, DBCM, MCEN Presentation, January 2O11). CSA and Bench 
Marks (2O11) calculation of areas disturbed reported in individual mine concession area EMPRs 
gives an estimate of 17,OOO hectares (section 4.9).  
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that pre-mining, these areas were not ‘pristine’ in the 
sense that they have never been used by people to derive a livelihood. Historical analysis of previous 
land uses and environmental changes can help to give an idea of how present landscape forms and 
patterns have come about, and how alternative socio-cultural groups have sustained themselves 
within, and had an influence upon the natural environment. As Hoffman and Rohde (2OO7) have 
highlighted, Namaqualand has historically undergone a number of ecological revolutions, through a 
series of changes in predominant forms of human inhabitation and interaction with the 
environment. 
Many of the farms acquired by De Beers in the early twentieth century were previously inhabited by 
mobile hunter-gatherer San people, then used as grazing land for livestock, first by pre-colonial Khoi 
people, and secondly, by white farmers, from whom the mining companies purchased the land.  
Whilst many of the early white settlers in Namaqualand undertook a form of mobile pastoralism 
comparable to that of the Khoi people they displaced, British colonial rule had little respect for this 
mode of livelihood, just as they disregarded traditional San peoples’ modes of hunting and 















residency and agriculture were encouraged, and farms were divided up and allocated to private 
white owners, whilst most of the non-white inhabitants of these lands, who survived colonisation 
and did not migrate north across the Gariep (Orange) River, were gradually settled into rural 
reserves, often surrounding church mission stations, where they were encouraged to undertake 
agricultural work and wage labour (Wisborg and Rohde, 2OO4; Sharp, 1994; Bregman, 2O1O). 
It is likely that early smaller scale prospecting and diamond mining has also gone on in these areas 
historically, either by opportunistic small-time diggers prior to monopolisation by the De Beers, or by 
the company itself. The Park Manager at Namaqua National Park explained that when San Parks 
took over management of the coastal extension from DeBeers, they had to undertake rehabilitation 
on a number of small-scale mining scars he believed were decades old (Park Manager, NNP, pers. 
comm., September 2O1O). 
Yet, even if De Beers were to argue that since they acquired these farms, the land has been ‘left to 
itself’ and has thus ‘recovered’ from the prior uses, in fact De Beers have continued to manage much 
of the non-mined land as farmland which is contracted to farmers, or as a private game reserve, 
onto which they have introduced game, which is accessed by tourists and recreational hunters 
(Town Manager, DBCM, interviewed September 2O1O). ‘Surplus’ animals are also sold to other 
private land owners keen to stock their farms with game. According to the DBCM Town Manager at 
Kleinsee, this is a strategy De Beers and Anglo American, the other mining company controlled by 
the Oppenheimer family, have repeated on their other properties in southern Africa (Town 
Manager, DBCM, pers. comm., September 2O1O).  
Indeed, Roberts (2OO7) argues conservation also provides a convenient way for the company to 
‘lock-up’ mineral deposits it does not want to be mined. Allegedly rich diamond deposits have been 
‘locked-up’ in the Richtersveld National Park on the Orange River, where, according to a union 
official to the Alexkor mine, “all the top mining houses [are] involved in its management structure” 
(Roberts, 2OO7, p. 3O6).  The conservation areas set aside by De Beers and Anglo American solely 
for the appreciation of nature, thus may also be a strategy by which the company can legitimately 
retain title to diamondiferous territory (Roberts, 2OO7). 
In Namaqualand De Beers has agreed to lease a number of their farm properties to San Parks to 
manage as part of an expanded Namaqua National Park.91 Whilst San Parks’ mandate commits the 
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 The Namaqua National Park (NNP), which was established in 1998 and proclaimed in 2OO1and is managed 
by South African National Parks (SANParks), was expanded through contract with DeBeers in 2OO8 to include 















conservation authority to undertake conservation on behalf of, and for the benefit and enjoyment of 
all South Africans, meaning the parks it manages ought to be accessible and affordable for all, and of 
benefit to local communities (SAN Parks website, accessed 18/O7/2O11;  SAN Parks NNP, 2O1O), the 
expansion of Namaqualand National Park has provoked antagonism among local communities, who 
feel their land claims have been trumped by conservation interests, and who perceive a hostile 
alliance between De Beers and SAN Parks to keep them from occupying and deriving benefits from 
the coastal land92. 
When asked why the company had only agreed to lease the farms and not to sell them to the 
conservation authority, a De Beers representative said, “if SAN Parks ever decide they don’t want to 
continue with this park, they’ve got to give it back to De Beers…All De Beers - the Oppenheimers- are 
saying is, we’ll give this to you, but providing you don’t take this land and sell it, or convert it into a 
commercial property…You can have it for these 99 years and then there’s the option to renew it. But 
that’s providing you keep it as a conservation area. Because if you don’t want to use it as a 
conservation area, then we’ll take it back” (Town Manager, DBCM, pers. comm., September 2O1O). 
It is in any case very misleading to present the image of ‘nature’ ‘left to itself’, or reserved as a zone 
of non-utilitarian or non-commercial custodianship for De Beers’ coastal farms. From the perspective 
of local farmers, De Beers is a private landowner, maintaining livestock on their properties. Whether 
or not the company uses the term ‘conservation’ to describe this activity, it is nevertheless farming 
stock on land that local farmers would likely see as prime grazing land for their livestock (NNP 
Manager, pers. comm., September 2O1O).93. The company meanwhile do lease some of their farms 
to commercial white farmers. ‘Conservation farming’ and tourism have thus provided subsidiary 
income to the company, in addition to their profits from diamond mining. All of these sources of 
revenue depend on the company’s exclusive ownership rights to coastal land.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dunes. The newly expanded park has a size of 14O,O35 hectares, including 35,183 hectares of contractual land 
owned by either DeBeers or WWF-SA 
92
 Communities seeking land redistribution through the Land Claims Court were under the impression that 
DeBeers had agreed to make land first available to the DLA for land redistribution to disadvantaged 
communities, before advertising on the open market.(H. Smith, LRC to DBCM, 26 August 2O1O). Yet a number 
of farms subject to land claims have since been transferred to San Parks.  
93
 According to the Manager of Namaqua National Park, many local farmers have little interest in, or respect 
for the aims of conservation. He said, “I think they know what our agenda is, they just don’t agree with it. They 
see this land as being very good grazing land for sheep and putting it under conservation is a waste of time”. 















7.5 Expansion of Namaqua National Park 
The Namaqua National Park (NNP) , which was established in 1998 and proclaimed in 2OO194and is 
managed by South African National Parks (SAN Parks) , was expanded through contract with DeBeers 
in 2OO8 to include the coastal section between the Groen and Spoeg River mouths, a 5Okm stretch 
of relatively unspoilt coastal dunes. The newly expanded park has a size of 14O,O35 hectares, 
including 35,183 hectares of contractual land owned by either DeBeers or WWF-SA95.  
The long-term aim of SAN Parks would be to see an expansion of NNP to connect the inland and 
coastal sections (see Figure 7), and potentially the southern side of the Groen River estuary, further 
developing tourism amenities, and providing up to 3OO job opportunities throughout the park. They 
also hope to enable educational visits by local schools (SAN Parks NNP, 2O1O; Park Manager, NNP, 
pers. comm., September and December 2O1O). The Namaqualand National Park has been promoted 
as of substantial benefit to local communities due to the tourism market the Park can draw from 
across the country and internationally. 
Plans for expansion also include the establishment of a Marine Protected Area (MPA) adjacent to the 
terrestrial conservation area. The proposed MPA will be the first MPA for the Province and 
conservation authorities were keen to establish a deepwater MPA, 2OO nautical miles seawards 
from the shore. Yet the Park Manager explained that at present such a MPA would be beyond SAN 
Parks’ ability to manage.  
Whilst SAN Parks is attempting to sell the idea of expansion of the park through promise of benefits 
to local communities, representatives from the local fisheries had not even heard of the proposed 
MPA, despite the fact it would likely impact on their livelihoods (Local Fisher Association 
Representatives from Hondeklip Bay and Port Nolloth, pers. comm., December 2O1O). 
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 In accordance to the National Parks Act, No.57 of 1976, for the purpose of conserving the rich diversity of 
succulent plants. 
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 The coastal section can be accessed via a dirt road that leads to the Groen River estuary and at present there 
















Figure 7: Map depicting Extent of Namaqua National Park and recent and proposed extensions. 
 
This is despite SAN Parks’ vision is to conserve biodiversity and cultural heritage ‘with the support 
and active participation of all stakeholders, enhancing livelihoods of the region’, ‘to manage NNP 















and engaging in public participation workshops, the Park seeks to overcome resistance from local 
communities, by ensuring that they derive some benefit and feel their concerns are heard.96 
Whilst hired labour is necessary to rehabilitate and fence the chosen ‘wilderness’ site, the real 
‘economic opportunities’ for local communities supposedly on offer are the ‘spin-offs’ that will come 
from establishing guest houses and tour operations for visitors. The Park Manager suggested that it 
is envisaged the Park will provide a ‘resource’ for those who make for themselves a business 
opportunity from the anticipated ‘flow’ of tourists. He sited the exemplary case of Kruger, which has 
seen the proliferation of secondary businesses surrounding the Park, catering to the tourist market 
(NNP Manager, pers. comm., September 2O1O.97  
However, the Park Manager admitted the current tourist market to Namaqua National Park is highly 
seasonal and the destination is nowhere near as popular as a Park like Kruger. Moreover, when it 
comes to hosting tourists or operating tours, clearly those who already are privileged with land, 
property and vehicles, residing near the conservation area, are at substantial advantage over most 
landless, income-poor persons, the majority of which in Namaqualand are members of ‘coloured’ 
communities. Hence San Park’s conservation strategy will likely do very little to alter these structures 
of inequality, and patterns of enrichment and impoverishment in the region.  
Furthermore, with substantial financial resources to draw upon98, San Parks is seen as having 
trumped local land claims made by ‘coloureds’ to achieve restitution or redistribution under the 
Land Act, proving a willing buyer of land double the market price (NNP Manager, pers. comm., 
September and December 2O1O). 
It thus remains to be seen whether SAN Parks efforts to ensure significant local and regional socio-
economic benefits from conservation initiatives will be successful, or whether the ‘opening up’ of 
the coast for tourism access will do little to enhance the coast’s accessibility or the acceptability of 
conservation as a post-mining land-use among local communities seeking real long-term livelihood 
opportunities. 
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 San Parks received funding from Conservation International-SA to operate a dog breeding project in order to 
prevent farmers from killing escaped game, which they say predates on their livestock. NNP Manager, 
explained that the dog-breeding project had been necessary to placate farmers who perceive all predatory 
game on their farms come from the Park, though he argued this is a “wrong perception”, as some of the 
nearby farms are also inhabited by jackal and caracal. (NNP Manager, pers. comm., September 2O1O). 
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 NNP Manager, “Look at the Kruger model, the economy outside is 1O times that inside”. He mentioned that 
guesthouses had already started opening near the park, and “although we’re not directly responsible for 
managing these, if it weren’t for the Park, they wouldn’t have been there” (pers. comm., September 2O1O).  
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 San Parks received funding from WWF, CI and the Leslie Hill Trust to establish NNP and to take on the 















7.6 Fisheries and Mariculture  
Though many of South Africa’s fisheries elsewhere are operating at or above maximum sustainable 
capacity, in Namaqualand, the possibilities for fishing, harvesting and mariculture farming of marine 
species are, according to the 2OO3 FMSD, ‘significantly under-developed’ (DEAT, 2OO3)99.   
On the other hand, Namaqualand’s commercial fish stocks, including rock lobster, the major catch 
landed locally, have been declining for a number of years (G. Branch, pers. comm., February 2O11). 
In fact large-scale commercial fishing companies have moved elsewhere, closing their operations at 
the fish processing and packaging factories in the towns of Hondeklip Bay and Port Nolloth, and 
further exacerbating problems of unemployment and income-poverty. 
 In addition, as the 1998 Coastal Policy Green Paper mentioned ‘there are no significant bays on this 
straight coast. Sandy shores comprise 3O% of the coastline, while rocky shores comprise the 
remaining 7O%’ (DEAT, 1998, chapter 6). This, combined with ‘the distance from major urban 
centres, limited access to markets, scarcity of fresh water, lack of a deep-water harbour and the 
restricted access to the diamond concession areas’, were indicated as serious challenges to the 
successful development of economically viable commercial fishery and mariculture industries (DEAT, 
1998, chapter 6). 
 
7.7 Namaqualand’s Fisheries 
According to the chairman of Hondeklip Bay Fishers Association (pers. comm., December 2O1O), 
when many from the coastal town lost their jobs in the mines, they hoped to shift to making a living 
from the sea, as ‘it was their only solution’. But he pointed out that many did not have boats and did 
not have the finances to start up their own company. Thus many in the community applied for 
‘Interim Relief Permits’ to catch crayfish.100  
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 The FMSD Strategy (DEAT, 2OO3) mentioned that ‘findings of the fisheries Information System over the 
period 1995-7 indicated there are at least 1O commercial species with the potential for exploitation off the 
Northern Cape Coast. These include deep and shallow-water hake, monkfish, snoek, horse mackerel, kingklip, 
squid and west coast sole.’ In addition there are limpets, mussels and seaweed that can be harvested, and 
historically the large fur seal colony at Kleinzee has seen seal culling for commercial use. Though now the seal 
colony is serving as a tourist attraction for De Beers’ tourism operations. 
100
 This category of permit was introduced in 2OO7 in response to an outcry that the National Fisheries policy 
did not make provision for fishers who derived their livelihood from fishing but did not operate as a 
commercial company. The Interim Relief Permits were introduced as a short-term measure until a small-scale 















According to the Chairman, many unemployed members of the community raised the 3OO Rand, 
some borrowing the money, to apply to MCM101 for the permit, yet only 5 permits were allocated to 
individuals from Hondeklip Bay, and this excluded all of those who were receiving a pension or 
disability grant, who, from his perspective, were those most in need of the extra income. 
The Chairman also expressed his frustration at trying to get his voice heard among government 
officials, who, he said, did not seem interested unless it might be to their electoral advantage to 
assist the community (pers. comm., December 2O1O). He had drawn up plans to rehabilitate 
Hondeklip Bay’s small harbour and broken-down fishery infrastructure, and to develop the coastal 
facilities. As of yet, though, he had been unable to find anyone from local government willing to take 
an interest in his designs102. And, though he had attended meetings with MCM officials, when they 
hear him and others speak on behalf of the local fishers, he said, ‘they’ll listen (but with) no reaction. 
They just do whatever they want anyway. Once they leave and go back home, the local issues just go 
out of their mind’ (Chairman of Hondeklip Bay Fishers Association, pers. comm., December 2O1O). 
  
Plate 8: Representatives from the Hondeklip Bay Fishers’ Association. 
 
At Port Nolloth, R. Malan had been one among 11O mostly female employees of the John Ovenstone 
rock lobster processing and packaging factory, which had been run by the large company, Premier 
Fishing. Since the factory closed in 2OO1, however, most of those who had been employed there 
have been without jobs or an income. They are, said Malan, very “hungry for work” (pers. comm., 
December 2O1O). 
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 Marine and Coastal Management, sub-section of the Department of Environmental Affairs. Fishery 
Management has since become the preserve of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). 
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 The Chairman said that he had sent faxes and emails to the District Municipality, but on enquiry, they 















Although the factory is now in a state of disrepair, and would not pass the health and safety 
standards required by the South African Bureau of Standards, for fish processing and packaging, the 
facility is currently being used as a holding facility for crayfish caught by around 4O fishers from 
Hondeklip Bay and Port Nolloth, some operating commercial permits, and others, Interim Relief 
Permits. Their catch is currently counted, recorded and then pooled for sale en masse to one or two 
larger companies who sell on to markets in the West Coast, from Saldhana Bay down to Hout Bay in 
Cape Town. 
According to Malan (pers. comm., December 2O1O), all of the 54 applicants who applied for Interim 
Permits at Port Nolloth received them, except the women who hoped to get fishers to catch on their 
behalf. This compares favourably to the Hondeklip Bay fishers, where only 5 received permits were 
issued. Though, many fishers at Port Nolloth also do not have their own boats, and must rely on boat 
owners to allow them space on board.103  
R. Malan explained that the fish processing industry had been “the life” of the town, and since its 
decline, things were looking bleak for the community. She had hoped that the local government 
might find a way of reviving the industry or at least creating alternative livelihood opportunities for 
people, yet with the Mayor and other government offici ls “looking after their own pockets”, not 
the town or its people, Malan said, “now the buildings are empty in town, everything is closed” 
(pers. comm., December 2O1O). 
Whilst the National Government thus ultimately determines the policies that decide what the local 
fishers are allowed to do, local fishery representatives indicated government officials are out of 
touch with the local issues and problems at Hondeklip Bay and Port Nolloth, where they very rarely 
visit, or engage with local fishers. Even the local Mayor, who is supposed to be directly accountable 
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 R. Malan described how an individual with a diamond mining concession tows a number of small fishing 
boats out, and how those fishers who have already caught their quotas are expected to make space for those 
yet to catch (pers. comm., December 2O1O). 
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 The Chairman of the Hondeklip Bay Fisher Association claimed the Mayor had turned his car around and 
gone home more than once, on hearing a crowd of constituents await him to complain about the deteriorating 





















                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
Plate 9: R. Malan at the Hondeklip Bay fish processing factory, now being used to quality check 
and store crayfish.  
 
Local fishers at Hondeklip Bay and Port Nolloth are thus struggling to sustain their fisheries. With the 
withdrawal of the commercial companies who operated factories in the two coastal towns, and 
competition to access ‘Interim Relief’ Permits, local fishers and workers in the fishing industry are 
struggling to survive, finding very little support or a sympathetic hearing from government. 
 
7.8 Mariculture Development 
Namaqualand’s mariculture sector, on the other hand, is being promoted as a key ‘growth sector’, 
attracting substantial state and private investment. Yet, it is large-scale, capital intensive, export-
oriented mariculture projects, controlled by larger companies, and with political buy-in, that are 
being promoted and facilitated, not small-scale operators able to sustain economically viable yields 
with minimal capital investment. 
According to the Fishing and Mariculture Sector Development Strategy for the Northern Cape (DEAT, 
2OO3), mariculture is a key industry of the future for Namaqualand. The farming of valuable species 
such as oyster and abalone, could be the new high value enterprise that could replace revenues 















mariculture sector in Namaqualand (DEAT, 2OO3). Moreover, the sea conditions and mined-out 
coastal pits have been identified as ideal for the establishment of mariculture farms105. 
Whilst an oyster farm at Kleinzee could be described as a fairly technologically simple form of 
enterprise, and a model SMME, requiring dedicated and well-informed management106; it is capital-
intensive, large-scale, expert-led models of mariculture development that are attracting 
Governmental support, with two high profile mariculture projects envisaged for Namaqualand. 
In Hondeklip Bay the Department of Science and Technology have invested in developing an Abalone 
grow-out facility with FAMDA107, a private company, HIK-Abalone, and Stellenbosch University (DST, 
undated, p. 25). An initial pilot study, which involved the establishment of 16 grow out cages, 
housing 2O,OOO animals, was conducted in onshore tanks contained in the disused Oceana lobster 
processing plant. Since 2OO7 the aim has been to expand from 16 tanks to 92 and generate 15 
permanent jobs and 8O part time jobs; as well as offer a training programme to selected 
beneficiaries. The long-term vision is to develop a fully-fledged 12O tonne capacity abalone farm, 
through a combination of private and local government investment (DST, undated).  
Though this has been promoted as a development with the potential to reverse the decline of the 
fishing town, it remains to be seen what benefit will reach many of the local community, who are 
reportedly suffering up to 8O% unemployment (DST, undated, p. 25).108 Whilst a few jobs may be 
created for local people, development of an abalone industry has the potential to reinstate the 
structures of hierarchy, exclusivity and elite enrichment of the diamond mining industry. Certainly 
the controversy surrounding a proposed Mariculture Park at Port Nolloth, which supposedly had the 
backing of the Northern Cape Provincial Government, DEAT and FAMDA (DENC official, pers. comm., 
September 2O1O), indicates that the pursuit of capital-intensive, elite controlled economic 
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 For instance, in 1993 Alexkor established an oyster Farm in a old sea water holding dam, initially created for 
a diamond processing plant. They have reported production of more than 5O,OOO oysters per annum. (DEAT, 
2OO3, p. 12) According to the Deed of Settlement with the Richtersveld Community, the oyster farm is to be 
transferred to the Community Property Association as one of their reclaimed assets. 
106
 A privately owned oyster farm at Kleinzee makes use of an old dam constructed to supply DeBeers diamond 
recovery plant with sea water According to the farm manager, the seawater conditions at Kleinzee were ideal 
for achieving a good yield with simple technology. (Manager of Kleinzee oyster farm, pers. comm., December 
2O1O). 
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 According to their website, ‘FAMDA (The Northern Cape Fishing and Mariculture Development Company) 
was established in 1998 as an initiative of the Northern Cape's Department of Economic Affairs and 
Tourism. FAMDA is a section 21 company intended to act as ‘a representative interest group promoting the 
development of Namaqualand communities through the sustainable utilisation of living marine resources’ 
(www.famda.org.za accessed, February 2O11, though inaccessible thereafter. See discussion below).   
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 The same report stresses the increasing importance of abalone farming to South Africa, stating that it is the 
most valuable single aquaculture sector in the country. But it also warns that the sector is becoming 
















development schemes will bring little in the way of long-term benefits or sustainable livelihoods for 
most local people. 
 
 
Plate 1O: Abalone Farming at Hondeklip Bay. 
 
According to an official of the Northern Cape Province Department for the Environment and Nature 
Conservation (DENC official, pers. comm., September 2O1O), FAMDA was granted 4O million Rand 
by DEAT to establish a Mariculture Park at Port Nolloth. However, it seems that FAMDA has since 
dissolved amidst allegations of mismanagement and corruption109. Whilst the fate of the project is 
subject to much speculation, with rumours circulating about the disappearing funds; all that has thus 
far been established is a high section of wall, which blocks public access to the beach for some way; 
and a sign on the gate announcing the yet-to-be-built Mariculture Park. 
Meanwhile, the oyster farm manager at Kleinzee reported that the most complicated and stressful 
part of maintaining his small-scale business was attempting to meet an ever-proliferating set of 
bureaucratic requirements introduced by national government to monitor and control mariculture 
activities. Meeting such increasingly complex, multi-layered and repetitive legal requirements in 
order to acquire official permission to operate, and navigating a complicated control system levelled 
at the competencies of large-scale commercial businesses, was he argued, becoming impossible for 
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 The official reported that whenever she raised the issue of the Park or the government grant at Provincial 
Coastal Committee meetings, she is “silenced” and told not to speak of the matter. She mentioned that some 
politicians had been involved, and, when somebody she knew had requested an audit on the company, the 
individual was “transferred” from their job. As of yet, the 4O million Rand remains unaccounted for (DENC 















a small-scale producer, with a small number of semi/unskilled employees. (Manager of Kleinzee 
oyster farm, pers. comm., December 2O1O). 
 
7.9 Discussion 
A 2OO8 Environmental Evaluation Unit (EEU) study on small-scale fishery management in South 
Africa highlighted, meeting ecological, social and economic sustainability objectives in contemporary 
coastal governance, will require a ‘holistic and integrated approach’, whereby ‘socio-economic 
problems like poverty, food security and diversification of livelihoods’ are addressed by fishery 
authorities in order to achieve sustainable resource management (Executive Summary, point 5). 
The EEU study highlights the ‘need to adopt a long-term and proactive approach to developing and 
implementing alternative and/or supplemented sustainable livelihoods for fishers. A sustainable 
livelihood approach seeks to understand the broader ecological, social and economic context of 
fishers as well as the policy and institutional dimensions that enable or constrain sustainable 
livelihoods. The focus must be on recognising and building on existing assets and encouraging 
diversification of livelihood activities’ (Executive Summary, point 5). 
Whilst governance of fisheries in South Africa has historically been characterised by a ‘science-based 
and centralised decision-making approach’ that has neglected to ‘reflect the needs, knowledge or 
socio-economic context’ of small-scale fishers (EEU, 2OO8, Executive Summary, point 4); The EEU 
(2OO8) thus recommend that a livelihoods-based approach is adopted whereby the ‘cultural context 
of fishing needs to be understood and respected’. Moreover, livelihood opportunities promoted 
‘need to reflect the local context in order to ensure that activities are appropriate and generate 
sufficient income to meet the needs of the fishers’ (EEU, 2OO8, Executive Summary, points 1 and 2). 
Key to this sustainable livelihoods approach to fishery management is that fishers must be actively 
involved in resource management and decision-making that affects their livelihoods (EEU 2OO8, 
Executive Summary point 4). 
Yet, at present it seems this governance approach has not yet been achieved in the Namaqualand 
coastal region. Instead it seems that, as the 2OO8 EEU study found in other Provinces of South 
Africa, appropriate institutional arrangements for a sustainable livelihoods-based approach with 
local fishers involved in key decision-making processes are not yet adequately established. Instead, 
local fishers are being largely overlooked in regional economic planning projects, and their 
customary catches increasingly restricted by national legislation, whilst little has been done to 















Meanwhile, Namaqualand’s mariculture sector seems to be modelling itself on the diamond mining 
industry in more than one respect. Not only does it seem that national governmental strategies are 
promoting monopolisation of opportunities by larger companies and/or political elites; small-scale 
operators are confronting various obstacles, with little support from governmental departments. 
This seems to perpetuate the double standards of the pre-1994 era, which was characterised by top-
down, elite-driven forms of economic development and governance, with very few opportunities for 
public participation in processes of planning and management, public access to information or 
opportunities to make a sustainable living from or to otherwise enjoy marine and coastal resources.  
Moreover, it remains to be stated that the viability of these capital-intensive mariculture projects 
has hinged on the expected sustained high value returns from a commodity resource that currently 
fetches very high prices on the international market, with the key consumers located among the 
upper classes in Asia. As with other such markets, there is no guarantee the demand will last, or that 
other competitor producers will not lower prices and out-compete South African producers110.  
Reliance on an export-oriented, high value commodity resource, where markets are controlled by 
large foreign-based corporations and fashions in consumption of luxury goods, is a very risky form of 
development to pursue, particularly for local communities, to whom private companies are 
minimally accountable. When the pursuit of national and corporate ‘economic growth’ is pursued to 
the neglect of more ‘socially thick’ and locally accountable forms of development, the majority of 
Namaqualanders will likely be ‘treated to a crash course in the most vicious aspects of free-market 
capitalism while being largely denied any of the benefits’ (Smith, 1997, in Ferguson, 2OO2, p.141). 
Arguably, it is the idea that salvation from socio-economic crisis left in the wake of mining can be 
averted through attracting investment for developing a comparable, export-oriented, corporatised, 
and potentially highly lucrative industry that needs to be questioned. The promise of farming high 
value species such as abalone is to generate large profits for investors in a short period of time.  
However, as the Town Manager of DBCM highlighted (pers. comm., September 2O1O), potential 
investors  are expected to be attracted by high levels of exclusivity and security, such as those 
established by mining operations, in order to protect their investment against poaching. Mariculture 
farms could thus turn into another kind of capitalist enclave mentioned by Ferguson (2OO2) as 
characteristic of the neoliberal extractive industry; thus leading to a situation where new wealth 
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 Professor G. Branch, marine biologist at UCT, mentioned that the export market for South African kelp had 
collapsed due to the entry of cheaper Chilean kelp onto the international market. This is presumably the 
reason why few of the kelp harvesting concessions for Namaqualand are currently being utilised. Some kelp is 















derived from the Namaqualand shores largely by-passes local communities, whose only chance to be 
involved is competing for low-paid semi/un-skilled work. It is thus critical to compare the rhetoric 
through which mariculture is being promoted with the actual practice of the kinds of projects that 
are being developed on the Namaqualand coast.   
In the final chapter, these issues are further discussed in relation to other findings and some of the 

































Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The South African Constitution and subsequent legislation committed the post-Apartheid 
government to redressing racial injustice and achieving democratic governance, as well as ‘secur[ing] 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources, while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development’ (RSA, 1996, Bill of Rights, section 24). 
Governmental frameworks such as the National Framework for Sustainable Development recognise 
that ‘in South Africa, as in the rest of the world, the situation of continuing inequality, accompanied 
by a deteriorating resource base, makes it imperative for us to go beyond thinking in terms of trade-
offs and the simplicity of the ‘triple bottom line’ (DEAT, 2OO8, p. 14), by which sustainability is 
conceived as a balancing act between three distinct spheres, social, economic and environmental.  
The National Framework for Sustainable Development recognises that ‘social, economic and 
ecosystem factors are embedded within each other, and are underpinned by our systems of 
governance’, and argues that, as preconditions to meeting economic and social development 
objectives, ‘we must acknowledge and emphasise that there are non-negotiable ecological 
thresholds; that we need to maintain our stock of natural capital over time; and that we must 
employ the precautionary principle in this approach’ (DEAT, 2OO8, p.14).  
NEMA (1998) advances environmental rights for South African citizens, emphasising  that in the 
post-1994 South African context, ‘environmental justice must be pursued so that adverse 
environmental impacts shall not be distributed in such a manner as to unfairly discriminate against 
any person, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged persons’; and  ‘equitable access to 
environmental resources, benefits and services to meet basic human needs and ensure human well-
being must be pursued and special measures may be taken to ensure access thereto by categories of 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’ (principles, 4 (c) and (d)). 
Furthermore, according to NEMA (1998): 
 ‘The environment is held in public trust for the people, the beneficial use of environmental 
resources must serve the public interest and the environment must be protected as the people’s 
common heritage’. (Principles 4 (o)). 
 ‘Sensitive, vulnerable, highly dynamic or stressed ecosystems, such as coastal shores, estuaries, 
wetlands, and similar systems require specific attention in management and planning 
procedures, especially where they are subject to significant human resource usage and 















 ‘The costs of remedying pollution, environmental degradation and consequent adverse health 
effects and of preventing, controlling or minimising further pollution, environmental damage or 
adverse health effects must be paid for by those responsible for harming the environment’ (4 
(p)). 
Meanwhile, the MPRDA (2OO2) requires mining companies to ‘as far as is reasonably practicable, 
rehabilitate the environment affected by prospecting or mining operations to its natural or 
predetermined state, or to a land use which conforms to the generally accepted principle of 
sustainable development’, (MPRDA, 2OO2, 38(d)). 
Moreover, South Africa’s Integrated Coastal Management approach, laid out in the 2OOO 
Government White Paper for Sustainable Coastal Development acknowledges that sustainability will 
only be achieved through a collaborative effort on the part of government agencies, coastal users 
and coastal communities, in pursuing inter alia the following objectives:  
 To ensure that the public has the right of physical access to the sea, and to and along the sea 
shore, on a managed basis (B2); 
 To ensure that the public has the right of equitable access to the opportunities and benefits of 
the coast, on a managed basis (B2); 
 To promote the diversity, vitality and long-term viability of coastal economies and activities, 
giving preference to those that are distinctly coastal or dependent on a coastal location (C1); 
 To alleviate coastal poverty through proactive coastal development initiatives that generate 
sustainable livelihood options (C2); 
 To use non-renewable coastal resources in a manner that optimises the public interest and 
retains options for alternative and future uses (D4); and 
 To rehabilitate damaged or degraded coastal ecosystems and habitats (D.5). 
(DEAT, 2OOO, White Paper, section 7.2). 
The study has highlighted opportunities for implementing such key post-1994 legislative and policy 
frameworks in the Namaqualand context, as the coastal diamond mining industry undergoes 
transformation. Diamond mining companies are currently shifting core operations offshore; 
downscaling, subcontracting and selling on onshore mines; and thus having to grapple with 
potentially ‘costly’ social and environmental ‘liabilities’ from historical mining. The findings of the 
research indicate, despite post-1994 policy objectives, implementation of key legislation has been 















in order to rehabilitate the post-mining landscape; thus leaving a dismal legacy for Namaqualand 
communities. 
 
8.1 De Beers’ Legacy for Namaqualand 
Forecasting mine closure within 1O-12 years in the early 199Os, De Beers Consolidated Mines 
commissioned socio-economic impact assessments, which indicated the significant detrimental 
impact that sudden mine closure would have on employees, their families, local communities and 
the region. These studies recommended mitigatory measures and a gradual phased process of 
closure, involving on-going consultation with employees, adequate retrenchment packages and 
support with post-retrenchment planning, skills training and re-employment (Beaumont, 1992; 
Gosling, 1992). In the late 199Os, De Beers hired the consultation of expert botanists and ecologists 
to assess their environmental impact and to develop a programme of rehabilitation. 
Although the company initially implied they were committed to leaving a positive legacy from nearly 
a century of mining in Namaqualand, De Beers have since reneged on key social and environmental 
responsibilities, seeing these instead as burdensome liabilities to be minimised or avoided. The 
company has been reluctant to negotiate with local communities over resolving land claims and 
contributing positively to the development of post-mining socio-economic opportunities for 
communities adversely affected by mass retrenchments and contraction of mining operations.  
Whilst the opportunity presented itself of generating employment from comprehensive 
rehabilitation work, thereby turning two problems into a positive solution, the mining company have 
determined this is not in their economic interest. The company decided not to pursue the Living 
Edge of Africa Project, which has intended to generate substantial employment opportunities 
through designing an ambitious model ‘green’ development project for the Namaqualand coast.  
Instead De Beers have decided to sell Namaqualand Mines on to another mining company. The 
company’s behaviour indicates that this decision may be an attempt to avoid meeting legal 
requirements for environmental rehabilitation as outlined in MPRDA relating to mine closure. The 
company have decided to shift their mining effort from coastal open-cast mining to exploitation of 
marine diamond deposits and diamond interests in countries such as Canada and Botswana, where 
mines are proving more profitable.   
The CSA and Bench Marks (2O11) review of the company’s Amended Environmental Management 















significantly underestimating their environmental liability (see annex 5). Through omitting all pre-
198O impacts, underreporting areas disturbed by mining and minimising re-vegetation and earth-
moving commitments in their liability costing to a point that negates ecologically sound practice, the 
company may provoke further extensive environmental degradation and pollution, which will fall to 
future mine owners, land users and the state to attempt to remedy (CSA and Bench Marks, 2O11).  
Whilst De Beers claims that their sale commitment to their chosen company, Trans Hex was based 
on an ‘open and rigorous selection process that evaluated prospective bidders on a number of 
criteria determined by De Beers as critical to ensuring the long term sustainability of the 
Namaqualand Mine community’, the company’s approach has actually been highly secretive and has 
excluded IAPs, including local community organisations, from access to key information and 
involvement in consultation about significant criteria for prospective buyers (CSA, 2O11, Press 
Release). In fact the chosen buyer, Transhex, has demonstrated a poor social and environmental 
responsibility record in Namaqualand (CSA, 2O11, Press Release; Mohamed 2OO6), and, without 
substantial financial provisions made by the selling company, it is unlikely Transhex will be able to 
clean-up De Beers’ environmental degradation legacy.   
Whilst De Beers is not the only company seeking to minimise and avoid ‘costly’ liabilities, the 
company deserves a particularly critical assessment, due to its prestigious reputation and massive 
international resource base, role-model status, and claims to high standards of corporate social and 
environmental responsibility. Where De Beers seeks to dispense with its liabilities by selling them off 
as quickly as possible, with an absolute minimum of public participation or consultation of IAPs in 
the process; it will prove extremely difficult to press other companies to perform better.  
Arguably, De Beers’ behaviour in Namaqualand establishes the precedent for the smaller mining 
companies, such as Alexkor and Transhex, to reduce their ‘liability’ costs and thereby externalise 
adverse social and environmental impacts of mining. This also sets a worrying precedent for 
inadequate environmental responsibility and democratic accountability in marine mining practice, 
the adverse impacts of which are, unlike the terrestrial open-cast mines, at present poorly realised 
or well understood. 
Not only have De Beers made inadequate provision to rehabilitate and restore the coastal 
environment disturbed by mining, they have pursued their own post-mining development strategy, 
in a way that lacks democratic accountability or accommodation of the interests of local 
communities (see annex 5). The company’s proposed ‘correctional facility’, mariculture and wind 















in their Amended EMPR (De Beers, 2O11), though key feasibility studies, social and environmental 
impact assessments and IAP consultation processes have not been undertaken; and, indeed, very 
little information regarding the proposed prison and hazardous waste disposal site has been made 
public (CSA and Bench Marks, 2O11). This is particularly disturbing as these proposals are potentially 
controversial and have risks involved for local communities.  
Meanwhile, De Beers has avoided repeated requests to negotiate over farms included in community 
land claims; though the company seems more than willing to invite bids from private investors for 
mariculture, wind-energy generation, or prison facilities; to operate their own tourism business; and 
to lease land to selected conservation authorities; all of which capitalise on, and affirm their 
ownership and exclusive control of, coastal land and resources.  
Although the expansion of the Namaqua National Park furthers national and regional protected area 
targets, enabling some environmental rehabilitation and conservation of Namaqualand’s coastal 
ecosystems; it is critical to understand the historical and political-economic context through which 
this protected area expansion has occurred. Many of Namaqualand’s ‘coloured’ communities were 
expecting redress for their historical disenfranchisement and discrimination through redistribution 
and restitution of land. The transfer of mining territory to exclusive conservation areas, in which 
they have relatively little stake in ownership or management, or potential to pursue land-based 
livelihoods, thus is seen to greatly limit opportunity for communities to achieve socio-economic 
upliftment based on their control of land and natural resources. 
The fact that De Beers retains title to farms leased to San Parks, further confirms that we are seeing 
a continuation of historical patterns of inequality and elite governance, rather than a 
democratisation of environmental governance. The establishment of vast game reserves across 
southern Africa as part of the ‘Diamond Route’ constitutes the Oppenheimer strategy to 
demonstrate commitment to the protection of indigenous wildlife; and to thus offset environmental 
degradation incurred through mining activities undertaken by their multinational mining companies, 
Anglo-American and De Beers. Yet this study has sought to highlight the irony of the (re)invention of 
the Oppenheimer Family of Companies as key defenders of South African wildlife.  
 Firstly, after 8O years of mining the Namaqualand coastline, a distinctive lack of effort to mitigate or 
rehabilitate from mining impacts is reason to accuse DeBeers of environmental degradation on a 
grand scale, rather than praise them for their good environmental custodianship. If this 
environmental liability of approximately 17,OOO hectares of degraded wasteland were seen in 















and by another companies subcontracted to these, the paradox of a professed devotion to nature 
custodianship would become even clearer. 
Secondly, the conservation park approach pursued by the company must be seen in light of its 
historical precedent. As Magome and Murombedzi (2OO3)  have highlighted, ‘game parks’ and 
‘nature reserves’ were historically imposed on colonial subjects by European colonisers, who had 
little respect for pre-existing modes of natural resource use, farming and hunting. Traditional forms 
of livelihood and ways of engaging with the land were often dismissed as primitive or prohibited as 
harmful. Meanwhile, nature reserves and game parks were established for the recreation and 
enjoyment of a governing elite. Arguably, De Beers’ conservation approach perpetuates this 
historical colonial arrangement, giving new life to a European fantasy of ‘wild Africa’, without (local) 
people, who have historically been displaced and excluded from conservation areas. 
 De Beers’ post-mining portfolio thus, far from the vision of LEAP, seems to be aiming to capitalise on 
the exclusivity, ‘remoteness’ and inaccessibility of the mining area. The company are seeking 
numerous ways to disown costly social and environmental responsibilities, whilst at the same time 
seeking to profit from the exclusive access regime they have established to guard their mining 
interests. 
 
8.2 The Minerals Energy Complex and Neoliberalisation 
South Africa’s 2OO2 Mining Charter intended to change the status quo of the country’s mining 
industry, where Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs) are generally considered as a 
repository for cheap labour’; black workers are made to live in ‘appalling conditions’ which have ‘led 
to a myriad of social ills’; and ‘the proliferation of mining ghost towns, due to poor mining practices 
in the past, which were inconsistent with sustainable development principles’ (DMR, 2OO9, MC IAR, 
p. 2 & 11). The Charter highlights that, historically, ‘mining was used as a tool to perpetuate 
inequalities in favour of a select group in a manner that precluded Historically Disadvantaged South 
Africans HDSAs from participating in a meaningful way’ in the economic wealth derived from the 
industry’ (DMR, 2OO9, MC IAR, p. 9-1O).   
However, as of the 2OO9 review of the Charter, most of the targets agreed to in 2OO2 to transform 
the mining industry in line with key goals for Broad-Based Social and Economic Empowerment had 
not been met (DMR, MC IAR, 2OO9; See annex 1).  The Mining Charter Review confirms two key 
points made in this thesis: firstly, in response to post-1994 South African governance agendas, 















disguise their more fundamental ‘intransigence and lack of commitment…to change’ (DMR, 2OO9, 
MC IAR, p.6) to accord with democratic, social equity and environmental sustainability objectives; 
and secondly, government agencies intended to enforce social and environmental rights afforded to 
citizens through South Africa’s post-1994 legislation are proving inadequate to the task. Whilst only 
a small minority of mining companies submitted the required progress reports to the DMR111, the 
Mining Charter Review admits that the department ‘lacks coordinated mechanisms to monitor on an 
annual basis’; and the penalty for non-compliance is ‘preposterously inadequate’.  
This apparent national governmental ‘incapacity’ needs to be understood through an appreciation of 
how international systems of neoliberal political-economic governance constrain and shape the role 
and capacities of national state government. Particularly significant is the rise in power of 
corporations, and the ability of  multinational companies and elite groups to form informal, 
horizontally-organised and polycentric ensembles of power, characteristic of contemporary 
governance ‘beyond the state’ (Swyngedouw, 2OO5, p.1999). These ensembles of power and 
privilege thus wield significant power to determine government macro-economic policies in 
countries in which they operate, through their monopoly control over financial and industrial 
systems.  
 As Innes (1984) and Fine (2OO8) highlight, economic controls imposed in the 198Os on South 
African companies led to the conglomeration of companies within the country into a form of 
monopoly capitalism, centred around the Minerals and Energy Complex. Now that these controls are 
being lifted by economic ‘liberalisation’ policies, corporations such as Anglo American and De Beers 
are freer to disinvest from South Africa and to establish or consolidate their investments around the 
world (Fine, 2OO8), becoming significant multinational corporations. Anglo American and De Beers, 
both owned and controlled by the Oppenheimer Family, are thus at the forefront of this process of 
‘globalisation’. 
As Ferguson (2OO5) highlights, it would be misleading to believe that the neoliberalisation of Africa 
has seen the abandonment of the continent by global capital, instead, it seems capital investment 
has become increasingly concentrated, and selectively territorialized (p. 378). The business of 
extractive industries, particularly mineral resource extraction, is booming. However, ‘what is 
noteworthy is the extent to which this economic investment has been concentrated in secured 
enclaves, often with no or very little benefit to the wider society’(Ferguson, 2OO5, p.378).  
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 According to the DMR, 2OO9, MC IAR, only 37% of companies have audited reports, with only 11% 















Schroeder (2OOO) emphasises, in the international neoliberal economy  ‘complex, vertically 
integrated production, processing, and distribution systems…connect remote localities to centres of 
economic power on regional and global scales’ (Schroeder, 2OOO, p. 57)  Commercial benefits from 
these export-oriented modes of production derive less from formal property rights ‘over localized 
land resources, than in the control over market outlets, transportation networks, labour resources, 
and, most particularly, the license and permitting processes organized through the state’ (Schroeder, 
2OOO, p. 57).  
Whilst the state remains a powerful agent of government, it has been modelled into a ‘regulator for’ 
rather than a ‘regulator of’ corporate enterprise.  In order to create attractive investment prospects 
for international corporate business, neoliberalising states have enabled these points of profiteering 
in the international economy to be placed beyond the scope of democratic accountability (Newell, 
2OO8).  
In the South African context, minerals and energy conglomerates of companies have largely been 
able to determine the government’s macro-economic policies (Fine, 2OO8); and these corporations 
have demonstrated little or only token commitment to economic and social restructuring post-
Apartheid, particularly that in favour of local economic development. Instead, Fine (2OO8) argues, 
these conglomerates have furnished the requirements for continued and secure profitability to feed 
their own globalisation.  
Neoliberalisation of the diamond mining industry of Namaqualand has thus meant de-linking of the 
project of corporate profitability from local socio-economic welfare and employment. Socially ‘thick’ 
forms of company investment in local infrastructure, facilities and services for mining communities, 
characteristic of a system of colonial-era paternalist mineral extraction, have been determined an 
unnecessary expense for increasingly multinationalised mining companies. Comparable to the 
Zambian case discussed by Ferguson (1999), during the decline of copper mining in Zambia in the 
197Os-8Os, the shift of core operations offshore, closure of mining company towns, and mass 
retrenchments in Namaqualand has led to serious socio-economic depression among local 
communities who have been abandoned by neoliberal capital. 
According to (Fine, 2OO8) the South African economic policy approach has been geared to attracting 
short-term capital inflows by way of compensation for the outflows of conglomerates disinvesting 
from the country. Meanwhile, liberated by neoliberal national and international economic policies, 
multinational companies are free to choose areas of operation with the lowest possible operating 















standards of social and environmental responsibility and popular accountability on the part of 
private companies could prove detrimental to attracting or sustaining the interest of private 
investors. 
This situation also helps to explain the apparent ‘institutional incapacity’ problem, blamed for the 
failure of the new South African government to realise inspiring post-1994 commitments to 
achieving democratic accountability, economic redistribution and social welfare provision, whilst 
realising environmental rights and environmentally sustainable socio-economic development.  
 
8.3 The Limits of CSR 
Whilst Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been promoted as the business-friendly alternative 
to regulatory control, providing  ‘a more responsible, strategic approach to environmental 
management, labour relations and community development [which] should lead to better 
relationships and improved reputation, and hence greater profits’ (Hamann and Acutt, 2OO3, p.256). 
Far from a ‘win-win’ solution, Van Wyk et al.’s 2OO9 report on the grim social and environmental  
legacy left in the wake of diamond mining in Namaqualand mentions ‘the implications are that CSR 
driven development is rendered ineffective unless the national and provincial governments take the 
necessary steps to overcome these limitations’. However, ‘government incapacity, in so far as DME 
and DEAT is concerned implies that the mining corporations in the area have almost carte blanche as 
far as environmental rehabilitation and mine closure commitment are concerned’ ( van Wyk et al., 
2OO9, p. 53).  
The findings of this thesis affirm Hamann and Acutt’s (2OO3) point that ‘CSR needs to be 
underpinned by corporate accountability’ (p. 268). Where governmental regulation is weak and 
there is a deficit of institutionalised democratic recourses for publics, particularly for communities 
negatively impacted by corporate behaviour, ‘where corporations perceive ‘trade-offs’ between 
fulfilling social and environmental responsibilities and sustaining economic efficiency, the 
temptation will be to give the impression of being responsible, perhaps making small, feasible 
changes to how things work (including cosmetic changes), so that demands for more significant 
changes can be precluded’ (Hamann and Acutt, 2OO3, 259). 
As Hamann and Acutt (2OO3) highlight, ‘if companies are trying to ‘clean up their act’ solely for the 
purpose of accommodating social pressures, but with the main objective of maintaining or 
increasing profits, then wherever serious trade-offs arise between CSR and the financial bottom-line, 















impression that they are being responsible’ (Hamann & Acutt, 2OO3, p. 258). Meanwhile, as is the 
case with De Beers in Namaqualand, the company will take any shortcuts they can to avoid taking on 
costly social and environmental liabilities, whilst shifting their core mining efforts to more profitable 
prospects, offshore and abroad.  
Thus Corporate Social Responsibility, the neoliberal response to a contemporary democratic deficit, 
is essentially part of the mainstream sustainable development hegemony critiqued by Adams 
(2OO9). According to the mainstream approach, development policy and practice is to be ‘greened’ 
in order to ensure its own sustainability. Capitalist forms of resource acquisition and utilisation; 
corporate control over systems of industrial production, trade, marketing and transportation are to 
be carefully managed according to ‘more technically sophisticated’ forms of accounting; enhanced 
technological efficiency; and the development of managerial systems able to assess, mitigate and, 
where possible, reduce, negative environmental impacts (Adams, 2OO9).  
The approach is essentially reformist, aiming to manage potential crises generated by modern 
systems of political-economic organisation and industry. The mainstream approach thus serves to 
maintain and perpetuate normative political-economic systemic structures in a way that serves the 
interests of the status quo, and to avert more fundamental transformation. ‘The fact that much of 
CSR remains within the ‘voluntary’, non-regulatory realm may be seen as legitimising and 
entrenching the existing system.’ (Hamann and Acutt, 2OO3, p. 26O). Yet, it is this governing regime 
that is failing to guarantee the protection of key social and environmental rights, and must be 
changed.  
As Sawyer (2OO4) emphasises, ‘there is a ‘fundamental inequality inherent in processes of trans-
national capital accumulation’. Whilst national development programmes, negotiated between state 
governments and international trade partners are proclaimed to ‘modernise’ industry and accelerate 
‘development’, in order to bring developing countries ‘on par with those other liberalizing-
globalizing economies around the world...it [is] the bodies and lives of subaltern subjects that 
enable[s] transnational capitalists to expand their profit margin. Comparative advantage include[s] 
not simply enchanting foreign capital with attractive contracts. It similarly meant providing cheap 
natural resources, scant industrial regulations, cheap labour and a submissive population that [will] 
not protest’ (p. 116). 
 The CSR agenda, devised and implemented by mining companies themselves, has at its foundation 
the economic interest of the companies, and not provision of social, cultural, economic and 















seen as a part of a hegemonic consensus about sustainable development that is enabling companies 
to get away with seeming to change their practice and approach rather than radically transforming 
their role, and (ab)use of local communities and natural systems where they operate.  
Cullinan’s (2O1O) proposal for ‘earth jurisprudence’ conceptualises a much stronger role for legal 
and democratic participation. Cullinan (2O1O) suggests that local communities should be supported 
in moving ‘beyond simply reacting to each attack on their health and wellbeing’ and instead 
empowered to use the law proactively to support the establishment of sustainable, local economies. 
The same should apply to structures of democratic governance more broadly, in order that 
governmental policies and developmental projects pursued in the Namaqualand region pro-actively 
empower previously disenfranchised communities, redress historical inequality and injustice, and 
meet key criteria for long-term environmental sustainability. 
 
8.4 Towards Sustainable Coastal Development? 
A 1998 Government Green Paper  entitled, ‘Towards Sustainable Coastal Development ‘outlined an 
alternative vision for Namaqualand, which sought to achieve: 
 Equitable access to coastal resources and resources being used on a sustainable basis for the 
benefit of present and future generations. 
 Restitution of land to communities subjected to forced removals in the past.  
 New economic opportunities that benefit local communities in the region.  
 The unique natural and cultural characteristics of the Namaqualand coast being protected and 
properly managed.  
 Areas damaged by mining activities being rehabilitated; and 
 Community members assuming a greater responsibility for managing coastal resources (Coastal 
Policy Green Paper, 1998, chapter 6). 
Key challenges to be addressed were identified as limited public access to the coast due to exclusive 
control of mining companies and the prevention of the development of alternative use of the 
environment and ecosystem services for activities such as harvesting marine organisms or tourism 
and recreational activities; inappropriate coastal development and pollution of coastal and marine 















Whilst large-scale commercial fishing companies have since closed their Namaqualand factories, in 
pursuit of more profitable prospects elsewhere, unemployment in the coastal towns of Hondeklip 
Bay and Port Nolloth has worsened and local fishers are struggling to sustain their livelihoods. Due to 
stringent restrictions on fishing quotas issued by national government, coupled with a lack of 
interest or investment on the part of district and national government in maintaining or 
rehabilitating near-shore fishery infrastructure, the opportunity to develop sustainable sea-based 
livelihoods is being neglected.  
Meanwhile, high profile mariculture projects have attracted substantial investment (DST, undated, 
online, accessed 18/O7/2O11; DENC official, pers. comm., September 2O1O). Whilst a few jobs have 
been created out of maintaining Abalone facilities at Hondeklip Bay, the ambitious Mariculture Park 
at Port Nolloth has not come to fruition, and instead, substantial investment has disappeared, 
leaving the majority of the surrounding communities with nothing but a large fenced empty 
enclosure beside the sea shore.  
If mariculture and aquaculture are to be pursued as a key post-mining economic strategy, it is critical 
that projects are not designed to repeat and perpetuate the patterns established by the diamond 
mining industry of elite enrichment, hierarchical, top-down governance, local unaccountability and a 
disregard for environmental sustainability and community consultation. Instead, small-scale 
businesses with local ownership, making use of available infrastructure and land forms on areas 
already degraded by mining should be promoted. Careful planning, capacity-building and market 
research would first need to be done to ensure project sustainability. 
As discussed in chapter six, a number of communities, such as the Komaggas community, are 
struggling to attain redress for historical discrimination, disenfranchisement and exclusion from 
systems of governance and control which have derived wealth from exploitation of Namaqualand’s 
coastal resources.  
Yet, as Sowman and Wynberg (2OO7) argue, if land reform is pursued in the absence of long-term 
planning, adequate and coordinated management and support systems or realistic assessments of 
available social and ecological resources, projects are unlikely to meet the aims of ‘reducing poverty, 
achieving social and environmental justice, securing participation of civil society, and ensuring 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity’ (p. 784 and p. 791). It is thus critical that 
redistribution or restitution of mining territory to communities includes substantial commitment on 















term social, ecological and economic sustainability planning, in collaboration and consultation with 
the relevant communities.  
The Richtersveld Community’s successful land claim has raised hopes that impoverished local 
communities will be able to gain access to mineral wealth and economic opportunities through 
official recognition of their land and mineral rights. However it is unclear as to what real substantial 
or long-term benefit the majority of claimants stand to gain from the Settlement reached with 
Alexkor, the state mining company. Firstly, the company was highly reluctant to recognise the 
community claim, seeking instead to ‘privatise’ the company, following the precedent set by De 
Beers, retrenching the majority of the workforce, shedding ‘non-core’ operations, including farm and 
town maintenance, shifting core mining activities offshore and using subcontracted service-
providers to cut operating costs.  
Secondly, substantial government funds (see annex 2) that could have been used to help diversify 
the regional economy away from reliance on non-renewable resource extraction and to develop 
sustainable settlements and livelihoods, have instead disappeared into efforts to turn mining 
company losses into an annual profit (Alexkor, 2O1O; Pressly, 2O1O, HighBeam online, accessed 
18/O7/2O11). The neglect of long-term planning and capacity building processes in the Richtersveld 
settlement, incorporating key environmental sustainability considerations, has greatly undermined 
the opportunity to meet socio-economic development objectives, as well as those for environmental 
rehabilitation and conservation. 
As Sowman and Wynberg (2OO7) highlight, the development of sustainable livelihoods is reliant on a 
natural resource base, which must be managed according to principles of environmental 
sustainability and social justice (p. 784).  A key concern in the Namaqualand context, is that the 
natural environment has been significantly disturbed and degraded by mining activities, and thus the 
natural resource base has already in places been devastated, prior to redistribution or restitution of 
land to local communities. It is thus critical that communities gain support in challenging corporate 
irresponsibility, and pressing companies to fulfil substantial environmental rehabilitation 
requirement. 
 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
Over the last 8O years, a huge amount of ‘wealth’ has been ‘extracted’ from the coastal landscape of 















mining should not be limited to a calculation of the ‘wealth’ generated, but also to the ‘costs’ of 
mining born by local communities, and the degradation of the natural environment. 
Historically, securing a monopoly on South Africa’s diamond resources was achieved at the expense 
of the ability of the people of Namaqualand to pursue alternative livelihoods or to access the coast 
on any other premise than for the extraction of diamonds, at the behest and in the employ of the 
mining companies. Though the landscape had previously yielded many other ‘resources’ to human 
inhabitants, as well as sustaining many other plant and animal species, its ‘productive capacity’ has 
long been narrowed by the sovereignty of diamond mining, which has governed and controlled 
social-environmental relations in line with the logic of capital accumulation, and export-oriented 
industrial development. 
Contrary to DeBeers’ motto, diamonds are not ‘forever’, at least for the people of Namaqualand, 
where the diamond mining industry that has historically been the stronghold of the regional 
economy, is coming to an end. Van Wyk et al. (2OO9)  claim, ‘after almost a hundred years of 
diamond mining on the West Coast communities have little to show in terms of community 
development, infrastructural development or an existence much above that of a subsistence level’ 
(p. 53).  
Despite progressive governmental and corporate social and environmental responsibility policies, 
van Wyk et al. (2OO9), found the implementation and monitoring of these policies seem to be 
‘problematic…As a result, serious environmental and social problems exist throughout the 
region…In a regulatory sense, it seems that the industry on the West Coast is embedded, like the 
mining in the rest of South Africa in an unfolding legislative environment in which the primacy of the 
mining industry is often in conflict with environmental and community concerns’ (van Wyk et al., 
2OO9, p. 53, emphasis in the original). 
Regional income derived from diamond mining is dwindling, corporate investment in regional 
infrastructure and services is being withdrawn and thousands of workers have been retrenched with 
many remaining unemployed. According van Wyk et al.’s 2OO9 report on the socio-economic 
impacts of mine closure, ‘South Africa’s West Coast, which is the hub of the country’s diamond 
mining, is characterised by unemployment, substance abuse, high level of suicide rates and lack of 
infrastructure development… the communities also show high levels of domestic violence, mental 
















This grim situation has prompted a number of retrenched mine workers to seek their fortune 
through illegal mining, despite significant risk of injury or prosecution. De Beers’ response has been 
to intensify policing their secure access mining territory to ‘eradicate illegal mining’. Arguably, this 
approach is attempting to deal with the symptom rather than the cause of a wider problem. This 
situation could have been pre-empted through adherence to social and environmental principles 
outlined in government legislative and policy frameworks, such as the Constitution, NEMA, ICMA 
and the MPRDA. 
It is clear that the diamond mining industry has left little in the way of sustainable human 
settlement, vibrant local economy or secure long-term livelihoods for those who have been enrolled 
in and affected by its operations. It is thus vital that the post-mining development trajectory pursued 
in Namaqualand should change a minimalist and superficial demonstration of corporate 
responsibility to a rights-based framework that prioritises and finds fruitful connections between 
forms of local social and economic development, community empowerment, transition of towns and 
livelihoods to enhanced long-term sustainability, environmental restoration and conservation. 
The orientation of ‘development’ in Namaqualand has hitherto been overwhelmingly linked to the 
creation of commodities by corporations that will reach a high price on an internationalised market. 
This has been envisaged as the best way in which local people and environment can be enrolled in 
projects of economic profitability. Yet the diamond mining industry in Namaqualand and the wider 
political-economic context from which it emerged, and which it has helped to sustain, has left a 
legacy of stark inequality, a highly exclusive coastal access regime, monopolisation of benefits from 
natural resources by large private companies, a heavily degraded landscape and a highly 
undemocratic system of governance. 
New mining initiatives, including uranium mining and drilling for offshore natural gas112, are now 
being promoted as positive signs of investment in Namaqualand’s economic development, in the 
context of downscaling of diamond mining and the withdrawal of the large-scale commercial fishing 
industry. However, further promotion of mining interests needs to be critically re-assessed against 
the legacy nearly a century of diamond mining has left for Namaqualand’s communities and their 
natural environment. 
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 A number of companies are reportedly busy drilling for gas off the coast of Namaqualand, including the 
Government’s Petrol SA, in partnership with a private company, as well as the multinationals Shell and BHP 
Billiton. (E. Julius, NCPG, interviewed December 2O1O); and another company, Urafields South Africa, is 















In order to avoid the continuation of successive forms of re-colonisation of rural peripheries to the 
interests of neoliberal corporate profitability, such as has been seen on the Namaqualand coast, 
‘development’ needs to be reconfigured and reconsidered, so that it is not something pursued at the 
expense of ecological integrity, democratic accountability and redistributive justice. Rather 
‘developing the local’ should translate into facilitating social welfare and the enfranchisement of 
local communities, including recognition of their rights to land, livelihoods and natural resources, to 
good health and to a safe and sustaining environment. 
Whilst land reform and legislation such as ICMA should facilitate the redistribution and restoration 
of rights to land and coastal resources to local communities, it is vital that post-mining land uses and 
developments do not perpetuate historical patterns of elite enrichment, export-oriented non-
renewable resource extraction, and hierarchical forms of governance that prioritise short-term 
pursuit of profit over long-term goals of achieving social and environmental rights and genuinely 
sustainable forms of socio-economic organisation.  
It is crucial that a coastal governance approach is developed which will prioritise the development of 
a diversity of sustainable livelihood opportunities for members of local communities, integrating 
concern for long-term ecological sustainability, and sensitivity to local socio-economic and cultural 
contexts. In this integrated governance approach, local communities struggling to survive 
abandonment by fishing and mining industries, and, must have the opportunity to realise their 
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Annex 1: Synthesis of DMR, 2OO9, Mining Charter Impact Assessment Report.  
Area 2OO2 BBSEE Targets for 
mining companies 
2OO9 Review 
1] Human Resources 
Development 
 
Adult education and skills 
training for employees. 
‘Career pathing’ for 
employees. 
17.1% had literacy programmes. 
17.1% reported ‘career pathing’. 
But investigation found management 
generally not supportive of adult 
education and training. 
Most beneficiaries are non-South 
African employees. 
Focus has been on basic skills 
development, not beyond. 
2] Employment Equity 
 




Only 37% published Employment 
Equity Plans; none submitted to the 
DMR. 
26% achieved 4O% HDSA in 
management. 
Most HDSAs occupy middle-
management positions. 
3] Migrant Labour 
 
Non discrimination against 
foreign migrant labour. 
‘Significantly complied with’ 
Migrants involved in education and 
skills development programmes. 
But little evidence of promotion of 
non-discrimination as agreed with 
government. 
4] Mine Community 
Development 
 
Companies to cooperate in 
formulation of IDPs with local 
government. 
Provide proof of consultation, 
money expenditure and socio-
economic development plan. 
49% cooperated, though most 
reported CSR as their contribution to 
IDPs 
37% developed Social Labour Plans.  
No direct links between proposed and 
implemented community development 
projects for affected communities. 
Inefficient consultation, lack of 
collaboration and alignment with mine 
communities. 
Narrow Empowerment approach using 
handpicked individuals, not broader 
community. 
5] Housing and Living 
Conditions 
 
Promote humane living 
conditions. 
Provide housing for 
employees. 
Improve housing standards 
Upgrade from hostels to 
family units. 
Facilitate own home 
ownership 
Improve employee nutrition. 
26% provided housing. 
29% improved existing standards. 
34% facilitated employees access to 
home ownership. 
Hostel inspection showed unhygienic 
conditions. 
Dispensation of ‘living out allowance’ 
supporting informal settlement. 
Less than 1/3 make nutritional 




















Preferential procurement to 
HDSA suppliers. 
17% preferential procurement 
8O% companies showed no 
improvement over 3-5 years. 
37% HDSA procurement reported, but 
many not HDSA-owned suppliers, and 
contracts for non-core services (e.g. 
consumables and cleaning]. 
7] Ownership and Joint 
Venture 
15% HDSA ownership in 5 
years. 
26% in 1O years. 
BEE ownership ‘at best’ 9%. Mostly a 
‘handful of black beneficiaries’.  
Lack of transfer of assets in pooling 
and joint ventures. 
Net value is negative due to high 
interest on purchase loans, moderate 
dividend flows and global financial 
crisis. 
Deals struck with lifespan up to 2O14, 
not beyond. 
Use of ‘fronting’ of HDSAs, whilst 
HDSAs do not participate in key 
decisions. 
8] Beneficiation Increased local value addition, 
Turning comparative 
advantage to competitive 
advantage. Shift from 
resource- to knowledge-based 
economy. 
More jobs in mining and 
secondary industries. 
Sector employs 6% of total SA labour 
force, but 25,OOO job losses by June 
2OO9 due to ‘global financial climate’. 
9] Reporting Reporting on progress on an 
annual basis, submit reports 
to DMR. 
37% have audited reports, only 11% 
submitted to DMR, many are not 
externally audited. 
DMR lacks coordinated mechanisms to 
monitor on an annual basis 

























Annex 2: The final Deed of Settlement entered into between Community representatives, Alexkor 
Ltd. and the Government of the Republic of South Africa  
Agreed on the 22 April in 2OO7, the Deed of Settlement included the following: 
 Compensation of 19OR million to compensate for diamonds removed by Alexkor. 
 Transfer of mining rights to the Richtersveld Community [whilst Alexkor Ltd. retains marine 
mining rights]. 
 Restoration of 84,OOO hectares of land to the Community. 
 A 49% share in the Company for the Community and the establishment of a Pooling and 
Sharing Joint Venture [PSJV]. 
 Transfer of Agricultural and Maricultural Assets to the Community through the Richtersveld 
Agricultural Holding Company.  
 A 5OR million development grant. 
 The ownership and management of Alexander Bay town, to be transferred over a period of 
ten years. 
 45 R million for Alexkor to continue to house its employees in Alexander Bay. 
 Four Companies established to administer the assets on behalf of the Community: an 
agricultural company to develop the farms; an environmental company to rehabilitate the 
land after mining; a property holding company responsible for renting out the houses in 
Alexander Bay and a mining company to administer the 49% share in Alexkor. 





























Annex 3:  De Beers’ Farms claimed by the Komaggas community, through the Karusab Committee 
and Legal Resources Centre. 
 
Number Name Title 
172 Kwakanna Kwakanab T7O76/1942 
173 Oubeep T7O76/1942 
176 Tweepad T7O76/1942 




183 Kaa Vlakte T7O76/1942 
184 Langhoogte T7O76/1942 
189 Ronde Vley 
Roodevlei 
T7O76/1942 
189/1 Ronde Vley Portions O,1 and 2 T7O76/1942 
T3O675/1979 
T3O675/1979 
188 Strydrivier T7O76/1942 
19O/1 
19O/3 
Predikant Vlei Portion 1L T15314/1942 De Beers 
19O/2 
19O/5 
Predikant Vlei T 3O675/1979 
192 Dreyerspan T7O76/1942 
193 Klein Zee 193/2 T13O2/1923; 193/3 
T12(O/1923; 193/4 T245/1928; 193/5 
T4964/1957 
194 Kleyne Zee T7O76/1942 
195 Dikgat T7O76/1942 
196 Doornfontein-wes T7O76/1942 
198 Staan Hoek T7O76/1942 
199 Nuttabooi T7O76/1942 
312 Kraaifontein 312/O T57O1O/1997; 312/1 
T12/1937 WWF; 312/2 T14/1937 
WWF 
316 Koutootjie T7O76/1942 
317 Pienaarsbult 317/O T92O67/2OO7; 317/1 
T9731/193O DBCM; 317/2 
T9732/193O DBCM 
318 Mara T11266/1946 De Beers; T7O76/1942 
De Beers 
319 Doornfontein Oos 319/O T7O76/1942; 319/1 
T374O/1959 
32O Kleinskaap kop T7O76/1942 






















322 Sandkop T7O76/1942 DBCM 
323 Goraap T7O76/1942 DBCM 
324 Kannabieduin T7O76/1942 DBCM 
325 Hondevlei T7O76/1942 DBCM 
326 Zonnekwa 326/O T412O1/2OO9; 326/1 
T566O6/2OO2 
327 Rooivlei 327/O T566O6/ 2OO2 ; 327/1 
T38975/1981 ; 327/2 T38975/1981 ; 
327/3 T566O6/2OO2  
328 Zonnekwa 328/O ; 328/1 T412O1/2OO9; 328/2 
T566O6/2OO2; 328/3 T566O6/2OO2 
33O Samson’s Bak T7O76/1943 De Beers 
332 Zwart Duinen T7O76/1942 De Beers 
333 Elands Klip T7O76/1942 De Beers 
337 Taaibosch Vlakte 337/O T83O3O/1999 WWF South 
Africa; 337/1 T596O/1981; 337/2 
T67135/2OO6 
338 Kameelboom Vley 338/O T83O3O/1999 WWF South 
Africa; 338/1 T67135/2OO6; 338/2 
T66562/1999; 338/3 T596O/1981 
339 Oubees T83O3O/1999 WWF South Africa 
34O Wilde Paardehoek T7549/2OO1 South African National 
Parks 
466 Kookfontein 466/O T75491/2OO1; 466/1 
T75491/2OO1 SANP; 466/3 
T75491/2OO1 SANP ; 466/4 
T75491/2OO1 SANP ; 466/5 
T75491/1999 SANP 
469 Sandvlei 469/O T18331/2OOO & 
T32694/2OO2 Local Authority, 
Namakwa District Municipality. 
47O Roodeklipheuvel 47O/O T77675/2OO5 SANP; 47O/1 
T83O3O/1999 WWF South Africa; 
47O/2 T115475/2OO3 SANP; 
T4O485/198O; 47O/4; 47O/5. 
472 Schulpfontein T7O76/1942 De Beers 
473 Noup T7O76/1942 De Beers 
474 Somnaas 474/O, T7O76/1942 De Beers 
474/1 T38OO1/1989 DBCM 
475 Koiignaas T7O76/1942 DBCM 
484 Zwartlintjies rivier T7O76/1942 De Beers 


















Annex 4: List of Interviews and Presentations 






1. Town Manager, 
Klienzee. 
 
De Beers Consolidated 
Mines (DBCM) 
Kleinzee 
 2. W. Oppel  
 
Department of 
Environment and Nature 
Conservation (DENC) 
Springbok 
 3. Namaqua National 
Park (NNP)Manager 
South African National  
Parks (SAN Parks) 
Skilpad, NNP 
 4. A. Niewoudt Local Resident and evictee 
from the Groen River 
estuary site 
At his home between 
Garies and the Groen 
River estuary 
 5. Mr and Mrs Mac 
Donald 
Residents permitted to 
retain occupancy of their 
home at the Groen River 
Estuary 
Groen River 





6. Namaqua National 
Park Manager 
SAN Parks Skilpad, NNP 
 7. Park Ranger, NNP 
coastal extension 
SAN Parks Groen River Office 
 8. Chairman and Others Hondeklip Bay Fisher 
Association 
Hondeklip Bay 
 9. R. Malan Overseer of crayfish sorting 
operations 
Crayfish Factory, Port 
Nolloth 
 1O Karusab Committee 
representatives 
Karusab Committee Komaggas 
 11. R. Newman Programme Manager for 
Namaqualand, 
Conservation South Africa 
(CSA) 
Springbok 
 12. C. Owner and Manager of 
Kleinzee Oyster Farm 
Kleinzee 
 13. E. Julius, Namakwa 
District Co-ordinator 
Department of Economic 
Development and Tourism 
Springbok 






De Beers Namaqualand 
Mines 
Presenting to the 
Marine and Coastal 
Educator’s Network 
Conference, 9-14 
January 2O11, Kleinzee 
 15. S. Frazee Director, Conservation 
South Africa (CSA) 
Presenting to the 
Marine and Coastal 
Educator’s Network 
Conference, 9-14 

















16. P. Carrick Professor of Botany and 
Director of Nurture, 
Restore, Innovate (NRI) 
University of Cape 
Town 
 17. H. Smith Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC) 
Cape Town 
February 2O11 18. G. Branch Professor of Marine Biology University of Cape 
Town 
March 2O11 19. S. Frazee Director, CSA  Telephone interview 






















Annex 5:  CSA & the Bench Mark Foundation (BMF) review of De Beers’ Namaqualand Mine Amended Environmental Management Programme Report 
(EMPR), submitted to the DMR in 2O11. 
 
The MPRDA(28 of 2OO2)requires that: mining lease holders ‘must as far as is reasonably practicable, rehabilitate the environment affected by prospecting 
or mining operations to its natural or predetermined state, or to a land use which conforms to the generally accepted principle of sustainable 
development’, (38(d).  
 
Sections 24.3 (b-d) and 39(1) also require that: mine operators conduct Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and submit Environmental Management 
Plans (EMPs) as well as Social and Labour Plans (SLPs) to the Department of Minerals and Energy (no  DMR) to be approved before mining leases will be 
granted or renewed. 
 
In their review of De Beers’ NM Amended EMPR, CSA and Bench Marks found the following: 
 
 
 Criteria for Responsible Practice Company Claims and Assessment of Action Recommendation 
2. Financial 
Quantum of the 
Liability 
The MPRDA requires companies to 
provide financial assurance to the level 
of environmental liability assessed 
De Beers have substantially underestimated their 
environmental liability, in order to minimise their 
costs. 
Costs externalised or avoided by the company will fall 
on future land owners and/or the state. 
A fully independent assessment of 






Quantum of the 
Liability 
Government Guiding Principles for 
Closure113 state that the ‘closure 
measures stipulated in the closure 
plan must limit the potential (not just 
actual) adverse effects of the closed 
mine site on the receiving 
environment, and to ensure that the 
quality of life of the surrounding mine 
No mine closure models are included in the Amended 
EMPR, nor have any of the outputs or results of 
models that may have been used been clearly 
included in the Amended EMPR. 
 
 Neither the models, nor their outputs, have been 
shared with stakeholders, IAPs (Interested and 
Affected Parties) or the public in general. It is thus not 
Full information regarding mine 
closure plans, including models used 
and their output should be included in 
the EMPR for public scrutiny and 
comment. Only with the inclusion of 
these models can the company’s 
adherence to Guiding Principles for 
Closure be assessed. 
                                                          
113 DME, Financial Quantum Guidelines, 2OO5.  ‘Guideline document for the evaluation of the quantum of closure-related 
















is not compromised after closure’. 
 
possible to evaluate the reliability of the models, the 
methodology and assumptions used in them, or their 
outputs to determine the extent to which the 










How components of the liability are 
quantified and spatially explicit 
information regarding different land 
use zones, including detailed 
information on areas that have been 
mined should be included in order to 
assess whether the mining company’s 
strategy will prove adequate. 
No information relating to this process has been 
included in the Amended EMPR or been made 
available in contradiction to the IAP policies and 
practices for ‘sufficient and accessible information to 
be provided to IAPs’. 
 
No closure cost models, plans or calculations are 
provided in the Amended EMPR itself. No maps are 
provided for the identified land use zones, or for any 
of the areas discussed in the Environmental 
Management Programme section and the Closure 
Liability Report.  
 
No measurements of area or other spatial information 
has been provided for any features or components of 
the mining areas. In fact, other than an indication of 
the total mining degraded area, no quantification of 
any items, activities or features are given in the 
Amended EMPR at all (e.g. areas or volumes of 
dumps, quantity of earth to be moved, distances of 
earth moving, number or distance of roads, areas 
needing ecological restoration, size of toxic soil areas 
etc.) 
CSA requested quantified information 
on land classes but were provided 
with numbers only of 1357 ha for pre-
198O areas and 1O25 ha for Fine 
Residue Deposit (FDR) and Coarse 
Residue Deposit (CRD) areas.  
 
CSA is unable to confirm these 
numbers as no spatial information is 
provided in the Amended EMP. 
 
 No other categories were provided 
and this information has not been 
made available in a transparent 








Where third party evaluations and 
specialist reports are mentioned, full 
information should be provided as to 
the methodologies used and the 
extent to which specialist input and 
recommendation has been adopted by 
Although the company mention use of mine closure 
cost  models compiled by consultants; subsequent 
adjustments and exclusions were made to third party 
consultant’s closure cost models by NM themselves. 
 
The company mention that the expert advice of an 
CSA & BM request a formal review by 
the NRI. 
 
Where specialist studies have been 
undertaken or the advice of third 



















the company. NRI ecological consultant has been used; but in 
response to queries by CSA, the NRI specialists were 
not involved in the development or review of the 
Amended EMP.  
NM’s approach appears to have been strongly biased 
towards an outcome that significantly lowers the cost 
of the liability, and it does not appear to follow a 
defined, consistent and objective methodology. 
  
In some cases the rational used to calculate the 
reduced cost is not based on generally accepted 
engineering or scientific principles, or on specific 
feasibility studies.  
 
No specialist studies (or the details thereof) are 
included in the Amended EMPR. The costs of specialist 
studies have been excluded from the closure cost 
estimate. 
 
Financial information, unit rates and any 
quantification of components of the liability is entirely 
lacking from the Amended EMPR available to IAPs. It is 
therefore not possible to evaluate the accuracy of the 
financial liability or any other quantification relating to 
the liability. Neither is it possible to evaluate the 
methodology that has been used to arrive at this 
quantification. 
should be clarified where the 
company have altered this input 
themselves, and reasons for the 
alteration.  
 
The company should use generally 
accepted engineering or scientific 
principles or specific feasibility 
studies, in order to outline a 
consistent and objective 
methodology.  
 
Calculation methodology and 
information used to make calculations 
should be made explicit in the publicly 
available EMPR. 
 
Where specialist studies will be 
undertaken, these must be factored 






Biodiversity specialists within SAs 
National Biodiversity Institute 
recommend extensive EIA and 
consultation discussions for land-use 
decision-making in all Critical 
Biodiversity Areas (CBAs) as identified 
The methods recommended in the Amended EMPR 
will not be able to achieve the restoration to the level 
required by the MPRDA. 
 
Some of the approaches will simply not achieve the 
stated outcomes, and are unsound environmental 
Restoration and rehabilitation 
measures and post-mining land use 
plans for the Namaqualand Mines 
territory, considered part of a fragile 
ecosystem and Critical Biodiversity 















in Bioregional Plans defined by the 
Biodiversity Act (2OO5) under NEMA.  
 
Application of a standard practice 
spatially mapped restoration index 
and map is essential for enhancing 
understanding, application, and 
compliance monitoring by DMR of the 
restoration process required by the 
new mine owner. 
practices (i.e. negligence of the mines environmental 
responsibility). 
 
However, the biggest weakness in the Amended EMPR 
is the complete lack of spatial information and quanta 
relating to the components and practices of 
rehabilitation discussed. 
involve extensive expert and public 
consultation discussion. 
 
The company need to use a standard 
practice spatially mapped restoration 
index and map; and budget for best 
possible practice of environmental 
restoration, in order to facilitate 
compliance by the new mine owner 
and monitoring by the DMR.  





All salt-treated and compacted roads 
comprise and unsuitable growth 
medium for plants and will not be 
environmentally sustainable unless 
they are removed (and the soils buried 
in voids). 
 
The road network on all diamond 
mining operations including NM is 
extensive and saline treated road 
create potential future secondary 
impact liabilities in adjacent areas. 
 
 
In the EMP a full remediation treatment in envisaged 
for all haul and access roads. 
 
In the Closure Liability Report, some treatments are 
only envisaged for a portion of the roads, and others 
treatments have been removed entirely. 
 
Allowance made is only for treating 1O% of soils to 
alleviate salinity. NM road network is extensive and 
saline treated road create potential future secondary 
impact liabilities in adjacent areas. 
 
No allowance has been made for covering the roads 
with growth medium or for establishment of 
vegetation where the road disturbed area is wider 
than 5O m. 
The roads and their restoration is 
significant and a public consultation 
process should be implemented to 
determine which roads will improve 
community livelihoods and which 
should be restored to prior land use. 
 
For all roads that are to be removed, 
soils must be treated and buried. 
Cleared areas should be re-vegetated. 
 
4.2  Plants and 
Infrastructure 
 
DME Financial Quantum Guidelines 
(2OO5) stipulate that, “With the 
determination of the quantum for 
closure it must be assumed that the 
mine infrastructure has no salvage 
value. This is necessary as it is often 
difficult to determine the salvage 
The Amended EMPR assumes the removal of the 
redundant plant infrastructure is ‘cost neutral’ as the 
salvage value of the materials is sufficient to offset the 
costs of dismantling and removal by a contractor. But 
no formal arrangement exists covering demolition of 
the mine infrastructure and the payment to be 
received. 
Full costs of removal and disposal of 
plants and infrastructure must be 















value for the infrastructure. However, 
salvage value can be off-set if the mine 
can demonstrate that a formal 
arrangement exists covering 
demolition of the mine infrastructure 
and the payment to be received.” 
 
There is no evidence that removal of infrastructure 
and rehabilitation activities and costs, which would be 
significant in this case, have been factored into the 










According to established practice, 
CRDs do not need to be rehabilitated 
as they do not normally lead to 
significant secondary degradation. 
However, FRDs do require substantial 
management as they: a) do not 
constitute a natural substrate for the 
establishment of plants or natural 
ecosystems; b)they are frequently 
massive in terms of surface area; and 
c)they are not stable to the force of 
wind, and can constitute the single 
most toxic substrate to plant and 
ecosystem establishment in typical 
surface diamond mining operations on 
the west coast. Failure to manage 
FDRs could mean contravention of 
NEMA, the Water Act and Air Quality 
Act.114 
 
The Closure Liability Report indicates that for CRDs no 
action other than to fence off the tailings is envisaged. 
 
The company state that, FRDs ‘are stable, but 
provision is made for the netting of areas which may 
be affected by dust plumes in extreme cases’. This is 
misleading as dust plumes are clearly already evident, 
and have been netted, at a number of FRDs at NM.  
 
The problem at present is relatively minor as the most 
of fine material are not liberated from the FRDs as 
these remain wet. Once the FRDs dry out, netting will 








The standard procedure to cap FRDs is 
to cover the surface with CRDs or 
other gravel. This stabilizes the 
FRD substrate to environmental 
forces, i.e. it is effective in preventing 
wind transport of the substrate. 
 
This form of intervention has been 
successfully undertaken at a number 
of mining operations on the west 
coast. 
 
In the past ten years other mining 
operators on the west coast have 
been compelled by legal action to cap 
their FRDs in this way in order to limit 
further secondary degradation to 
natural areas. 
 
                                                          
114 According to the Air Quality Act (39 of 2OO4), communities are to be protected from air pollution by ‘providing reasonable measures for the prevention of pollution and 
ecological degradation’ (Mohamed, 2OO6, p. 35). Specifically in relation to mine closure, the Act requires that within 5 years prior to cessation of the mine, the owner must 
notify the Minister of DEAT of post-mining rehabilitation plans and measures to prevent atmospheric dust pollution, which must use the ‘best practicable means’ (ibid). 
Meanwhile, the Water Act (36 of 1998) should ensure that the owner or person in control of a water resource has the responsibility of avoiding pollution of the water 
















Standard procedure is to cap FRDs is 
to cover the surface with CRDs or 
other gravel to prevent wind erosion. 
 
Devastating environmental impacts 
will occur wherever fine tailings 
materials have been pumped, whether 
into dedicated tailings facilities or 
simply onto old mined out areas or 
natural pans. 
 
There can be substantial leakage of 
seawater from both CRDs and FRDs 
into the surrounding landscape, and 
this can significantly increase the 
impacted footprint area of these 
facilities possibly necessitating 
restoration or 





Information on areas where fine tailings have been 
dumped into old mined areas and natural pans, and 
references to the size of tailings facilities or discharge 
areas, included in a 2OO4 EMP, have been excluded 
from the Amended EMPR. More comprehensive 
rehabilitation procedures mentioned in the 2OO4 






This pollution is only obliquely mentioned in the 
Amended EMPR, 2O11, and is not mentioned in the 
Closure Liability Report. The Bench Mark report (van 
Wyk et al., 2OO9) presents a study in which potential 
human health may be impacted from water sources 




The 2OO4 EMP outlined a more 
thorough and ecologically-informed 
approach to management of FRDs.  
The 2O11 EMPR approach is wholly 








Further studies need to be done to 
ascertain secondary environmental 
degradation from seawater leakage 










A proper assessment of ecological 
stability is required to ensure 
degraded lands do not trigger 
secondary disturbance and leave 
massive environmental and livelihood 
 There is very little information about ecologically 
restored and naturally vegetated areas, and no 
indication of the areas or extent involved.  
 
It is indicated both that these areas have been 
The DMR must follow up on company 
claims that ‘ecological sign-off is done 
in collaboration with an external 
specialist west coast ecologist’, and 
that ‘areas have been fully reclaimed 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
required to submit Environmental Management Programme Reports to the Department of Water Affairs, and their management programme should involve systems and 
structures of water use that avoid contamination of clean water systems with polluted water, that will remain functional for at least 5O years subsequent to mine closure 
















impacts to adjacent communities who 
will seek to graze livestock on this land 
in the future. 
 
Current good practice for mine closure 
involves developing a post-mining 
land-use plan, and evaluating all 
rehabilitation criteria in that context. 
 
 
removed from the closure costing, and that 
allowances have been made for supplementing these 
areas by establishing vegetation pockets, which is 
contradictory. 
 
No information is given as to what criteria have been 
used to determine whether areas are sufficiently 
naturally vegetated and whether they are 
environmentally sustainable, or whether this has been 
independently evaluated. 
 
The major post-mining land-uses outlined in the 
Amended EMPR, have not been vetted by IAPs who 
will be left with this as their end land use plan. 
and signed off by the mine’, to ensure 
that the state is not left with future 


























A highly developed ecological 
approach to rehabilitation could 
involve the establishment of 
numerous pockets of vegetation 
across the disturbed areas that can 
spread by natural dispersal and 
succession to fill in the open areas 
between them. However, a detailed 
assessment of the areas required to be 
re-vegetated to create self-sustaining 









Restoration activities have and can 
continue to provide significant jobs. 
 
 
Despite outlining an ecological-informed approach to 
rehabilitation in an appendix to the report, the 
company’s intention in the Closure Liability Report to 
only re-establish vegetation on half of each disturbed 
area in the hope that the other half will re-vegetate by 
natural spreading is ‘wishful’, as vegetation in the 
Namaqualand region does not simply spread to un-
vegetated areas and, in fact, bare areas create a risk 
for adjacent vegetated areas due to the burying 
impacts of high winds and sandy soils. 
 
The Rehabilitation and Restoration Procedure outlines 
methods for netting, restoration packs, transplants 
and broadcast seeding but only netting and 
restoration packs appear to be included in the unit 
rates of the closure cost model which would result in 
insufficient funding calculations for restoration. 
 
 
The opportunity for creating employment from 
environmental rehabilitation efforts is now being lost 
th ough the approach outlined in the Amended EMPR. 
 
 
Stipulations fail to adhere to basic 
ecological principles for restoration 
and, not only should be considered 
inadequate under the MPRDA, but 
should also be seen as something 
contrary to the National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (2O1O) and 
other legislation that South Africa has 
instituted to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals to alleviate 
poverty and restore degraded 
ecosystems. 
 
All rehabilitation and restoration 
procedures must be accounted for in 
mine closure model calculations. 
 
A more substantial and ecologically 
appropriate commitment to re-
vegetation and ecological restoration 
is required. This could also benefit 
local communities through creating 




Alternative land uses must be given 
governmental permission, following 
consultation with IAPs, and with proof 
that adequate financial provisions 




Current good practice for costing mine 
A correctional facility, marine aquaculture, wind 
energy (electricity generating turbines) and a 
hazardous waste disposal site are indicated to be in 
progression towards alternative land uses in the 
mining areas. These alternative land use areas have 
been removed from the liability cost, though there is 
little publicly available information of the progression 
of the correctional facility and the hazardous waste 
site.  
DMR must ensure that these areas are 
properly provisioned for and that a full 
public participation process on this 
matter will be required as per 



















closure involves clearly defining the 
post-mining land use or land uses, 
then planning the process and steps 
that need to be followed in order to 








Feasibility studies undertaken by 
specialists should be undertaken to 
determine technical feasibility and 
potential social and environmental 
impacts of development projects. 
 
The removal of the correctional facility and BMC 
hazardous waste site from the closure cost model  
contradicts De Beers correspondence that ‘the area 
under consideration has not been excluded from 
liability calculations and as per discussions with the 
DMR will only be excluded from future EMP 
amendments once the projects have been approved 
by the authorities and implemented’ (April 2O11). 
 
 
No information is presented in the Amended EMPR as 
to the size of alternative land use areas but indications 
are that the area is significant. 
 
 
 It is unclear whether revenues from sale or lease of 
land will be used as a contribution to the wider 
liability of the mine either its restoration or to social 
development. 
 
The length of time for the development of these new 
enterprises is not indicated and information on how 
this relates to the anticipated life of mine by 2O23 and 
the associated transition plan has not been provided 
to IAPs.  
 
No technical reports have been included in the draft 
EMPR provided to CSA. 
Earthmoving costs to establish 
alternative land use facilities may be 
greater than the earthmoving 
required to modify slopes in order to 
rehabilitate. This cost may be passed 
on to the developer of the project 
rather than born by the mine. But 
assurance of this must be agreed 
before the mine can cede this liability. 
 
This information should be provided in 
the ongoing public consultation on the 
EMP to determine the ultimate 
optimal end land use. 
 
Revenues from sale and lease of land 
could contribute to meeting social and 




A number of technical reports are 
needed to ensure the feasibility of 
these projects, and in particular, the 
hazardous waste disposal site.  
 





In addition to any obligations that may 
have existed under governing 
legislation and regulation prior to 
 
The draft Amended EMPR states that liability for 
rehabilitation is limited to those operations that took 
place after the coming into effect of the amendment 
 
The mining company has a legal 
obligation to address pre-198O mining 















198O, section 28 of NEMA115 , DBCM, 
or any subsequent right holder, has an 
obligation to take measures to 
remediate environmental degradation 
even if it was caused prior to the 
legislation coming into effect. 
 
to the Regulations to the Mines and Works Act on 21 
March 
198O. The claim in the draft Amended EMPR 






the company has a retrospective duty 
to ‘minimise and rectify such pollution 
or degradation to the environment’ (s. 
28).  
Otherwise, the company could be 
prosecuted for infringing 
environmental rights and the rights of 
local communities to ‘an environment 
that is not harmful to their health and 
well-being’ (NEMA 1998, preamble). 





Earth Moving and Profiling are by far 
the largest and most costly 
components of mine’s rehabilitation 
liability. 
 
Where slopes of mine dumps and pits 
are too steep, serious erosion can 
occur, prohibiting re-establishment of 
vegetation and leading to secondary 
degradation and pollution. 
Information concerning these activities and costs 
amounts to less than one page in the entire Amended 
EMPR. Specifics, quanta and assumptions relating to 
earth moving, profiling and their models are 
hopelessly inadequate.  
 
The stated aim of earth moving is to: stabilize slopes 
and 
prevent erosion by shaping and contouring to emulate 
the natural stable land forms which will provide 
suitable conditions for sustaining vegetation. A 
‘dedicated reclamation model’ was reportedly used in 
2OO7 to determine the volume of material that will 
have to be moved across the full mine site. 
However, many deductions have been made to unit 
cost rates, and that assumptions and approaches have 
been changed from those in the specialist model. 
 
An application of the precautionary 
principle and financial provisioning for 
the prior model, informed by expert 
advice, should be instituted until such 
time as further research has provided 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
Adequate financial provision for earth 
moving and profiling across the whole 
mine site must be made in order to 
meet legal requirements and 
standards of best practice. 
                                                          
115 NEMA (Act 1O7 of 1998) creates a retrospective duty of care and remediation for environmental damage. Section 28(1) provides that “Every person who 
causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or degradation of the environment must take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or 
degradation from occurring, continuing or recurring or ....” S.28 (1A) provides that this obligation also applies to significant pollution or degradation that 

















It is stated that “Generally slopes will be profiled to a 
gradient of 1:3 and 1:5 where required”. Though no 
natural stable sand systems on the west coast have 
land forms with a slope as steep as 1:3. Many, if not 
most, mine overburden slopes and dumps of this 
angle on the west coast show deep erosion scars and 
extremely little re-vegetation. 
 
This model is very unlikely to comply with the 
standard for rehabilitation set in the MPRDA. 





Minimum Financial Liability of the 
mine can be calculated using the DME 
Financial Quantum Guidelines to meet 
the MPRDA standard for restoration. 
Accurate information regarding 
disturbed (mined) areas and estimated 
rehabilitation costs is required. 
 
 
No attempt to calculate liability of NM is made in the 
EMPR. The only figures given are for the total area 
estimated to be disturbed by mining. 
 
In the Amended EMPR the combined total mining 
licence area (i.e. the six rights together) is given, on 
the first page of the report, as 97 OOO ha, and the 
total mining disturbed area as approximately 1O OOO 
ha. However, the combined areas of the three licence 
areas given individually in Amended EMPRs indicate a 
total disturbed area (actual area mined) of over 17 
OOO ha.  
 
The company must give accurate   
information about the areas disturbed 
by mining, not understate their 
environmental impacts. 
 
Using the DME Financial Quantum 
Guidelines, and the company’s own 
stated commitments, CSA’s 
conservative estimate of NM 
minimum liability for restoration is:  
R 738,094,742.  
 
Any difference between this figure 
and that submitted to the DMR 
without expert review and auditing 
should be considered a risk to the 
state, if the changes and 
considerations made in this review are 
not incorporated and reflected in the 
Amended EMPR. 
5. Lack of 
Stakeholder 
Interested and Affected Parties (IAPs) 
should be involved through 
Stakeholder engagement for the draft Amended 
EMPR has been virtually non-existent and “sufficient 
More substantial stakeholder 



















stakeholder engagement and 
consultative processes, in order to 
ensure plans for mine closure and/or 
sale are transparent and 
democratically accountable.  
 
IAPs should be provided with 
‘sufficient and accessible information’ 
and invited to comment on and have 
input on EMPRs, Social Labour Plans, 
and plans for Mine Closure and 
alternative land uses, before these 
documents are finalised and accepted 
by government.  
 
It is standard practice in public 
consultation for any environmental 
authorisation is to make documents 
available at a number of different 
venues, as well as on a website for 
download. 
 
IAPs must have adequate time and 
notice to enable them to contribute 
meaningfully to the process. 
 
The interests of IAPs should be 
incorporated into the relevant plans. 
and accessible information” has not been provided to 
the IAPs.  
 
The public meeting held in ‘early 2O11’ was held on 1 
February 2O11, after the draft Amended EMPR was 
generated, according to the date provided. Copies of 
the draft Amended EMPR were not available at this 
meeting and participants were informed that it was 
not a consultation on any formal process but rather an 
opportunity for De Beers to share information on their 
sale plan. 
 
There was less than one week between notification of 
the meeting and the meeting itself, giving insufficient 
notice to many stakeholders. 
 
The draft Amended EMPR documents were only 
available at one urban location (Springbok library), 
and were thus inaccessible to many affected 
communities (e.g. Hondeklip Bay). 
 
 
The Amended EMPR also fails to ‘maximise the socio-
economic benefit related to mine closure’ by reducing 
employment opportunities available for the creation 




required, wherein sufficient, 
accessible and accurate information 
should be provided, and made 
available in a number of suitable 
locations and online. 
 
IAPs should be invited to contribute to 
EMPR, Social Labour Plans and plans 
for Mine Closure and/or sale of mining 
rights, as well as post-mining 
development projects. Their interests 
should be taken into account, as well 




IAPs should be given adequate notice 
about their opportunities to 
contribute and the occurrence of 
public meetings.  
 
  
  
 
 
